Weapons and Hope

Prompted by the entry into force of the African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba) on July 15^th, Dr. Jeffrey Lewis of ArmsControlWonk posted a fascinating piece yesterday that delves into the significance of Nuclear Weapon Free Zones and probes into the intricacies of negative security assurances, particularly as employed by the U.S.  He concludes that U.S. negative security assurances, because of their inclusion of exceptional “belligerent reprisal” clauses, today prove to be “anachronistic” and perhaps counterproductive to their underlying purpose of enforcing peaceful activities.  I agree and would like to expound upon Dr. Lewis’s perspective.

The Basics of Negative Security Assurances

Negative security assurances are legally binding commitments by nuclear weapon states (NWS) to not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS).  These assurances are generally established in the context of overarching nuclear treaties, such as the regional African Treaty of Pelindaba, or under the authority of the United Nations.  Negative security assurances are an important counterpart to positive security assurances.  Positive security assurances are iterated clearly in their originating document, UN Security Council Resolution 255 of 1968, which upholds the commitment of the five NWS (who make up the permanent members of the UN Security Council) to:

provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the [United Nations] charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the [NPT] that is a victim of an act or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.

UNSC 255 essentially establishes a sort of nuclear League of Nations.

Employed in concert, positive and negative security assurances are intended to thwart nuclear aggression, enhance the confidence of NNWS in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and thereby contribute to the nonproliferation regime.  See here for more information on security assurances.  As both tools of principle and confidence-building devices aimed at promoting general nuclear peace and nonproliferation, negative security assurances gain their strength and authority as unequivocal pledges to withhold the use of nuclear weapons.  As the nonproliferation regime is a system of not only laws but also norms and voluntary willingness, it is important that negative security assurances are unequivocal in order to maintain confidence in the nonproliferation regime and the credibility of pledges by the NWS.

The Problem with U.S. Negative Security Assurances: The WMD Conflation

Unfortunately, negative security assurances employed by the U.S. are not unequivocal.  The U.S. has adopted a policy of “strategic ambiguity,” which a release by the Arms Control Association explains:

Despite the “negative security assurances” pledge, the United States has not ruled out the use of nuclear weapons in response to attacks with chemical or biological weapons. The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), for example, maintains the possibility that U.S. nuclear forces may be used to counter threats from non-nuclear adversaries. In addition to China, an NPT nuclear-weapon state, the NPR cites five non-nuclear-weapon states (Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Syria) as driving “requirements for nuclear strike capabilities.” While all five states were suspected of pursuing nuclear weapons, none of the five at that time had demonstrated possessing such a capability. All five, however, were believed to have biological and/or chemical weapons or programs. The NPR also stated that “nuclear weapons could be employed against targets able to withstand non-nuclear attack, (for example, deep underground bunkers or bio-weapon facilities).”

Test of a Trident Nuclear Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile

The doctrine of “strategic ambiguity” in the way that it is employed by the U.S. is intertwined with the conflation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons under the umbrella genre of weapons of mass destruction.  As we know, ‘WMD’ has made its way into the most basic levels of vocabulary.  The term WMD is certainly useful for the purpose of understanding the extraordinary scope of danger that nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons present, in contrast to conventional weapons.  However, dealing with these three classes of weapons as a single group also contributes to general misconceptualizations, reductionism, of each class’s distinctions.  It undermines the need to shape policies that properly deal with the real-life contexts of each class of weaponry.

This is the case in terms of U.S. negative security assurances.  The conflation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons as WMD has led to the addition of exceptional “belligerent reprisal” clauses to U.S. negative security assurances: the U.S. reserves the right to U.S. nuclear weapons against NNWS if they employ chemical or biological weapons.  Dr. Lewis points out this phenomenon in the context of individual treaties as well as in the context of the overarching U.S. Negative Security Assurance policy issued in 1995 and reaffirmed in 2002.

For example, in the context of the Treaty of Pelindaba, which includes protocols for non-African states to sign onto to promote greater confidence and inclusion, the Clinton administration adopted what Dr. Lewis calls a “commitment [that] is not actually a commitment”:

Under Protocol I, which we signed, each party pledges not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any ANFZ party. However, Protocol I will not limit options available to the United States in response to an attack by an ANFZ party using weapons of mass destruction.

The Arms Control Association points out that this “belligerent reprisal” exception is a part of overarching U.S. policy, as opposed to just in the purview of individual treaties:

Signed in September 2002, National Security Presidential Directive 17 took an apparent step toward making nuclear retaliation to the use of any WMD official U.S. policy. The secret directive, portions of which were leaked, stated, “the United States will continue to make clear that it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force—including potentially nuclear weapons—to the use of WMD against the United States, our forces abroad, and friends and allies.” A subsequent unclassified version, known as the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, was not as explicit, substituting “including through resort to all of our options” for “including potentially nuclear weapons.”

Are our Claims to Retaliation Rights Helpful or Unhelpful?

Dr. Lewis thinks not, and he shares some fascinating words of wisdom that must be quoted here:

I wonder, however, about the wisdom of to invoking the possibility of belligerent reprisal too often in our public policy prouncements.

After all, nuclear weapons exist — a physical manifestation of the option to use them that seems rather more impressive than a paper pledge not to. (Think of “speak softly and carry a big stick.”)

and…

It seems to me that our nuclear options are too plausible, to the point where the interesting public policy challenge is too make credible the forgotten half of deterrence as articulated by Schelling — the promise to refrain:

“We have learned the threat of massive destruction deters only if there is a corresponding implicit promise of nondestruction in the event he complies …”

In his opinion it is time to revise the U.S. Negative Security Assurance—that is, make it more like a true Negative Security Assurance—which is something that could happen in an upcoming special session of the UN Security Council chaired by President Obama.

Strengthening the Nonproliferation Regime

The U.S. continues to try to make the case to all new and suspected nuclear proliferator countries that their security is actually enhanced by not pursuing and by not possessing nuclear weapons.  However, with exceptions to our negative security assurances that seem to continue to get looser, it may appear to other countries that the only true way to deter the U.S. is through the classical deterrence model: possess one’s own nuclear weapons.  Loose ambiguity undermines, as Dr. Lewis points out, the important “promise to refrain” that solidifies effective global deterrence.  Such a trend is increasingly worrisome as the WMD umbrella genre constantly seems like it is in the process of expansion.  NBC (Nuclear, Biological, Chemical) became CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear).  And then, recently, CBRN became CBRNE to include high-yield explosives.  As of January 8, 2008, U.S.C. federal law considers as a weapon of mass destruction “any destructive device as defined in section 921 of Title 18,” where “destructive devices” are defined as:

(A) any explosive, incendiary, or poison gas—

(i) bomb,

(ii) grenade,

(iii) rocket having a propellant charge of more than four ounces,

(iv) missile having an explosive or incendiary charge of more than one-quarter ounce,

(v) mine, or

(vi) device similar to any of the devices described in the preceding clauses;

See here and here

Now, this does not mean that the U.S. will respond to use of grenades in an international war with nuclear retaliation.  However, the conflation of terms seems unwarranted.  Such ambiguity, as expressed by loosening WMD definitions and exceptions to negative security assurances, could certainly be a reasonable cause of anxiety, concern, and fear on the part of other nations.  Some would argue that it is a good thing for your adversaries to fear you.  However, in an age of nuclear proliferation and market-technological globalization, fear is not productive.  Official inclusion of and constant lip service to an ambiguous belligerent reprisal privilege aids in making other nations paranoid about U.S. influence in the world—or at least gives other nations a useful excuse to pretend to feel paranoid—and such paranoia carries the possibility of resulting in the pursuit of nuclear weapons, as with North Korea.

It is a basic concept in the most widely accepted tradition of international relations theory, realism, that fear is one of the fundamental causes of conflict.  Leading realist scholar John J. Mearsheimer notes realism’s five foundational assumptions about the international system:

the international system is anarchic

states inherently possess some offensive military capability

states can never be certain about the intentions of other states

the most basic motive driving states is survival

states think strategically about how to survive in the international system (Mearsheimer, International Security 13 (3), 1994, pg. 10)

Fear results from natural competition between self-driven states and the impossibility of transparency in an anarchic international system.  However, theorists in the school of international liberalism believe there are ways to mitigate, and hypothetically eliminate, these base causes of tension.  In the context of the nonproliferation regime, such mitigation is aided by unequivocal negative security assurances.  Such a policy is certainly less morally ambiguous.  And to those who believe that such a change may display a softness that threatens national security, remember Dr. Lewis’s words: “After all, nuclear weapons exist — a physical manifestation of the option to use them that seems rather more impressive than a paper pledge not to.”  No nation on earth would forget that.

Back to Deterrence 101: Is the Ambiguous Negative Security Assurance Credible?

According to the very basics of the theory, in order for nuclear deterrence to be successful, the following two criteria must be met: 1) the threat must be sufficiently unacceptable and 2) the threat must be sufficiently credible.  Given the proper technical capacities, the first criterion is generally easier to meet, as it simply requires a threat.  The second criterion is trickier, as it is tied to the unverifiable realm of motives.  Ambiguity in U.S. negative security assurances is designed as an element of nuclear deterrence.  However, it is unclear that such ambiguity, as mere rhetoric, is even effective.  In fact, it is likely to be counterproductive.

Although the U.S. position is one of ‘reserving a right,’ by emphasizing belligerent reprisal in official stances and in public declarations, the U.S. seems to be committing itself to employment of this right if circumstances warrant it according to the policy.  This is the result of deterrence criterion number two: the threat must be sufficiently credible.  In order for the threat of belligerent reprisal in the wake of ‘WMD’ use to be credible, the U.S. would need to display its credibility.  That is, the U.S. would be committed on the principles of deterrence—in order to maintain and solidify the effectiveness of deterrence—to employ nuclear retaliation.  Otherwise, the credibility of that specific deterrent would be lost, and it would no longer be an effective deterrent.  Such a situation would not only undermine the credibility of the ambiguous belligerent reprisal deterrent, but it could also undermine the credibility of overall U.S. deterrence policy, or even the credibility of the U.S. word.  Essentially, the dangers of our currently ambiguous Negative Security Assurance policy outweigh its benefits.  It is unclear that its benefit, as a deterrent, is at all effective.

A Dangerous Paradox

This situation is similar to the “central paradox of assured destruction” described by Freeman Dyson in Weapons and Hope:

The great conceptual advantage of the assured destruction strategy is that it does not require us to believe in the feasibility of actually fighting a nuclear war.  The purpose of assured destruction weapons is only to prevent nuclear war, not to fight it.  The weapons achieve their purpose by not being used.  The assured destruction strategist is not supposed to worry about what happens if the weapons are used.  When we threaten to use weapons of assured destruction, our threat depends for its credibility upon our not worrying about the consequences.  This is the central paradox of assured destruction.  Its success requires us to blind ourselves deliberately to the consequences of its failure. (Freeman Dyson, Weapons and Hope, pg. 247)

To be fair, the belligerent reprisal clause in the U.S. Negative Security Assurance policy is not a function of assured destruction; it does not pledge to retaliate unconditionally.  Moreover, retaliation would more likely come in the form of tactical nuclear weapons rather than an apocalyptic rain of strategic nuclear weapons.  However, as explained, the openness to retaliate is meant to deter the use of WMD aggression, and if WMD aggression were perpetrated, deterrence would only be effective if that retaliation took place.  Therefore, the paradox of our ambiguity stance is this: for true adherents of deterrence, who are many in top policy and military positions, openness to retaliate is in fact the commitment to retaliate.  The supposed “ambiguity” of the stance is another situation that “requires us to blind ourselves deliberately to the consequences of its failure.”