Last month, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) sought to authenticate North Korea’s status as a nuclear weapon state by citing a recent assessment by Robert Norris and Hans Kristensen. KCNA reported that “the Federation of American Scientists of the United States has confirmed (North) Korea as a nuclear weapon state.” However, KCNA’s report was an oversimplification of the Norris-Kristensen assessment. Yesterday, the South Korean Yonhap News Agency disseminated Kristensen’s rebuttal to the KCNA report, though over a week after it had been made. Better late than never…

Norris and Kristensen did list North Korea as a state that possesses nuclear weapons. On the FAS Strategic Security Blog, Kristensen wrote: “It’s certainly curious that they would need our reaffirmation, but after two nuclear tests we feel it is safe to call North Korea a nuclear weapon state.” However, Kristensen added that KCNA omitted a “huge caveat.” The original assessment reads:

We are not aware of credible information on how North Korea has weaponized its nuclear weapons capability, much less where those weapons are stored. We also take note that a recent U.S. Air Force intelligence report did not list any of North Korea’s ballistic missiles as nuclear-capable.

Concluding his rebuttal to the abridged analysis by Pyongyang’s media monopoly, Kristensen wrote:

In other words, two experimental nuclear test explosions don’t make a nuclear arsenal. That requires deliverable nuclear weapons, which we haven’t seen any signs of yet.

A rebuttal to Kristensen’s rebuttal, in the form of a new KCNA report, is unlikely. Hopefully, a flying missile rebuttal will not come too soon either.

As the Obama administration closes in on an agenda for bilateral talks with Pyongyang, it looks as though the United States and South Korea are back on the same page after a protracted spell of miscommunication…

The State Department still has not indicated if it will accept Pyongyang’s invitation for a visit by U.S. special envoy Stephen Bosworth. A senior South Korean official told the Korean Hankyoreh newspaper last Friday, however, that “Special envoy (Stephen) Bosworth will visit North Korea next month.” It was unclear at the time if the report had any concrete truth behind it.

But yesterday, the Korea Times quoted South Korea’s chief nuclear envoy, Wi Sung-lac, saying that the United States is “expected to make a decision soon on the date and agenda of bilateral talks with North Korea.” This statement has been corroborated by The Cable, which reported that the United States has already put forth a proposal. This report came a day after North Korea expressed impatience.

The United States has yet to make any formal public announcements about an agenda. Yesterday, State Department spokesman Ian Kelly limited his comments on the matter to the status quo policy. “We are willing to have bilateral talks with the North Koreans if these talks are conducted in the context of the Six-Party Talks and if they lead to the resumption of the Six-Party Talks,” Kelly said.

But the statements made by Wi Sung-lac and the unnamed senior South Korean official indicate that the South Koreans are aware of a U.S. plan, probably even more than they let on. Since North Korea began insisting on bilateral talks, the United States has uneasily assumed a vanguard diplomatic role. Each member of the six-party talks has accepted the prospect of bilateral talks provided that the goal is to revive the six-party negotiations. Yet this approach has not been without anxiety.

South Korea has been gently pushed to the side despite President Lee Myung-bak’s “grand bargain” proposal. Last month, South Korean media highlighted a potential rift between the United States and South Korea, perhaps exaggerating at times for fear of being relegated to the periphery. In light of this uneasiness, it is a relief that the United States and South Korea are no longer refuting or overlooking each other’s public statements.

Also noteworthy is the seeming coordination between South Korea and Japan. In response to Pyongyang’s announcement on Tuesday that it has reprocessed all of its 8,000 spent nuclear rods and made “significant achievements” in producing another atomic bomb, South Korea and Japan both used the word “regret” to express their outlook on the matter. It may simply be coincidence, but it seems possible that they coordinated this careful word choice to present a calculated and unified message.

Are the U.S. and South Korea struggling to effectively coordinate policy on North Korea? Last week Kurt Campbell, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, applauded the current level of international cooperation on the North Korea issue, but recent interactions between the U.S. and South Korea paint a different picture.

Signs of a potential rift emerged a month ago in the immediate wake of President Lee’s grand bargain proposal, which apparently took U.S. officials by surprise. When asked about Lee’s proposal a day later, Campbell noted that he was not aware of the offer. U.S. State Department spokesman Ian Kelly said, “I think it’s really not for me to comment on the particulars, because it’s – this is his policy. These were his remarks.”

What ensued was a tempest of South Korean media speculation about discord between the U.S. and South Korea. U.S. Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg assured reporters in Seoul that the two sides were on the same page. President Lee left a different impression: “So what if Mr. so-and-so says he is not aware of [the proposal],” he said.

Evidence of a communication gap was again evident earlier this week. In a Washington briefing with South Korean reporters, U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs Wallace Gregson indicated that Kim Jong-il had invited President Lee Myung-bak to Pyongyang for summit talks. Cheong Wa Dae promptly issued a denial of this claim and suggested a “misunderstanding.” Despite the denial, South Korea’s Chosun Ilbo and Korea Times reported that Gregson’s statement has powered a vigorous rumor mill.

As the North’s deputy nuclear envoy, Ri Gun, prepares a visit to the U.S. that may lead to bilateral negotiations, the U.S. and South Korea need to coordinate their efforts more carefully, even if the Korean media has overblown the extent of a rift. Negotiation with North Korea will be challenging enough as it is; it need not be further complicated by lack of communication between two allies.

(published on Nukes of Hazard)

On August 26, senior Indian nuclear scientist K. Santhanam publicly questioned the success of India’s 1998 nuclear tests. Calling the thermonuclear experiment a “fizzle,” he endorsed the need for new tests. It has been over a month, but the controversy surrounding his comments has yet to subside. The New York Times even published an editorial yesterday warning adamantly of the danger of new Indian tests. This raises an important question: just how deep are India’s pro-test roots?

Every once in a while, a high-profile government official (or ex-official) will make a half-baked comment implicating his or her country in controversial activities or intentions. Such comments are generally rebuffed by national authorities who clarify the nation’s “official” position. Though attention grabbing, these comments must be taken with a dozen grains of the finest sea salt.

For example, Brazil’s Vice President Jose Alencar told journalists on September 25 that Brazil should advance a nuclear weapon development program. Other officials quickly moved to dissociate Alencar’s personal view from governmental policy. Nothing has come of this impetuous statement, and we can reasonably expect that nothing will.

But not all provocative views are so easily quelled. This appears to be the case with K. Santhanam’s claims. His comments represent the first time a nuclear scientist involved in the 1998 Indian tests has denied the official government stance that the tests were sufficient. Though a wide range of high-ranking officials — including Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, Atomic Energy Commission chief Anil Kakodkar, Home Minister P. Chidambaram, Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Sureesh Mehta, and former National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra — promptly repudiated Santhanam’s statement, the debate rages on, thanks in large part to “a powerful but small group of nuclear scientists, diplomats and military experts who wish to prevent Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh from supporting Obama’s call [for the CTBT].”

In the immediate wake of the U.S.-drafted UNSC resolution on nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament, India reiterated its opposition to both the NPT and CTBT. This gesture surely satisfied K. Santhanam and his gang, but their influence on India’s position was likely negligible. India has long opposed the discriminatory nature of the nonproliferation regime, and it was fully expected to uphold its contrarian stance.

As the world gets closer to the possibility of an effective CTBT, Santhanam’s persistent voice is disquieting. India has articulated its continued resistance to the CTBT as a stance of principle, not of subversion. Santhanam’s claims, however, indicate that opposition to the CTBT may already be (or soon become) part of an actual desire for more tests. Even if Santhanam’s pronouncement does not ultimately prompt tests, his claims could fracture the domestic consensus required for CTBT ratification.

President Obama may be worried about U.S. domestic politics thwarting the CTBT, but he should pay attention to political challenges abroad as well. India is one of the nine CTBT hold-outs whose ratification is compulsory for the treaty to enter into force. Without exaggerating the dissent, Obama must work with the Indian government to repel the Santhanam position, lest it become the ultimate stonewall to the CTBT.

The inability to negotiate a new treaty by START’s expiration date has long been considered a realistic possibility.  In November 2008, before Obama established his agenda, Daryl Kimball at ACA noted an interim extension of START (to prolong verification measures) as a possibility in the case of the plausible inability to meet the expiration deadline.  A formal extension of START is certainly no longer on the table.  Instead, the U.S. and Russia now plan to sign a memorandum of understanding that pledges adherence to the old treaty’s provisions while the new treaty goes through the process of completion and ratification.  During the April 1^st meeting between Obama and Medvedev on the sidelines of the G20 summit, this option was indeed considered.

The Washington Post explains that the ostensible deceleration in New START negotiations is not unexpected:

Replacing the hefty START treaty in only a few months was an ambitious task to begin with, and therefore many analysts are not surprised that the two sides haven’t reached their goal.

One of the biggest problems has simply been logistical.  WP quoted a State Department official who affirmed, “It’s been 20 years since we negotiated an agreement of this kind.”

In compliance with the START Treaty, hundreds of B-52 bombers have been destroyed. They are left to open air at the Davis-Monthan Air Force Base boneyard in Arizona to be photographed by Russian satellites.

Clearly both sides want the New START negotiations to be concluded as quickly and effectively as possible.  And in spite of the recent reports, Medvedev declared on Sunday that the chances of reaching an agreement by December 5^th are “high enough.”  Nonetheless, we should be neither surprised nor alarmed by possible delays.  These delays would not necessarily mean a breakdown in progress, nor would they lead the U.S. and Russia to a state of arms control anarchy.  They are simply delays.  After all, the ratification process in both countries will likely extend beyond December 5^th in any case.

As to the matter of missile defense, Global Security Newswire indicated that Obama’s new approach may “stiffen opposition to a START successor among Republicans.”  For example, Senator Jon Kyl (R-AZ) explained that Obama’s decision “makes clear that the administration ignored the input of senators of both parties who warned that linking START and missile defense would be ill-advised.”  However, as the President, Secretary of Defense, and Secretary of State have made amply clear, the missile defense decision was not linked to other issues.

In a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on the subject today, all three witnesses reiterated unequivocally that the missile defense decision never had anything to do with Russia.  The witnesses were Michèle Flournoy, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Lt. Gen. Patrick J. O’Reilly, USA, Director of the Missile Defense Agency; and Gen. James Cartwright, USMC, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Whether or not New START ratification faces Congressional opposition will have to do with Senators linking the two issues (START and Missile Defense), not linkage by Obama.

Myth #1:  Missile Defense in Europe has been scrapped.

Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) interceptor in launch silo

If you noticed above, I specified that President Obama abandoned plans for a European Ground-Based Midcourse Defense interceptor system.  This does not mean that he has abandoned all plans for missile defense in Europe.  Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) is a component of U.S. missile defense strategy, but it is by no means the only component.  Obama plans to replace (not unconditionally discard) the European GMD plan with a new plan: to deploy SM-3 Interceptors initially on Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense naval ships and then eventually on upgraded land-based platforms.  This has been outlined by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, and the decision to abandon the European GMD was contingent upon the fielding of a replacement plan.

Myth #2:  Europe and the U.S. will now be more exposed to hypothetical ballistic missile attacks by rogue states.

Not only is the GMD plan being replaced, but it is also being replaced by a system proven to be more effective.  The GMD system has a spotty testing record, successfully intercepting during only 62% of tests (or 57% depending on whether or not the May 25, 2007 test is considered a failure or a “no-test”).  In contrast, the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System using SM-3 Interceptors has achieved an 83% success rate.  The testing record has been released by the Missile Defense Agency, and can be seen here.  Gates specified that using Aegis ships deployed in and around the Mediterranean and North Seas, reliable coverage can be provided by two or three ships at any given time, and the capacity to circumstantially surge ships will be retained.  See my NoH post for more details on this point.

Moreover, neither Iran nor North Korea currently poses an extensive ballistic missile threat to Europe.  Given Iran’s relative proximity to Europe and its more advanced missile capabilities, Iran poses a more exigent threat than North Korea.  Nonetheless, this past July, Lt. Gen. Patrick O’Reilly, the Director of the Missile Defense Agency asserted that “Ninety-nine percent of the threat today” comes from short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, thereby reinforcing the beliefs of the intelligence community that Iran does not currently field ballistic missiles capable of reaching beyond southeastern Europe.  See Kingston Reif’s fact sheet.  The original GMD proposed system did not even cover southeastern Europe.  The flexibility provided by fielding mobile Aegis systems will be better able to deal with the existing ballistic missile threats as well ultimately covering a greater area of land than the original GMD plan.

Myth #3:  Now there will be a delay to protecting Europe against ballistic missile threats.

The USS Shiloh, an Aegis-capable U.S. missile cruiser, launching an SM-3 Interceptor for a successful test

The proposed GMD site has not yet been built.  Moreover, it would be a modified version of the GMD system deployed in Alaska and California, and it would not even be tested until sometime in 2010.  In contrast, the U.S. already possesses 18 Aegis-capable ships, as well as previously approved budgetary plans to acquire six more Aegis-capable ships for FY 2010.  Thus, the new missile defense plan will save both time and money.  February 2009 estimates put the original GMD system at $9-13 billion over 20 years—this all for a system that has not even been tested yet.

Myth #4:  The U.S. has abandoned Poland and the Czech Republic.

The replacement decision was based primarily on technical factors: the proposed GMD system was simply not a technically sound system.  Now, with the plan to establish a more effective and tested ballistic missile defense system, Poland and the Czech Republic (as well as all of Europe) will be better protected.  There are arguments that pressure from Russia was the critical deciding factor for the Obama administration.  It is impossible to know this from outside the administration, though Russian pressure very well may have factored in.  Nonetheless, this does not alter the fact that the new ballistic missile proposed system is still more tested and effective than the original GMD proposal.  Framing the decision vis-à-vis Russian pressure neglects the technical prudence behind the decision and also misrepresents the purpose of European missile defense (as iterated by both the Bush and Obama administrations): to protect against rogue state threats.

Yesterday, in reaction to these diplomatic developments, The Wall Street Journal and The New York Times both ran op-ed pieces discussing Obama’s strategy, the demerits and the merits respectively.  The Wall Street Journal published “Kim Wins Another”, arguing that the U.S. is effectively strengthening North Korea’s hand by reaching out to it.  The article espouses opposition to the Obama strategy, and although it speaks specifically only in regard to North Korea, its position and tone seem implicitly linked also to Iran.  The New York Times published Chester A. Crocker’s “Terms of Engagement”, which argues that critics mischaracterize the nature of Obama’s strategy and do not fully understand the utility of engagement.  Though critical of the Obama Administration’s failure to fully explain the strategy, the article espouses support for the strategy.  Although they are contradictory, both articles are rhetorically credible, and each should each be read.  But in the partisan world that we live in, it is an unfortunate rarity that a reader of WSJ op-eds will also be reading NYT op-eds, and vice versa.

The reader is encouraged to view the articles in their entirety.  Although the articles are not written in direct contradiction to each other—as they each deal with slightly different subject matter and they vary in length—their underlying spirits and their stances on Obama’s engagement strategy do stand in direct contradiction to each other.  Juxtaposition of the two articles is an attempt to circumvent reader partisan bias: the reader must decide for him or herself which position is more compelling without the usual convenience of having the position already pre-chosen.  In promotion of this open-minded approach, I will not give my own opinion.  Instead, I will let the opinions speak for themselves:

Kim Wins Another, The Wall Street Journal, 14 September 2009

Terms of Engagement, by Chester A. Crocker in The New York Times, 13 September 2009

It is often difficult to separate public diplomacy from the real diplomacy.  Similarly, it is also difficult to separate hard analysis from catchy headlines.  As a ‘rogue’ nation, North Korea is under the constant scrutiny of the media and governments worldwide.  Thus, there is an incredible amount of incoming data on North Korean behavior and activities.  But that data is not always synthesized into coherent messages; after all, it is incredibly difficult to know what exactly is going on with as insular a country as North Korea.  Thus, it is very helpful when experts and analysts flesh out the details.

But ultimately, the clarity offered by analysts has its limits. Let us not forget that it is impossible to know, even for the most astute scrutinizers, exactly what North Korea’s motives and future plans are.  Below, I explore three headline issues, seeking lucidity but noting the limits of understanding: (1) North Korea’s recent mix of reconciliation and provocation, (2) its report on uranium enrichment capabilities, and (3) its willingness to negotiate.

Part 1.  Truly conciliatory or just a tactical game?

It seems like just yesterday that former President Bill Clinton visited North Korea and personally met with Kim Jong Il to secure the release of detained journalists Euna Lee and Laura Ling.  In conjunction with releasing the two Americans, the North Korea regime made a few other decisions portraying a newfound desire for reconciliation.  On August 29^th, North Korea released a South Korean fishing boat that had been detained for a month.  The release of the boat and crew, which had strayed into the North’s territorial waters, was characterized by Reuters as an act of “reach[ing] out to its foes after months of military grandstanding” and “the latest in a series of conciliatory moves by the North.”  This conciliatory trend also included the decision to allow another round of family reunions (between North and South Koreans separated since the Korean War) and the restoration of regular traffic over the border for the North-South jointly run industrial park.

The "Bridge of No Return" in the Korean DMZ, Looking to the North from South

On the surface, thorny relations with North Korea seemed to be progressing nicely.  But then all of a sudden, new reports came in about North Korea nearing mastery over uranium enrichment.  In addition, North Korea this past Sunday opened the flood gates to a reservoir, resulting in the deaths of six South Korean campers in the pathway of the flood.  Of course, this was not necessarily an “attack” on South Korea, but the North has failed to make a formal apology, and the ordeal has cast “a pall over recently warming ties between the rivals.” (Washington Post)

And finally, North Korea was also caught on August 14^th, in the middle of all the conciliatory gestures, shipping weapons to Iran in contravention of UN Security Council Resolution 1874.

Thus, it may seem that North Korea is being inconsistent in its approach to international ties.  Not so, explain analysts.  Instead, North Korean behavior displays confidence and the steadfast desire to maintain their status quo objective: to become a nuclear power.

For example Van Jackson reported in UPI Asia:

Such behavior is not contradictory but actually consistent, when viewed as the coordinated effort of a rogue state attempting to consolidate its infant nuclear capability. North Korea can achieve the best of both worlds – that is, positive relations with the United States and South Korea while possessing nuclear weapons – if it can succeed in reframing the nuclear issue as a negotiation over arms reduction and nonproliferation rather than total denuclearization.

South Korea officials have referred to this approach as a mere change in North Korea’s tactics. (AP)

A report yesterday by Reuters, which also refers to North Korea’s recent behavior as a “tactical game,” presents Stanford analyst Peter Beck’s understanding:

Peter Beck, research fellow at Stanford University and a specialist in Korean affairs, said Pyongyang was trying to gain the upper hand by forcing regional powers to guess its intentions. “By being nice, the North wants to relieve any pressure they are feeling by the sanctions,” he said. “They are also making it pretty clear that they are intent on being a nuclear power.”

Apparently, the U.S. has also adopted such an understanding as Stephen Bosworth, U.S. special envoy to North Korea, stated on Sunday that he has not seen a “fundamental change” in North Korea. (Korea Times)

As can be gleaned from above, the experts have done a masterful job of making sense of the contradictory details.  But perhaps the most important thing to remember is this: they could be absolutely wrong.  Even the most beautifully stitched analyses on North Korea (and, for that matter, any country) are simply political forecasts.  The particularly opaque nature of the North Korean regime makes such a task even more tenuous.

The perspectives provided by the analysts are impressive, compelling, and useful.  Nonetheless, it must be remembered that they may amount to an artificial ordering of the disorder.

Part 2.  Securing the second pathway to a nuclear bomb?  No, just a test.

Following North Korea’s declaration on Friday, September 4^th, that it has reached the “concluding stage” of uranium enrichment tests, mainstream media poured onto the public some incredibly loaded headlines.  Some examples:

BBC News: N Korea ‘in final uranium phase’

Washington Post: North Korea: Uranium Program Near Completion

The Daily Telegraph: North Korea in ‘final phase’ of uranium enrichment

Asia Times Online: North Korea drops a uranium bombshell

All of these headlines can be said to simply reflect Pyongyang’s statement.  But nonetheless, the implications and exigency expressed in the headlines do not necessarily capture reality.  It requires some more in-depth reading than just the headlines and first few paragraphs of each story to get to the important details about the uranium enrichment progress.

David Sanger of The New York Times indicated in regard to North Korea’s statement:

No details were offered, and the use of the word “tests” suggests that the country may only be experimenting and has not yet undertaken the huge expense required to install the thousands of centrifuges necessary to produce enough uranium for a nuclear weapon.

Reuters also indicated that Pyongyang’s statement does not amount to an immediate threat:

The U.S. has long suspected North Korea of trying to enrich uranium for weapons but proliferation experts said the North is nowhere near a full scale program, and it would take several years at least before it could reach that stage.

Instead, The Korea Times has reported that Pyongyang’s uranium statement simply amounts to another short-term tactical move:

North Korea’s uranium enrichment program is seemingly aimed at pressing the United State to promptly agree to hold bilateral talks, an analyst here said Friday.

Of course, we do not know North Korea’s exact motives for its recent announcement. However, any response to this announcement must be tempered. North Korea’s uranium program is obviously of concern to the U.S., but its latest statement is not a sudden, game-changing breakthrough, as some headlines may seem to indicate.  As Stephen Bosworth said:

This is not the first we have heard of HEU [highly enriched uranium] and it may not be the last.

Check out Joshua Pollack’s post on ACW if you want a more in-depth look at Pyongyang’s enrichment and the recent reporting on it.

Part 3.  Open to negotiations? We just don’t know.

We cannot say unequivocally that North Korea is not open to negotiations.  We just don’t know.

Kim Jong-il, De Facto Leader of North Korea

But many have argued that North Korea is only open to negotiations whose terms it can personally dictate.  As evidence they point to North Korea’s pursuit of bilateral talks with the U.S. outside the scope of the Six-Party Talks.  We have yet to see North Korea reply to the Bosworth’s indication that such talks will not occur outside of multilateral engagement.  Moreover, North Korea has shown no serious interest in negotiations over total denuclearization.

Van Jackson explained in UPI Asia:

Instead, North Korea seeks to negotiate arms reductions, the suspension of proliferation activities and the shutdown of its nuclear facilities. If Pyongyang succeeds in reframing the primary issues of concern in this way, it will have gained tacit recognition of its membership in the club of de facto nuclear weapons states, joining the likes of Pakistan, India and Israel.

Van Jackson’s statement makes a great deal of sense, particularly within the scope of the abovementioned ‘tactical game’ North Korea may be playing.  The analogy to Pakistan, India, and Israel also solidifies his persuasion.  But despite the logic and aesthetics of his rhetoric, we still do not know North Korea’s motives.

It remains to be seen if the world’s powers are willing to take the denuclearization card off the table for a nuclear compromise.  Nonetheless, they will need to continue to actively pursue diplomacy with Pyongyang.  Regardless of what the North Koreans are up to, as Travis Sharp and Lt. Gen. Robert S. Gard have pointed out over at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, there is simply no reasonable alternative at this point.