Weapons and Hope

Regulation and monitoring of transnational commerce is a tough business, particularly as the global market becomes ever more interconnected. The nonproliferation regime depends on strict regulations, while economic growth (and competitiveness) requires relative lenience. Two recent studies are described below as examples of the attention currently being given to transnational commerce. Each presents a unique perspective on specific elements of transnational commerce, one focused on biological weapons nonproliferation and the other on U.S. export controls. However, the two studies incorporate a common, essential theme: the need to establish a detailed understanding of international market flows for the sake of security interests.

Harnessing Trade Data for BWC Compliance

On October 7^th, Global Green USA hosted Gunnar Jeremias of the University of Hamburg’s Research Group for Biological Arms Control, who described a novel strategy to support compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention.

Jeremias gave a presentation entitled “Harnessing Trade Data for BWC Compliance.” His proposal, part of a project that commenced in 2004, is to enhance the mechanisms and detail by which international trade data is recorded and to comprehensively analyze that data in order to identify suspicious biotechnological research activity. Underling this strategy is the idea that, through astute and expert analysis, the dual-use dilemma can be partially overcome.

Jeremias quoted BW expert Kathryn Nixdorff’s assertion that “the dual-use problem in biotechnology is total” (my emphasis). Trade data analysis can provide a rough picture of research intent, thereby mitigating the dual-use dilemma.  Specifically, Jeremias is encouraging state parties to augment the World Customs Organization (WCO) Harmonized System by increasing transparency and instituting more specific coding for trade items. In Jeremias’ view, biotechnology items are not adequately identified under the Harmonized System, which assigns standardized numbers to trade items for recording and monitoring purposes. Growth media is currently one of the few items with an individual code, while most biotech items are classified by broad basket codes. Jeremias explains that the Harmonized System must employ individual codes for all biological dual-use items. Open publication of more detailed trade data will then provide meaningful information for analysis by NGOs or governments.

This strategy is certainly not a panacea for identifying foreign biological weapons activities, and there are some serious limits to its effectiveness. For example, the already large and established biotechnological industries of many countries could overshadow the significance of trade data (specifically imports). Analysis of trade data must not occur in a vacuum, but rather must be done vis-à-vis a nation’s established biotechnological capabilities. A sizeable indigenous industry could render trade data inseparable from the dual-use dilemma, or it could make trade data inconsequential due to insignificant volume. In addition, this strategy does not confront the threat of bioterrorism, which would result from small-scale non-state activities rather than high-volume national programs.

Bioreactors are currently classified by the same coding as brewery equipment under the Harmonized System

Nonetheless, the strategy could be incredibly useful as a supplement to intelligence activities and diplomacy in identifying and thwarting national biological weapons development. The establishment of conclusive evidence of a biological weapons program based on trade data is unlikely, but astute analysis would identify suspicious trade patterns and emerging trends. According to Jeremias, UNSCOM and UNMOVIC, the UN inspection regimes created to assess Iraq’s WMD programs, have demonstrated the value of item transparency in identifying suspicious biological research. Through their analysis of biological research materials in Iraq juxtaposed with Iraq’s biotechnological capacities, UNSCOM and UNMOVIC were able to identify biological weapons activities on the part of Iraq. Detailed and transparent trade data would provide similar insights into other countries’ biotechnological intentions.

In addition, implementation of the proposal would also have the positive effects of increased transparency. Transparency is a crucial lynchpin in averting international conflicts. Greater international transparency is needed specifically with regards to weapons and scientific research programs in order to avoid the misunderstandings and deceptions that lead to hostile international competition. Biological research is no exception. Increased transparency, as explained in an earlier post, may prove to be fundamental in the prevention of a secretive international biological weapons arms race—something that may, in fact, already be in its nascent stages. Jeremias’ proposal would contribute significantly to the transparency effort.

The transparency afforded by more detailed and comprehensively monitored trade data combined with proactive endeavors of openness by individual nations (particularly those that do not import biotechnological materials in great volumes) would establish a more stable international situation and avert dangerous biological competition.

The Role of National Security Export Controls in a Globalized Economy

On October 16^th, the Woodrow Wilson Center hosted Mitchell Wallerstein (Dean of the Maxwell School of Public Affairs, Syracuse University) and Patricia Wrightson (Program Director of the Policy and Global Affairs Division, The National Academies) to speak about the U.S. export control system.

Operating with the understanding that “the national security controls that regulate access to and export of science and technology are broken,” the National Research Council of the National Academies convened the Committee on Scientific Communication and National Security in 2007. Subsequently, the National Research Council established the ad hoc Committee on Science, Security and Prosperity to propose policy solutions. The co-chairs of the committees were Brent Scowcroft and John L. Hennessy, President of Stanford University. This “select group of national security officials and leaders from the sciences, the defense industry, the information technology sector, academia, and the legal community” produced the 2009 report Beyond ‘Fortress America’: National Security Controls on Science and Technology in a Globalized World. Mitchell Wallerstein was a member of the committees, while Patricia Wrightson was a member of the project staff for the committees.

Invoking the report’s title, Wallerstein argued that we must overcome ‘Fortress America’ thinking—the strain of thought that assumes the U.S. is the primary source of most useful military and scientific technology in the world, and that the U.S. can continue to deny these materials to foreign countries without damaging economic interests. In reality, suggested Wallerstein, excessive export controls are hurting U.S. national interests and economic competitiveness. The unilateral attitude toward export controls held by the U.S. does not reflect the reality of a widely distributed high technology global landscape.

As a result of our controls over materials and technologies that remain uncontrolled by other nations, the U.S. harms itself in the following ways, according to Wallerstein:

1. The Department of Defense is deprived of cutting-edge products: domestic and foreign companies shy away from dealing with DOD in order to avoid the U.S. export control regime
2. The U.S. military is sometimes unable to outsource repair and maintenance of equipment to venues close to battlefields
3. Loss of access to foreign military capabilities, scientific and technological developments
4. Increased cost of doing business relative to foreign companies
5. Creation of markets for foreign competition
6. U.S. universities have difficulty recruiting and retaining foreign researchers
7. U.S. companies must compartmentalize information, leading to further disincentives for research talent and damage to competitiveness

For this reason, the Committee on Science, Security and Prosperity recommended an overhaul of the U.S. export control system through the most effectual mechanism possible: Presidential initiative. The committee recommended that a single administrative entity (a “one stop shop”) be set up to coordinate all licenses. The committee also recommended the maintenance of a “fundamental research exemption” as well as the creation of an “economic competitiveness exemption,” which would enable the export of dual-use items that are “widely and legally available” elsewhere. In addition, the committee recommended loosening the control of the flow of people in addition to materials. The committee suggested that visa processes be streamlined for researchers in order to maintain and enhance U.S. access to the reservoir of foreign scientific talent.

It is important to note that the committee does not suggest a total elimination of export controls. Their goal is not to completely deregulate the export control system for deregulation’s sake; instead, they have iterated that their fundamental interest is U.S. national security, of which economic competitiveness is an essential element. Thus, their goal is to deregulate controls on specific items so as to maintain U.S. market competitiveness while still not sacrificing U.S. security on other fronts, such as that of nonproliferation. This requires export control reassessment on an item-by-item basis, including items that are currently covered by specific export control arrangements.

Currently, National Security Advisor Jim Jones and National Economic Council Director Lawrence Summers are currently overseeing an export control review effort, which Wallerstein and Wrightson pointed to as an illustration of how seriously President Obama is taking the issue. Concerns remain regarding the proliferation implications of loosening export controls to any degree. Nonetheless, export controls have been a contentious and gridlocked issue for many years now. A review, in and of itself, should be seen as a useful endeavor.

Synthesis

The two studies described above are significantly different in content, purpose, and recommendation. The first is focused on biotechnology, whereas the second is focused on a wide range of technologies. The first is aimed at enhancing the global nonproliferation regime, whereas the second is aimed at protecting U.S. economic competitiveness. The first deals with monitoring mechanisms, whereas the second deals with control mechanisms.

Nonetheless, the two studies are similar in that both identify the heightened need for a better understanding of commerce flows as the international market becomes more globally integrated and dynamic. It is within this increasingly complex, open, and globalized system of commerce that proliferation of sensitive and potentially destructive technologies takes place—leading to the ever-increasing challenge of averting proliferation threats. At the same time, market interconnectedness also enhances national economic growth. This situation demands astute and vigilant eyes.

In addition, both studies recommend an analysis of commerce flows on an item-by-item basis. According to the reasoning implicit in both studies, only through nuanced understandings of market flows may nations balance the importance of technological and economic development with the hazards of proliferation. Nuanced understandings require awareness of the following, among other things: the status and nature of items on an individual basis, national scientific and technological capabilities, already established trade trends, and emerging trade trends. Consideration of both proliferation hazards and economic dynamics is vital to the interests of individual nations. As both studies point out, we must operate using the full details of the global market rather than function in generalities.