Weapons and Hope

Ok, so what exactly is going on with North Korea?

It is often difficult to separate public diplomacy from the real diplomacy.  Similarly, it is also difficult to separate hard analysis from catchy headlines.  As a ‘rogue’ nation, North Korea is under the constant scrutiny of the media and governments worldwide.  Thus, there is an incredible amount of incoming data on North Korean behavior and activities.  But that data is not always synthesized into coherent messages; after all, it is incredibly difficult to know what exactly is going on with as insular a country as North Korea.  Thus, it is very helpful when experts and analysts flesh out the details.

But ultimately, the clarity offered by analysts has its limits. Let us not forget that it is impossible to know, even for the most astute scrutinizers, exactly what North Korea’s motives and future plans are.  Below, I explore three headline issues, seeking lucidity but noting the limits of understanding: (1) North Korea’s recent mix of reconciliation and provocation, (2) its report on uranium enrichment capabilities, and (3) its willingness to negotiate.

Part 1.  Truly conciliatory or just a tactical game?

It seems like just yesterday that former President Bill Clinton visited North Korea and personally met with Kim Jong Il to secure the release of detained journalists Euna Lee and Laura Ling.  In conjunction with releasing the two Americans, the North Korea regime made a few other decisions portraying a newfound desire for reconciliation.  On August 29^th, North Korea released a South Korean fishing boat that had been detained for a month.  The release of the boat and crew, which had strayed into the North’s territorial waters, was characterized by Reuters as an act of “reach[ing] out to its foes after months of military grandstanding” and “the latest in a series of conciliatory moves by the North.”  This conciliatory trend also included the decision to allow another round of family reunions (between North and South Koreans separated since the Korean War) and the restoration of regular traffic over the border for the North-South jointly run industrial park.

The "Bridge of No Return" in the Korean DMZ, Looking to the North from South

On the surface, thorny relations with North Korea seemed to be progressing nicely.  But then all of a sudden, new reports came in about North Korea nearing mastery over uranium enrichment.  In addition, North Korea this past Sunday opened the flood gates to a reservoir, resulting in the deaths of six South Korean campers in the pathway of the flood.  Of course, this was not necessarily an “attack” on South Korea, but the North has failed to make a formal apology, and the ordeal has cast “a pall over recently warming ties between the rivals.” (Washington Post)

And finally, North Korea was also caught on August 14^th, in the middle of all the conciliatory gestures, shipping weapons to Iran in contravention of UN Security Council Resolution 1874.

Thus, it may seem that North Korea is being inconsistent in its approach to international ties.  Not so, explain analysts.  Instead, North Korean behavior displays confidence and the steadfast desire to maintain their status quo objective: to become a nuclear power.

For example Van Jackson reported in UPI Asia:

Such behavior is not contradictory but actually consistent, when viewed as the coordinated effort of a rogue state attempting to consolidate its infant nuclear capability. North Korea can achieve the best of both worlds – that is, positive relations with the United States and South Korea while possessing nuclear weapons – if it can succeed in reframing the nuclear issue as a negotiation over arms reduction and nonproliferation rather than total denuclearization.

South Korea officials have referred to this approach as a mere change in North Korea’s tactics. (AP)

A report yesterday by Reuters, which also refers to North Korea’s recent behavior as a “tactical game,” presents Stanford analyst Peter Beck’s understanding:

Peter Beck, research fellow at Stanford University and a specialist in Korean affairs, said Pyongyang was trying to gain the upper hand by forcing regional powers to guess its intentions. “By being nice, the North wants to relieve any pressure they are feeling by the sanctions,” he said. “They are also making it pretty clear that they are intent on being a nuclear power.”

Apparently, the U.S. has also adopted such an understanding as Stephen Bosworth, U.S. special envoy to North Korea, stated on Sunday that he has not seen a “fundamental change” in North Korea. (Korea Times)

As can be gleaned from above, the experts have done a masterful job of making sense of the contradictory details.  But perhaps the most important thing to remember is this: they could be absolutely wrong.  Even the most beautifully stitched analyses on North Korea (and, for that matter, any country) are simply political forecasts.  The particularly opaque nature of the North Korean regime makes such a task even more tenuous.

The perspectives provided by the analysts are impressive, compelling, and useful.  Nonetheless, it must be remembered that they may amount to an artificial ordering of the disorder.

Part 2.  Securing the second pathway to a nuclear bomb?  No, just a test.

Following North Korea’s declaration on Friday, September 4^th, that it has reached the “concluding stage” of uranium enrichment tests, mainstream media poured onto the public some incredibly loaded headlines.  Some examples:

BBC News: N Korea ‘in final uranium phase’

Washington Post: North Korea: Uranium Program Near Completion

The Daily Telegraph: North Korea in ‘final phase’ of uranium enrichment

Asia Times Online: North Korea drops a uranium bombshell

All of these headlines can be said to simply reflect Pyongyang’s statement.  But nonetheless, the implications and exigency expressed in the headlines do not necessarily capture reality.  It requires some more in-depth reading than just the headlines and first few paragraphs of each story to get to the important details about the uranium enrichment progress.

David Sanger of The New York Times indicated in regard to North Korea’s statement:

No details were offered, and the use of the word “tests” suggests that the country may only be experimenting and has not yet undertaken the huge expense required to install the thousands of centrifuges necessary to produce enough uranium for a nuclear weapon.

Reuters also indicated that Pyongyang’s statement does not amount to an immediate threat:

The U.S. has long suspected North Korea of trying to enrich uranium for weapons but proliferation experts said the North is nowhere near a full scale program, and it would take several years at least before it could reach that stage.

Instead, The Korea Times has reported that Pyongyang’s uranium statement simply amounts to another short-term tactical move:

North Korea’s uranium enrichment program is seemingly aimed at pressing the United State to promptly agree to hold bilateral talks, an analyst here said Friday.

Of course, we do not know North Korea’s exact motives for its recent announcement. However, any response to this announcement must be tempered. North Korea’s uranium program is obviously of concern to the U.S., but its latest statement is not a sudden, game-changing breakthrough, as some headlines may seem to indicate.  As Stephen Bosworth said:

This is not the first we have heard of HEU [highly enriched uranium] and it may not be the last.

Check out Joshua Pollack’s post on ACW if you want a more in-depth look at Pyongyang’s enrichment and the recent reporting on it.

Part 3.  Open to negotiations? We just don’t know.

We cannot say unequivocally that North Korea is not open to negotiations.  We just don’t know.

Kim Jong-il, De Facto Leader of North Korea

But many have argued that North Korea is only open to negotiations whose terms it can personally dictate.  As evidence they point to North Korea’s pursuit of bilateral talks with the U.S. outside the scope of the Six-Party Talks.  We have yet to see North Korea reply to the Bosworth’s indication that such talks will not occur outside of multilateral engagement.  Moreover, North Korea has shown no serious interest in negotiations over total denuclearization.

Van Jackson explained in UPI Asia:

Instead, North Korea seeks to negotiate arms reductions, the suspension of proliferation activities and the shutdown of its nuclear facilities. If Pyongyang succeeds in reframing the primary issues of concern in this way, it will have gained tacit recognition of its membership in the club of de facto nuclear weapons states, joining the likes of Pakistan, India and Israel.

Van Jackson’s statement makes a great deal of sense, particularly within the scope of the abovementioned ‘tactical game’ North Korea may be playing.  The analogy to Pakistan, India, and Israel also solidifies his persuasion.  But despite the logic and aesthetics of his rhetoric, we still do not know North Korea’s motives.

It remains to be seen if the world’s powers are willing to take the denuclearization card off the table for a nuclear compromise.  Nonetheless, they will need to continue to actively pursue diplomacy with Pyongyang.  Regardless of what the North Koreans are up to, as Travis Sharp and Lt. Gen. Robert S. Gard have pointed out over at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, there is simply no reasonable alternative at this point.