Weapons and Hope

President Obama’s decision on Thursday to abandon his predecessor’s plan to place a Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) missile interceptor system in Europe has set off a firestorm of competing remarks and claims over the last few days.  Enthusiastic support and turbulent opposition have stridently clashed in the media and on the Hill.  Newspapers, think tank releases, and blogs across the country have already covered the public discursive response in excess, seeking to address knowledge gaps is various statements and to create appropriate understandings of the decision.  Nonetheless, controversy continues over what constitutes the appropriate understanding, much of which is a function of political ideology and partisan solidarity.  There is nothing truly groundbreaking that I can add here.  Nonetheless, Thursday’s decision is too big to not acknowledge.  In search for some sort of “truth” in the messiness of the missile defense debate, below I address a few myths that have been propagated in response to the recent decision.

Myth #1:  Missile Defense in Europe has been scrapped.

Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) interceptor in launch silo

If you noticed above, I specified that President Obama abandoned plans for a European Ground-Based Midcourse Defense interceptor system.  This does not mean that he has abandoned all plans for missile defense in Europe.  Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) is a component of U.S. missile defense strategy, but it is by no means the only component.  Obama plans to replace (not unconditionally discard) the European GMD plan with a new plan: to deploy SM-3 Interceptors initially on Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense naval ships and then eventually on upgraded land-based platforms.  This has been outlined by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, and the decision to abandon the European GMD was contingent upon the fielding of a replacement plan.

Myth #2:  Europe and the U.S. will now be more exposed to hypothetical ballistic missile attacks by rogue states.

Not only is the GMD plan being replaced, but it is also being replaced by a system proven to be more effective.  The GMD system has a spotty testing record, successfully intercepting during only 62% of tests (or 57% depending on whether or not the May 25, 2007 test is considered a failure or a “no-test”).  In contrast, the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System using SM-3 Interceptors has achieved an 83% success rate.  The testing record has been released by the Missile Defense Agency, and can be seen here.  Gates specified that using Aegis ships deployed in and around the Mediterranean and North Seas, reliable coverage can be provided by two or three ships at any given time, and the capacity to circumstantially surge ships will be retained.  See my NoH post for more details on this point.

Moreover, neither Iran nor North Korea currently poses an extensive ballistic missile threat to Europe.  Given Iran’s relative proximity to Europe and its more advanced missile capabilities, Iran poses a more exigent threat than North Korea.  Nonetheless, this past July, Lt. Gen. Patrick O’Reilly, the Director of the Missile Defense Agency asserted that “Ninety-nine percent of the threat today” comes from short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, thereby reinforcing the beliefs of the intelligence community that Iran does not currently field ballistic missiles capable of reaching beyond southeastern Europe.  See Kingston Reif’s fact sheet.  The original GMD proposed system did not even cover southeastern Europe.  The flexibility provided by fielding mobile Aegis systems will be better able to deal with the existing ballistic missile threats as well ultimately covering a greater area of land than the original GMD plan.

Myth #3:  Now there will be a delay to protecting Europe against ballistic missile threats.

The USS Shiloh, an Aegis-capable U.S. missile cruiser, launching an SM-3 Interceptor for a successful test

The proposed GMD site has not yet been built.  Moreover, it would be a modified version of the GMD system deployed in Alaska and California, and it would not even be tested until sometime in 2010.  In contrast, the U.S. already possesses 18 Aegis-capable ships, as well as previously approved budgetary plans to acquire six more Aegis-capable ships for FY 2010.  Thus, the new missile defense plan will save both time and money.  February 2009 estimates put the original GMD system at $9-13 billion over 20 years—this all for a system that has not even been tested yet.

Myth #4:  The U.S. has abandoned Poland and the Czech Republic.

The replacement decision was based primarily on technical factors: the proposed GMD system was simply not a technically sound system.  Now, with the plan to establish a more effective and tested ballistic missile defense system, Poland and the Czech Republic (as well as all of Europe) will be better protected.  There are arguments that pressure from Russia was the critical deciding factor for the Obama administration.  It is impossible to know this from outside the administration, though Russian pressure very well may have factored in.  Nonetheless, this does not alter the fact that the new ballistic missile proposed system is still more tested and effective than the original GMD proposal.  Framing the decision vis-à-vis Russian pressure neglects the technical prudence behind the decision and also misrepresents the purpose of European missile defense (as iterated by both the Bush and Obama administrations): to protect against rogue state threats.