“Pruning the Nuclear Triad? Pros and Cons of Bombers, Missiles, and Submarines”

“2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference”

“2010 Global Nuclear Security Summit“

Last month, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) sought to authenticate North Korea’s status as a nuclear weapon state by citing a recent assessment by Robert Norris and Hans Kristensen. KCNA reported that “the Federation of American Scientists of the United States has confirmed (North) Korea as a nuclear weapon state.” However, KCNA’s report was an oversimplification of the Norris-Kristensen assessment. Yesterday, the South Korean Yonhap News Agency disseminated Kristensen’s rebuttal to the KCNA report, though over a week after it had been made. Better late than never…

Norris and Kristensen did list North Korea as a state that possesses nuclear weapons. On the FAS Strategic Security Blog, Kristensen wrote: “It’s certainly curious that they would need our reaffirmation, but after two nuclear tests we feel it is safe to call North Korea a nuclear weapon state.” However, Kristensen added that KCNA omitted a “huge caveat.” The original assessment reads:

We are not aware of credible information on how North Korea has weaponized its nuclear weapons capability, much less where those weapons are stored. We also take note that a recent U.S. Air Force intelligence report did not list any of North Korea’s ballistic missiles as nuclear-capable.

Concluding his rebuttal to the abridged analysis by Pyongyang’s media monopoly, Kristensen wrote:

In other words, two experimental nuclear test explosions don’t make a nuclear arsenal. That requires deliverable nuclear weapons, which we haven’t seen any signs of yet.

A rebuttal to Kristensen’s rebuttal, in the form of a new KCNA report, is unlikely. Hopefully, a flying missile rebuttal will not come too soon either.

As the diplomatic standoff with Iran continues to heat up, Yukiya Amano of Japan today begins his tenure as the new Director General of the IAEA. In an interview with Reuters in February, Amano praised President Obama’s willingness to open dialogue with Iran. But dialogue has not gone well thus far, which prompted exiting Director General Mohamed ElBaradei to declare last Friday that the IAEA’s cooperation with Iran has reached a “dead end.” With these firm farewell words from ElBaradei, it is now Amano’s turn to navigate the technical and political minefield that is the Iranian nuclear program…

Mohamed ElBaradei has been a controversial figure due to his hostile relationship with the Bush administration. During his term, ElBaradei was criticized by Washington for politicizing the IAEA and taking a relatively soft stance on Iran. Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice placed much of the blame for Iran’s nuclear developments on ElBaradei’s leadership of the Agency.  She accused ElBaradei of “muddying the message” to Iran and stated that “The IAEA is not in the business of diplomacy. The IAEA is a technical agency…”

In contrast, Amano is known to be more of a technocrat than a diplomat. In his February interview, he stated: “The IAEA’s basic function is not political negotiation but implementing already agreed safeguards. Remarks by the director have political implications which, if made without properly assessing these implications, can be very dangerous.”

In fact, much of Amano’s support in his July 1st election was rooted in the belief that he would “depoliticize” the IAEA in the wake of ElBaradei’s leadership. The AP’s George Jahn noted in July that, “without publicly saying so, the U.S. and its allies had made clear before Tuesday’s voting that they favored Amano because they saw him as someone who would manage the IAEA without thrusting himself into the political fray.”  In a similar vein, UPI explained that, “poor Asian and African nations regard him as too aligned with rich nations.” The developing nations largely supported South African candidate Abdul Minty, who had run for the position on a platform of moderate activism aimed at challenging the nuclear weapon states on disarmament issues.

Amano has tried to deflect concerns that he has a hidden, factional agenda. At a conference shortly after his election, Amano told reporters: “As a national from Japan, I will do my utmost to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. To do that, the solidarity of all the member states, countries of the north, from the south, from east and west, is absolutely necessary.”

Amano has also called for a wider understanding of the IAEA as not only a nuclear watchdog, but also a key facilitator of peaceful nuclear energy use.  He explained that new perceptions of the IAEA as a “dual objective organization” would be “helpful in strengthening confidence in the agency.”

As for how Amano’s vision of a depoliticized IAEA and increased solidarity will play out in the context of the Iranian nuclear issue, NoH wishes the new Director General the best of luck.  He is likely to need it.

Update: James Acton has published a more in-depth analysis of the IAEA’s change in leadership on Carnegie’s website

China remains hesitant to accept the U.S. bottom line on Iran. The two nations this week expressed goodwill and pledged general cooperation on nonproliferation, among other items, but failed to produce concrete plans of action and displayed subtle signs of divergence, as illustrated by today’s press briefing…

The Wall Street Journal described the briefing as an “awkward” affair in which President Obama and President Hu Jintao “exhibited body language that seemed to say they had been frustrated by the entire exercise.” The two presented different tones in their remarks on Iran. Obama’s remarks were forceful: “Our two nations and the rest of our P5-plus-1 partners are unified.  Iran has an opportunity to present and demonstrate its peaceful intentions, but if it fails to take this opportunity there will be consequences.” In contrast, Hu was more oblique: “We both stressed that to uphold the international nuclear nonproliferation regime and to appropriately resolve the Iranian nuclear issue through dialogue and negotiations is very important to stability in the Middle East and in the Gulf region.”

Of the P5+1 countries, China has been the most resistant to ratcheting up pressure on Iran. This is no surprise given China’s dependence on Iran for 12 percent of its crude oil imports. When asked today about China’s plan to help deal with Iran, U.S. National Security Council official Jeffrey Bader replied, “I would not say that we got an answer today from the Chinese, nor did we expect one on the subject.”

Blessing or Blasphemy?

Policy agenda aside, China made serious efforts to make Obama’s visit as enjoyable as possible. According to the Washington Post, China began last week to regulate its market for Obama souvenirs in an attempt to eliminate insulting images. For example, the wildly popular “Oba Mao” memorabilia got the axe while the Obama-Superman figurine made the cut. Superman beats Mao? That will probably not be a victory for the history books.

Obama did stir things up during a town-hall meeting with Chinese students yesterday by discussing the importance of open government and internet freedom.

The Chinese government responded by censoring the dialogue.

Nuclear weapons tests are a toxic relic of a past characterized by arms races and fallout shelters. Except for outlaw nations like North Korea, the world today has quit the business of testing nuclear weapons…

The love-hate triangle between the United States, North Korea, and South Korea continues.

Pyongyang has called its recent naval clash with the South the result of Seoul’s meddling in U.S.-North Korean reconciliation. Referring to the incident as “deliberate, planned provocation” by South Korea, one of Pyongyang’s state-run newspapers reported today, “It goes to show how recklessly crazy the South Korean government is in trying to put a brake on improving relations between North Korea and the U.S.”

This is not the first time Pyongyang has accused Seoul of playing saboteur…

In its rejection of President Lee Myung-bak’s “grand bargain” proposal, Pyongyang explained that the real problem was Washington’s hostility and that Lee’s “ridiculous proposal” was nothing more than interference: “It is evident that [Lee] seeks to meddle and stand in the way of settling the nuclear issue between the DPRK and the U.S.”

South Korean newspaper Donga Ilbo explained the predictability of Tuesday’s sudden clash: “The North uses the fears of its counterparts as a negotiating tactic.” According to Donga Ilbo, both the 1999 Yellow Sea clash and 2002 Yeonpyeong Island clash were prompted by North Korea amidst diplomatic activity so as to achieve leverage through tension. Similarly, Tuesday’s clash precedes a trip to Pyongyang next month by U.S. special envoy Stephen Bosworth.

In each confrontation, the North blamed the South. “It’s a sly conspiracy,” said the DPRK state-run news agency of South Korea’s role during Tuesday’s naval clash. But documentation of each incident tells another story. In the most recent confrontation, a North Korean patrol boat charged through a disputed sea border, ignored several warning shots from South Korean vessels, and then fired directly upon a South Korea patrol boat. North Korean vessels were also first to fire in the other two conflicts.

In what seems to be an effort to undercut Pyongyang’s rhetoric, both the United States and South Korea have attempted to downplay the event, noting that it would have no bearing on diplomatic plans. Within hours of the clash, South Korea’s government declared that inter-Korean cooperation and exchanges would be unaffected, while Secretary Clinton yesterday “urged calm” and noted that plans for Bosworth’s trip remain unchanged.

South Korean troops are now on high alert, anticipating possible retaliation after the superior South Korean navy sent Pyongyang’s patrol boat limping away in flames.

While the United States has chastised both Iran and North Korea for their human rights abuses, it has typically kept the issue separate from denuclearization talks. Yet some experts recommend integrating human rights into broader discussions, as opposed to pursuing single-variable negotiations, in order to create valuable synergies within the diplomatic process.

At an event hosted by the National Iranian American Council on November 4, Ambassador Thomas Pickering emphasized the value of integrating human rights into current U.S. outreach to Iran. In his view, introducing more items for discussion broadens the range of diplomatic possibilities and increases chances for success. As opposed to a “grand bargain” with a rigid a priori formula, Pickering proposed a “grand agenda” with the goal of squeezing as many goodies as possible into the final package.

Ambassador John Limbert expounded upon this point, recommending a “firm but polite” approach with Iran. He explained that while “chest-bumping” moralistic statements by the West have proven unsuccessful, a calculated play of the human rights card could create a dilemma for the Iranian regime, which would run the risk of discrediting itself if it did not respond positively to ostensibly well-intentioned concern for its population. Nonproliferation and human rights might be simultaneously strengthened in this type of approach.

Similar reasoning has been applied to the standoff with North Korea. In a New York Times op-ed, Andrei Lankov recommended cultural and informational exchanges to plant seeds for the eventual emergence of North Korean civil society. Another recent report also recommended outreach, including academic and economic exchanges, in order to “spur better behavior by Pyongyang while helping its impoverished citizens.” Of course, the United States would have to reassure North Korea that these exchanges were not a backhanded attempt at regime change. Providing full transparency of all activities would help.

Lankov makes a strong case for the people-to-people strategy: “This is a well-tested approach: It is, essentially, the one that allowed liberal democracies to win the Cold War…it was the West’s economic prosperity and political freedom that irrevocably undermined popular support for Communism.” That may be true, but it is unclear whether or not sociopolitical reform will lead regular Iranians and North Koreans, let alone the ruling regimes, to support denuclearization or other policies more amenable to U.S. interests.

While the human rights-denuclearization link is compelling and policymakers should hope for its effectiveness, there are a few assumptions that are difficult to swallow. The first is that the American government and public will be patient enough to await the positive effects of the approach. The second is that the two regimes will be open to American engagement with their economies and populations. The latter assumption can more reasonably be made vis-à-vis Iran, which has, despite heinous crackdowns, shown concern about sustaining domestic popular support since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. In contrast, North Korea is a totalitarian state with a constitution based on a “military first” (songun) ideology and a public both barred from electing their leaders and isolated from the outside world.

As the Obama administration closes in on an agenda for bilateral talks with Pyongyang, it looks as though the United States and South Korea are back on the same page after a protracted spell of miscommunication…

The State Department still has not indicated if it will accept Pyongyang’s invitation for a visit by U.S. special envoy Stephen Bosworth. A senior South Korean official told the Korean Hankyoreh newspaper last Friday, however, that “Special envoy (Stephen) Bosworth will visit North Korea next month.” It was unclear at the time if the report had any concrete truth behind it.

But yesterday, the Korea Times quoted South Korea’s chief nuclear envoy, Wi Sung-lac, saying that the United States is “expected to make a decision soon on the date and agenda of bilateral talks with North Korea.” This statement has been corroborated by The Cable, which reported that the United States has already put forth a proposal. This report came a day after North Korea expressed impatience.

The United States has yet to make any formal public announcements about an agenda. Yesterday, State Department spokesman Ian Kelly limited his comments on the matter to the status quo policy. “We are willing to have bilateral talks with the North Koreans if these talks are conducted in the context of the Six-Party Talks and if they lead to the resumption of the Six-Party Talks,” Kelly said.

But the statements made by Wi Sung-lac and the unnamed senior South Korean official indicate that the South Koreans are aware of a U.S. plan, probably even more than they let on. Since North Korea began insisting on bilateral talks, the United States has uneasily assumed a vanguard diplomatic role. Each member of the six-party talks has accepted the prospect of bilateral talks provided that the goal is to revive the six-party negotiations. Yet this approach has not been without anxiety.

South Korea has been gently pushed to the side despite President Lee Myung-bak’s “grand bargain” proposal. Last month, South Korean media highlighted a potential rift between the United States and South Korea, perhaps exaggerating at times for fear of being relegated to the periphery. In light of this uneasiness, it is a relief that the United States and South Korea are no longer refuting or overlooking each other’s public statements.

Also noteworthy is the seeming coordination between South Korea and Japan. In response to Pyongyang’s announcement on Tuesday that it has reprocessed all of its 8,000 spent nuclear rods and made “significant achievements” in producing another atomic bomb, South Korea and Japan both used the word “regret” to express their outlook on the matter. It may simply be coincidence, but it seems possible that they coordinated this careful word choice to present a calculated and unified message.

Drawing inspiration from America’s Four Horsemen, the British group seeks to secure the world from nuclear dangers. Their plans include reducing nations’ reliance on nuclear weapons and advocating for the CTBT. Yet perhaps their most valuable aspiration is the group’s hope to create a unified European voice.

In an event hosted by the Carnegie Endowment last month, Des Browne introduced this mission as part of his goal for the group: “We hope to bring Europe together. As I say, every country in Europe has its Gang of Four, but they’re operating broadly separate from each other.” In the press release announcing their launch, the group stated that they hope to “provide an authoritative European voice to back up the position of U.S. President Barack Obama.”

Such an enterprise could provide U.S. politicians and lawmakers with a window of clarity into the European stance on key issues. As the press release explains: “The group has also tasked itself with ensuring that politicians in the U.S., of all political persuasions, are in no doubt of their allies’ positions on extended deterrence, tactical nuclear weapons, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty.”

The issues of extended deterrence and tactical nuclear weapons have fueled an intense debate in Washington over the future of U.S. nuclear deployments in Europe. Withdrawal of U.S. tactical nukes from Europe would go a long way toward promoting global nuclear reductions, but this possibility has run into numerous obstacles.

Despite strong indications that the tactical deployments are unwanted and unnecessary, critics of withdrawal argue that our European allies want the nukes. They argue that withdrawal would lead to anxiety and even proliferation as the Europeans would begin to doubt the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. And the critics have plenty of anecdotes from their own meetings with Europeans to support this view.

On the other hand, Des Browne at Carnegie articulated his strong personal view that tactical nuclear weapons could be discarded without undercutting anyone’s strategic defense. He also expressed his confidence that the United States could withdraw its tactical nuclear deployment from Europe smoothly without prompting some sort of extended deterrence crisis, provided that the United States properly engaged diplomatically with Europe in the process.

The UK group’s pursuit of a unified European voice should help to clarify these types of conflicting messages The U.S. political process and future of nuclear reductions are in great need of a clear and coherent message from U.S. allies. The UK group has spotted this problem and seems poised to ameliorate it.