Weapons and Hope

Over the past couple of weeks, India and Pakistan have come into the nuclear limelight.  Iran and North Korea have become staples to be expected almost daily.  The U.S. and Russia are veteran role players that come as no surprise when featured in nuclear media.  China seems to get involved regularly on the nuclear media stage as it is one of the five official nuclear weapon states, but they are pragmatically careful to avoid incitements and political drama.  In contrast, India and Pakistan bring a unique set of challenges to the nuclear security and nonproliferation table because of their unique status as unofficial nuclear weapons states—that is, they are proven nuclear powers but are outside of the authority of the NPT.  In the scope of this status, they (along with Israel) represent one of the critical frontiers of the global nonproliferation challenge.  Paying heed to their nuclear involvements, agendas, and rhetoric is of crucial importance.

The last few weeks have seen several noteworthy nuclear news items from the South Asian rivals, including: India’s announcement (perhaps premature) of its new nuclear submarines, Pakistan’s ambivalent responses to this announcement, Pakistan’s obstruction of breakthrough progress in the Conference on Disarmament, and renouncement of the CTBT by a top India nuclear physicist.  It is vital that the challenges of South Asia are not simply swept to the side as the world focuses on Iran and North Korea.  Once the Iran and North Korea crises are hypothetically (and hopefully) resolved, India and Pakistan will remain central to the dynamics of the global nonproliferation regime.  Their impact is distinctive, because as non-members of the NPT, it can be interpreted that they are technically outside of the nonproliferation regime.  However, though they do not participate in the NPT, India and Pakistan are nonetheless being increasingly pulled into the global politics of the overarching nonproliferation regime, thus rendering their nuclear decisions as issues of increasing global importance.

Indian External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee and U.S. Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice After Signing the Bilateral Civil Nuclear Deal in October 2008

The U.S. seems to be the key player in bringing India and Pakistan into the fold, as it has pursued strong ties with both India and Pakistan.  Perhaps the most significant event was the final establishment of a U.S.-India civil nuclear partnership last summer/fall.  It was an unprecedented deal, effectively breaking the U.S. moratorium on nuclear trade with India that had existed for thirty years, and bringing the U.S. into the company of an unofficial nuclear power previously considered a nuclear renegade.  There was great opposition to the proposal for the deal both worldwide and within the U.S., but after three years of diplomatic, technical, and political processes—the U.S. had to amend domestic law, India had to implement a separation in their civil and military nuclear programs, India had to make extensive safeguard arrangements with the IAEA, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) had to build the consensus to make an exception for the non-NPT India—the partnership finally came to fruition.  See the CFR’s backgrounder for a good summary.

One of the interesting surprises of this deal was Nobel Peace Prize winner IAEA Director Mohamed ElBaradei’s support for it.  Despite the regular tension between ElBaradei and U.S. policies (see here), despite the fact that the deal was a bilateral accord between the U.S. and a country known to have been avoiding the nonproliferation regime, and despite ElBaradei’s passionate commitment to averting nuclear proliferation, ElBaradei threw his full support behind the deal.  There are two primary grounds on which the deal was opposed.  The first 1), global in scope, was that the deal would contribute to nuclear proliferation by a) providing India with nuclear fuel that it could divert towards its weapons program and b) projecting a delegitimizing effect on the nonproliferation regime by rewarding India despite its shunning of the NPT.  The second 2), regional in scope, was that the deal would ultimately intensify the nuclear rivalry between India and Pakistan and contribute to a destabilizing arms race.  After all, China pledged that it would establish a corresponding partnership with Pakistan if the U.S.-India deal came through.  Nonetheless, ElBaradei felt that these problems were outweighed by the advantages of the deal.

ElBaradei was able to provide a comprehensive explanation of his unexpected position on the U.S.-India civil nuclear deal during a public conversation with Scott Sagan at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies in May 2006.  He explained this deal as an example of an innovative method of dealing with the intricate realities of global nuclear challenges.  By creating a partnership with India, the U.S. effectively filled in a critical gap in the nonproliferation regime; the U.S. brought India finally into the fold, an event that was long overdue.

ElBaradei emphasizes that we must remember the reality of India’s status: it made a sovereign decision to refrain from joining the NPT because of its own security concerns, and it became a nuclear power outside of the bounds of the NPT.  It possesses nuclear weapons, and thus, a civil nuclear deal with India will not affect its weapon status.  Instead, such a deal has brought India into compliance with other aspects of the nonproliferation regime despite not being a party to the NPT: India has permanently separated its nuclear civil energy and weapons programs, has established cooperation with the IAEA safeguard and inspection regimes, and enhanced the public and international accountability of India’s overall nuclear program.  According to ElBaradei, the U.S.-India partnership is a creative way of dealing with the reality of India’s complicated nuclear status.  Moreover, such a deal helps to address India’s need for energy to promote development.  ElBaradei explained: “From a safety, security, and nonproliferation standpoint, I see that agreement as a win-win for everyone.”  ElBaradei, of course, has a soft spot for the energy-development argument.

Technically speaking, the U.S.-India partnership should not be seen as negatively impacting the nonproliferation regime because, by shunning the NPT, India never officially joined the nonproliferation regime, and no one can expect India to ever join the NPT.  Nonetheless, a more accurate understanding of the nonproliferation regime is perhaps one that views it more broadly—that is, as a global system of norms and ideas that transcend a single treaty.  In that sense, the appearance that India is being rewarded despite neglecting the authority of the NPT is in fact damaging to the system of mutual confidence that drives the nonproliferation regime.  Nonproliferation efforts require diplomatic finesse and political symbolism as much as they do technical fixes and international laws.  How can India be rewarded with such a fantastic bilateral nuclear partnership even though it has been a longstanding pariah to the NPT?

If India can have such a great deal, perhaps it is incumbent upon the five NWS and the IAEA to do a better job facilitating for nuclear energy partnerships for all countries around the world, most of which have actually joined the NPT and are thus assured of access to nuclear energy.  However, herein lies one of the big paradoxes of the nuclear nonproliferation agenda.  In order to maintain adherence to the NPT and confidence in the nonproliferation regime, the IAEA and five NWS have the duty to aid other nations in the developing of their own nuclear energy capabilities, provided that the other nations agree to safeguards and monitoring.  However, it is also through these nuclear energy programs that proliferation of nuclear weapon capabilities is facilitated.  This may occur through a nation’s intentional strategic plan to begin an energy program as a front for an eventual weapons program.  Or more likely, the development of a nuclear energy program may render a nation into what ElBaradei calls a virtual nuclear power, or a latent nuclear power—that is, a nation that does not possess nuclear weapons but possesses the expertise, components, technology, and knowledge required to produce nuclear weapons in a very short period of time if an occasion for demand ever arises.  The limiting factor for the transition from a virtual nuclear power into an actual nuclear power is the approximately 6-month period it would take to enrich energy-grade uranium into weapons-grade uranium or reprocess plutonium into fissile material.  But there are hypothetical fixes to this paradox.  One of the most popular is the multinational fuel bank proposal, another idea that ElBaradei considers a uniquely creative step forward.

The abovementioned paradox, alongside the contentiousness of the U.S.-India civil nuclear partnership, illustrates that decisions made in the nuclear realm are full of internal contradictions and trade-offs.  As in all situations involving a two-sided coin, the question becomes, which side should one choose?  There is a lesson to be learned from ElBaradei’s conception of the U.S.-India deal and the related paradox.  Although he did not explicitly articulate it as such, it seems that ElBaradei saw the advantages of the deal as indispensible pieces of progress whereas he saw the deal’s problems and dangers as capable of being mitigated and overcome.  There is an elegant, and forward-looking wisdom to such an approach—choosing the advantages that are indispensible, accepting the dangers that may be mitigated, and then actually dealing with and mitigating those dangers.  Bringing a key global nuclear player like India into the political and diplomatic fray was an indispensible move for the future of the global nonproliferation and disarmament agenda.  The dangers of the partnership, though certainly understandable and serious, were capable of being effectively resolved.  In fact, the solutions for mitigating these dangers are additional measures that should be pursued and implemented regardless of the U.S.-India partnership.

4th IAEA Director General and Nobel Prize Winner Mohamed ElBaradei

The solution to the first, globally scoped, major danger (delegitimization of the NPT) is for the U.S. and IAEA to better facilitate universal access to effectively safeguarded nuclear energy while continuing to press for nonproliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities.  As stated earlier, one proposed way of balancing the need for access to nuclear energy against the danger of spreading weapons capabilities is through the use of multinational fuel banks.  And the solution to the second, regionally scoped, major danger (an Indo-Pakistani arms race) is to enhance the solidarity and cooperation between India and Pakistan.  This latter solution is one that is being conspicuously tested as evidenced by the increased attention on India’s and Pakistan’s recent nuclear posturing.

The U.S. and international community must serve as effective arbiters between India and Pakistan as both nations seem determined to build upon their strategic armaments.  As the decision of a sovereign nation, India has the right to pursue its own nuclear ballistic missile submarines.  But this does not mean that the U.S. cannot get involved in the political implications of such a posturing.  After India’s announcement of its nuclear submarine, the Pakistani Foreign Ministry gave the following statements on July 28^th:

Continued induction of new lethal weapon systems by India is detrimental to regional peace and stability…Pakistan believes that maintenance of strategic balance is essential for peace and security in South Asia…Without entering into an arms race with India, Pakistan will take all appropriate steps to safeguard its security and maintain strategic balance.

However, on July 30^th, the Nuclear Threat Initiative quoted a top Pakistani naval commander, navy chief of staff Admiral Bashir Noman, as expressing a different sentiment:

“We are not focused on India,” said Adm. Bashir Noman, chief of staff for the Pakistani navy. “India is a neighbor, so we must have [a] good relationship.” Pakistan is instead focused on curbing terrorism, piracy and drug trafficking in the Indian Ocean, he said.

This is a very productive change in attitude, and the world is very fortunate that the Pakistani navy has taken this tone.  Most likely, U.S. urging for greater partnership between India and Pakistan had much to do with this position.  India’s strategic posturing severely interferes with U.S. and global goals to curb terrorism.  Pakistan’s resources are stretched very thin due to the tremendously delicate stability across its lands, as Taliban militants, having been expelled from many parts of Afghanistan, have expanded into Pakistan looking to seize more power and more territory.  But at the same time that this struggle is occurring, Pakistan’s military remains on constant alert against Indian threats; Pakistan maintains strong forces along the Indo-Pakistani border.  In fact, it seems as though Pakistan has been inclined in some cases to negotiate with Taliban forces rather than face off against them because Pakistan lacks the military forces to divert toward this struggle, when in fact, excess Pakistani forces are deployed as a hedge against India.  As a consequence, the Taliban have gained stronger hold in some territories.

For the sake of both global nuclear nonproliferation and the struggle against the Taliban, the U.S. must continue to work toward easing the tensions between India and Pakistan.  On July 28^th, Pakistan pledged that they would balance against India’s nuclear submarine development, which translates into the funding of more weapons of war that that threaten the world’s survival and are useless in the fight that really matters right now.  It seems that the U.S. has gotten serious about wise military spending as applies to the challenges presented by 4th generation and asymmetrical warfare, which is why the U.S. has cut the funding to additional F-22s and certain projects within the army’s future combat systems.  The U.S. also needs its most important allies to get wise about spending.  Pakistan is one such ally, and this will not occur without cooperation from India.

Thus, we should be alarmed by the claim on Wednesday by high-level Indian nuclear scientist that India must not join the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and must pursue further thermonuclear tests.  See here.

Meanwhile, we should also be alarmed by Pakistan’s meddling in overdue progress in the Conference on Disarmament.  See here and here. The Conference on Disarmament, the paramount international disarmament negotiating forum, has been politically deadlocked for over a decade, and there are finally signs of a major breakthrough.  However, Pakistan may prove to be the single impediment to this progress, as Pakistan has called for a reconsideration of a work plan that the entire conference had agreed upon earlier this year (something that has not happened throughout the decade-long deadlock).  The Conference on Disarmament intends to address the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, the prospect of global zero, and other related items.  There may be no progress in any of these issues without the participation and cooperation of Pakistan.

India and Pakistan should heed the lesson of ElBaradei’s perspective on the U.S.-India civil nuclear partnership: they must seek the advantages that are indispensible, accept the dangers that can be mitigated, and then work towards mitigating the dangers.  Greater cooperation and solidarity amongst the world’s nuclear players is indispensible.  India and Pakistan must act correspondingly.