Dr. Marie Isabelle Chevrier – Professor at UT-Dallas, member of the Center’s Scientists Working Group on Biological and Chemical Weapons, and Chair of the Board of Directors of the Biological Weapons Prevention Project in Geneva:

Ellen Tauscher’s speech to the Meeting of the States Parties of the Biological Weapons Convention was much anticipated by delegations. Yet there was little excitement or enthusiasm by the delegation following her speech. Delegations and NGO observers welcomed the change in tone from earlier US interventions during the Bush administration, contrasting it, in particular, with the strident address by John Bolton to the 5th Review Conference in 2001. Nevertheless the lack of specificity of proposals in Tauscher’s address was notable. People wondered about the meaning of language in the statement such as “compliance diplomacy” and “robust bilateral compliance discussion.” Optimists greeted the statement with hope that the statement will be followed by real engagement absent the arrogance of the past while pessimists found little if anything in the statement that would lead to real policy changes from the Bush administration. The inclusion of CBMs on an open website was generally welcome, as a small measure of transparency but not something that would likely lead to real confidence in compliance. Many NGOs are looking forward to greater transparency among all stakeholders rather than mere “bilateral…discussions.”

Dr. Amy E. Smithson – Senior Fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies:

Tauscher tabled a modest, constructive set of proposals, but given the $49 billion in U.S. biodefense spending since 2001, the international community will want more in terms of transparency from Washington than just posting the US confidence-building declarations?already available to all member governments?on the web and inviting one person to Ft. Detrick.   New money earmarked for building international disease surveillance and reporting capacities would have more emphatically conveyed U.S. support for thorough implementation of the International Health Regulations.  If the Obama administration hopes to claim the leadership mantle in the biological nonproliferation arena, they will have to bring something much bolder to the table.  The sooner they do, the better.

Dr. Jonathan Tucker, Senior Fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies:

Although none of the elements of the U.S. strategy are new, taken together they provide a comprehensive and cooperative approach to the prevention of biological threats, both natural and deliberate. The main disappointment is the strategy’s lack of ambition with regard to strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention, both with respect to the treaty’s institutional deficit and the festering suspicions of non-compliance by a few member states. The measures proposed to address compliance concerns—increased transparency, confidence-building measures, and bilateral diplomacy—appear too weak to make much of a difference.

The Obama administration in Geneva yesterday formally revealed its new strategy for strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).

Anticipating the release of the White House’s “National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats,” Dr. Jonathan Tucker, a senior fellow with the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, told Global Security Newswire last Friday: “What’s important is the U.S. government is giving political attention to this issue, and making it clear the U.S. is not a one-trick pony and that in addition to the very ambitious nuclear agenda, the government is also very concerned about biological weapons.”

Undersecretary of State Ellen Tauscher did indeed proclaim the administration’s commitment to the issue. However, the strategy has drawn criticism for reaffirming the Bush administration’s opposition to creating an international monitoring system to verify treaty compliance…

It is important to understand why the Bush administration announced eight years ago that a BWC verification protocol was “not in the best interests of the United States and many other countries.” First, the Bush team felt that the protocol’s provisions were overly influenced by particular nations’ demands. According to FAS, Iran, who played a key role in the deliberations of the Ad-Hoc Group tasked with drafting the protocol, “insisted throughout that all export control regimes, and particularly the Australia Group arrangements, be totally abolished.” In addition, according to Dr. Tucker, Russia sought to define the “types and quantities” of pathogens and toxins banned by the agreement, thereby limiting its scope. Russia and Iran continue to seek such provisions.

An intrusive verification protocol was also perceived by the Bush administration, and perhaps now by the Obama administration, as a burden to biodefense research and the growth of the biotechnology industry. Although a broad interpretation of the BWC, particularly Article X, allows for the production of small amounts of hazardous biological agents for peaceful study, a verification protocol would subject the U.S. biodefense and biotechnology complex to “increased inspection costs and bureaucratic hurdles.” Moreover, the access required for inspections could also threaten to expose vulnerabilities in the U.S. biodefense shield or reveal lucrative pharma-industry secrets.

These concerns appear not to have changed since the Bush administration’s rejection of the verification protocol in November 2001. Meanwhile, biotechnology has continued to advance at a revolutionary pace, advanced techniques have been disseminated around the world and throughout populations, and the biological dual-use dilemma has been amplified. Given these trends, effective monitoring through a verification protocol may not be possible. For this reason, Undersecretary Tauscher explained, “We have carefully reviewed previous efforts to develop a verification protocol and have determined that a legally binding protocol would not achieve meaningful verification or greater security.”

Verification protocol aside, the Obama administration’s new strategy contains a collection of objectives to mitigate biological threats. One of those objectives is to promote global health security, which includes providing assistance to other nations to bolster their disease surveillance, detection, diagnosis, and response programs. Such an approach links security with public health, thereby countering not only nefarious biological weapon threats but also natural infectious disease outbreaks. The White House strategy also includes a variety of confidence and transparency building measures.

But in a press release yesterday, the experts at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies suggest it may take more far-reaching steps than are presented in the new strategy to truly impact the BWC. A close look at the White House strategy document makes it seem more like a reiteration of recommendations generally supporting biological threat reduction rather than a fresh roadmap for strengthening the BWC as an effective central pillar. In fact, the 23-page document’s emphasis on the BWC is limited to a brief pledge in the introduction to uphold the treaty’s obligations, fleeting mentions in a few bullet points, and a single subsection about the need to revitalize the BWC in one of the seven strategic objectives.

Legislation to Protect the Homeland

Sen. Lieberman made this comment on September 8^th, during his introduction of S. 1649, the WMD Prevention and Preparedness Act of 2009, which he co-sponsored with Senator Susan Collins (R-ME).  The legislation will implement a wide variety of recommendations from the Graham/Talent Commission to reduce the American homeland’s vulnerability to bioterrorism.  It aims to strengthen and universalize biological and biotechnological research security standards by introducing an integrated set of pathogen risk tiers, implementing risk assessment protocols, overhauling personnel reliability assessments, as well as other measures.  The legislation also lays out new blueprints for preparedness plans, such as networks for communications and access to countermeasures.

Since the FBI’s conclusion in August 2008 that the sole perpetrator of the 2001 anthrax letters was an American microbiologist working in a government facility, the threat of rogue scientists has been a particularly high-profile concern.  On September 22^nd, the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee held a follow-up hearing on the Lieberman-Collins bill. As one of the hearing’s witnesses, Bob Graham indicated that a rogue scientist is the most likely scenario in which a biological weapon attack is carried out.  Later that day, the Senate Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security held a similar hearing, entitled “Strengthening Security and Oversight at Biological Research Laboratories.”  The scheduling of two similar hearings so close to one another may be an important indication of the awareness on the Hill of serious bioterrorist threats.

A recently released National Research Council report assessed this issued, concluding that “there is no ‘silver bullet,’ that is, no single assessment tool that can offer the prospect of effectively screening out every potential terrorist” (9).  Nonetheless, a wide variety of protective measures will drastically reduce that risk.  The NRC report gives nine biosecurity recommendations (see the Executive Summary), which have been largely addressed by the Lieberman-Collins bill.  On top of the NRC report, the GAO has issued two relevant reports recently.  A July report identified gaps in security at high-containment laboratories, while a September report calls for a national strategy for oversight on high-containment laboratories, which would establish “uniform rules governing the planning, construction, accreditation and operation of the nation’s most sensitive biological defense laboratories” (GSN).  According to Global Security Newswire, federal officials and independent experts have been having difficulty determining which agency should take the lead on that agenda.  It is unfortunate that parochial politics and bureaucratic stalling are getting in the way.  Nonetheless, it is reassuring that people are talking about these critical issues.

The U.S. biological research complex has been plagued in the past by problems of security, standardization, and accounting (see here).  The volume of visible activity contributed over the last few months to the U.S. biosecurity establishment is encouraging; it seems that the country is now moving in the right direction to eliminate these vulnerabilities.

Legislation to Protect the World

Domestic legislation and activities aimed at protecting against bioterrorism not only serve to protect individual countries but also support the international movement to fortify the world against nefarious biological threats and proliferation.  An international multilateral treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), sits at the center of this movement.  However, the BWC lacks an international implementation body and contains no provisions for monitoring or verifying compliance with the treaty.

As stipulated by Article IV of the treaty, the onus is placed on the honest participation and initiative of individual member nations:

Article IV

Each State Party to this Convention shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, take any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in article I of the Convention, within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere.

In their September 22^nd joint statement to the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, Graham and Talent expressed their faith in the BWC:

While the treaty has some inevitable limitations—particularly the difficulty in detecting violators—it remains a powerful norm: no nation brags about their biological weapons capability. It is our obligation to strengthen this norm, internationally. Right now, the clock is ticking on the BWC—the next BWC review conference, in which every article of the entire treaty is reviewed, takes place in 2011. We must propose a new action plan for achieving universal adherence to the BWC, so that all nations of the world are signatories to this pact. We also need to promote new ideas for how the BWC may be implemented on a national level. This conference presents the United States with an opportunity to showcase the progress we have made here at home in both lab safety and lab security. We will have the opportunity to set the global standards of success.

Just as strategic nuclear reductions and declaratory policies made by individual nations help to solidify the nuclear nonproliferation norm, actions taken by individual nations to ensure the safety, security, and legality of domestic biological research help to solidify the biological nonproliferation norm.  Bills like the recent Lieberman-Collins proposal are vital to transforming the BWC into a robust and healthy international regime.  Sen. Lieberman shared Graham’s and Talent’s broad vision, saying, “We hope that this proposal embracing the recommendations of the Graham-Talent commission will set an international standard for biosecurity.”

Meanwhile, the U.S. is not the only entity contributing to international action.  For example, the Australian Parliament adopted legislation for stricter biosecurity practices this past September.  And yesterday, the UN Headquarters in New York hosted a special event entitled “Resolution 1540: At the Crossroads” that brought together experts from academia, NGOs, and industry to review states’ responsibility under Resolution 1540.  Based on the resolution, “all States shall take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls over related materials.”  At least three papers were presented that focused exclusively on biological issues.  This included a paper by Dr. Marie Isabelle Chevrier of the BioWeapons Prevention Project, which endorsed greater government and UN engagement with civil society groups for help “in monitoring and raising awareness of the norms against the weaponization of disease.”

Concluding Thoughts

It is in the interest of every nation to pursue a strong set of biosecurity prevention and preparedness measures for two important reasons.  First, as explained above, domestic action on the part of individual nations goes a long way in contributing to the nonproliferation regime, thereby decreasing the risk of an attack occurring in one’s own homeland.  Second, given the modern mobility of people and infectious disease, a biological weapon attack occurring anywhere presents a subsequent threat to the rest of the world.  This renders national and international interests as one and the same—and this applies to both nefarious and natural biological threats.

As previously articulated, the volume of visible activity in the biosecurity movement over the past few months is encouraging.  It may not be at the head, but bio is certainly at the international table of nonproliferation discourse.  Biological threat issues still require a greater influx of creative minds and active awareness.  For this reason, Dr. Chevrier’s paper, and the BioWeapons Prevention Project as a whole, are particularly interesting.  Ultimately, these issues must come to the forefront of public awareness before breakthrough progress can be made.

Within the life sciences curriculum of colleges around the world exists an exigent academic gap.

History has exemplified the imperative for science scholars to contemplate the ethical, social, and political implications of their disciplines.  Max Weber characterized the traditional scientific ethos in his description of science as an isolated value sphere, one that should not be coupled with ethics and politics.  J. Robert Oppenheimer, father of the atomic bomb, exemplified this Weberian spirit in his contention that “the true responsibility of a scientist, as we know, is to the integrity and vigor of his science.”  However, after the use of the atomic bomb, the tremendous culpability felt and expressed by many of the Manhattan Project scientists, including Oppenheimer as well as Robert R. Wilson, signaled the rise of a new scientific ethos, one that cultivates an ethically, socially, and politically responsible self-identity for the scientist and science scholar.  At this nexus between science and responsibility lies the curricular gap of life sciences programs.  I write to you in the spirit of the new scientific ethos with the express purpose of recommending that you include the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC/BWC) as a mandatory component in the curriculum of undergraduate programs pertaining to the life sciences.

It should be incumbent upon institutions of higher learning—charged with the task of creating individuals who are simultaneously astute authorities of their fields and responsible citizens of the world—to inculcate their science scholars with a socially, politically, and ethically responsible ethos.  Equipped with this holistic approach, these scholars will be properly prepared to go forth and conscientiously implement their powerful knowledge while guarding against dangerous misuse or nefarious exploitation of this knowledge.  In the life sciences, this ethos involves legal responsibility: the BWC is an international legally binding treaty that has been signed and ratified by our nation.  In light of the notorious dual-use dilemma of the life sciences, a large cohort from the international science community united with policymakers and diplomats have in the past two decades increasingly voiced deep concerns over irresponsible decision-making that is at odds with the obligations and objectives of the BWC.  They have declared the need to institute a global culture of bioethics, awareness, and codes of conduct.  Industry’s control over the life sciences continues to rise, and many worry about the possibility for advertent and inadvertent social, political, or physical damage as a result of reckless science—that is, science exclusively concerned with raw technical and industrial advances at the expense of considering its potentially problematic effects.

The BWC provides a foundational framework within which these dangers may be mitigated, but the BWC by itself is insufficient for executing such a formidable task.  The life sciences disciplines and industries cannot be dealt with as a single, autonomous organism.  Ultimately, individual people making individual choices on a daily basis determine the trajectory of the life sciences.  Thus, in order to achieve efficacy, the BWC must be applied and demonstrated on the basis of the individual scientist.  Moreover, a common grievance concerning the BWC is its lack of a verification protocol.  This unfortunate deficiency, whether a result of verification being impracticable or a result of complex politics, also places greater accountability and responsibility for compliance on individual states and individual actors within those states.  To comprehensively ensure compliance with the BWC and foster a conscientious eye toward maintaining global safety and security, individuals (in addition to governments) must be directly exposed to the material of the BWC.  Institutions of higher learning are the ideal setting in which to propagate this vital exposure.

We live in a world that has identified the need for comprehensive safeguards against harmful research, both advertent and inadvertent.  The BWC is the locus of these safeguards in the life sciences.  The scientist proponents of international bioethics are attempting to proliferate the new ethos of moral, political, and social responsibility in advance so that they will not, as nuclear physicist Robert Wilson did, have to repent:  “Thinking back to that time, it occurs to me that it would have been an excellent occasion for the conscience of a scientist to have been exercised.”  I entreat you, form your institutions into exemplars of progressive and ethical life sciences scholarship; infuse values of law, civility, and humanity into all disciplines; and ensure that your colleges provide its life sciences scholars with all the knowledge and understanding necessary to pursue the true goal of science: to advance the well-being of society and of the world.  Establishing the BWC as a mandatory life sciences curricular component is absolutely pivotal to this bioethical imperative.

Sincerely,

Weapons and Hope

Another troublesome element of the biological dual-use dilemma, which I did not develop in my earlier post here, is the possibility of dangerous international competition.  National research agendas, aimed at maintaining technological parity or advantages, could push the pace of advancements in the biological sciences at an incredible speed, perhaps thrusting research programs into areas that would otherwise be designated off-limits.

Such a situation is complicated by inconsistencies in international standards for research, which could be the result of two things.  The first would be intentional decisions on the part of individual nations to disregard the terms of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), which could prompt other nations to follow suit.  The second is a cultural issue: the lack of global cultural standards on what should and should not be permitted, particularly as advances are made in biotechnology and synthetic biology.  A global scientific culture of responsibility is vital, but it is unclear how consistently such a “culture” manifests itself into standards around the world.  The BWC is somewhat ineffective on many levels because of the vagueness of what exactly is illegal vis-à-vis the dual-use dilemma and the lack of a verification protocol.  These complicated shortcomings in the BWC have led to divisive issues surrounding biodefense programs, and may lead to similar dynamics surrounding biotechnology in the future.

The Biodefense Transparency Problem

In line with the dual-use dilemma, biodefense programs involve many of the same types of technologies and materials that a nefarious biological weapons program would involve.  Biodefense programs study and experiment with dangerous pathogens, sometimes they may genetically alter pathogens, and sometimes they may experiment with aerosolization—these are some of the primary earmarks of an offensive biological weapons program.  However, in biodefense, all of these activities are performed with the final purpose of developing countermeasures and therapeutics.  Nonetheless, it is not necessarily clear to outside observers that these biodefense programs are involved exclusively with biodefense goals.  In fact, the U.S. is suspicious that several countries may be developing offensive biological weapons under the disguise of biodefense, pharmaceutical, or life sciences research programs because of research elements that appear to have pertinence to offensive biological weapons capability.  As articulated by the U.S. Department of State Compliance Report of 2005, the U.S. suspects this may currently, or in the past, be the case with the following countries: China, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Russia, and Syria.  However, the U.S. itself has the most far-reaching and comprehensive biodefense, pharmaceutical, and life sciences research programs in the entire world.  In an interview on Wednesday with the Nuclear Threat Initiative, independent analyst Gerald Epstein indicated that the U.S. is “by far the most transparent on [bio]defense issues.”  See here.  Nonetheless, the U.S. certainly does have many research elements, such as those described above, that could be considered from the outside as pertinent to an offensive biological weapons program.  Can we expect other countries to not have the very same suspicions of us?

Domestic Suspicions Emerge

On November 25^th, 1969, Richard Nixon’s made an unprecedented announcement, unilaterally renouncing biological weapons and thereby leading to the first ban in history of an entire class of weaponry.  In his speech, Nixon explained:

Biological weapons have massive, unpredictable and potentially uncontrollable consequences. They may produce global epidemics and impair the health of future generations. I have therefore decided that:

• The United States shall renounce the use of lethal biological agents and weapons, and all other methods of biological warfare.
• The United States will confine its biological research to defensive measures such as immunization and safety measures.
• The Department of Defense has been asked to make recommendations as to the disposal of existing stocks of bacteriological weapons.

Prior to Nixon's announcement, Fort Detrick was the center of the U.S. offensive biological weapons program

Nonetheless, despite the U.S. founding and maintaining unflagging commitment to the BWC, suspicions of an offensive biological weapons program continue to exist in our society.  The extent of these suspicions became very clear during my thesis research on the political controversy surrounding a high-containment biodefense laboratory complex recently constructed in Boston—the National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratories (NEIDL), operated by the Boston University Medical Center and funded in large part by the National Institutes of Health.

The controversy has become an extremely complicated struggle between different interest groups that straddles a wide variety of political and social dynamics.  However, the foundation of the controversy, its raw fuel, revolves around the hypothetical risk that situating this particular laboratory (a Biosafety Level 4 facility) poses to the surrounding community.  The conceptually precarious nature of the NEIDL’s research agenda, characterized by its uppermost biocontainment classification of Biosafety Level-4 (BSL-4), serves as the primary stimulus for disagreement and dissent over both the hypothetical impact and underlying purpose of the NEIDL.  The beneficence of the NEIDL’s intended research has been questioned.  Discourses and ideas within the NEIDL controversy show that the NEIDL’s research agenda and the BSL-4 status are understood not only within their scientific context but also within a cultural context of connotations, experiences, and beliefs held by members of society.  This interconnected web of meanings has led many within the anti-NEIDL opposition group to contend that the NEIDL will undertake biological weapons research.

In formulating ways to institute an effective biodefense program for the nation, U.S. policy-makers have identified the need to implement a fusion of national defense and public health approaches.  However, this fusion, although seemingly suited to the intricate challenges presented by biological weapon and biosecurity threats, has resulted in its own shortcomings for the biodefense program.  Renowned journalist Laurie Garrett describes the contact between these two different institutional cultures, that of national defense and that of public health, as a “conflict of interest” that jeopardizes society’s trust in the public health system’s openness and beneficence:

But the fear of bioterrorism threatens to destroy that vital social contract, which is not shared by law enforcement and defense officials. The closer a public health system draws to the other two systems, the greater the danger that it will lose credibility in the eyes of the public… Some public health advocates are convinced that no marriage between their profession and law enforcement could ever work and have denounced all efforts to heighten concerns about bioterrorism. (Laurie Garrett, 2001, “The Nightmare of Bioterrorism”, Foreign Affairs 80(1): 76-89.)

In the eyes of the anti-NEIDL community, the NEIDL lacks credibility as a safe and integral component of the public health system—it undermines the “vital social contract” of public health—because of its association with a federal, national defense agenda.  Criticisms of the NEIDL’s development end up going beyond the alleged compromise of openness and transparency.  The NEIDL’s connection to national defense and homeland security, which is represented by both its official mandate and its funding from the NIH through a targeted Homeland Security budget, has incited a pervasive accusatory paranoia about biological weapons research, particularly amongst citizens who are cynical and disdainful of the Bush administration’s record.

In an attempt to understand and mitigate public opposition to the NEIDL, the NIH established a Blue Ribbon Panel.  The following is an excerpt taken directly from the 14 October 2008 Blue Ribbon Panel public community meeting in one of the Boston neighborhoods bordering the NEIDL:

Adel Mahmoud, Chairman of the Blue Ribbon Panel: This question has been on the minds of everybody and in Boston, and I want to respond to it.  And hopefully we are responding according to the laws of the country; we are not making a story.  The development of bioweapons is forbidden by the United States and international law.  This is the law.

Audience members laugh mockingly.

Now you can laugh, and I can laugh back at you, but that’s not the issue.  The issue is, do we live in a country that has got laws that are respected or not?

Audience: No!

You need to give me the courtesy to complete my answer, just as I give you the courtesy to say your questions, ok?  Anyone who develops bioweapons can be subject to criminal prosecution in keeping with those laws and restrictions.

A member of the audience verbally mocks Mahmoud.

I really don’t appreciate that, I really don’t appreciate it.  Boston University has publicly pledged that research on bioweapons will not take place at the NEIDL.  Furthermore, bioweapons research is very different than biodefense research.  Bioweapons research involves the development or production of biological agents or toxins for use as weapons.  Please try to appreciate this definition.  Biodefense, on the other hand, involves the development of protective interventions…I really, really plead with you to try to appreciate the difference between those two because if we continue on the same six years of debate, we’re not going to get anywhere.

The NEIDL in Boston

The pro-NEIDL interest group and many experts on the issue do not believe such accusations to be credible.  But regardless of its level of validity, this argument has become an unyielding element of the NEIDL controversy; that bioweapons research will occur in the NEIDL is a perceived reality for many people observing the NEIDL’s development.  Compliance and noncompliance with the BWC is a matter not only of practice but also of perception.  This is the case for domestic audiences, as well as for foreign nations examining one another.

Fears of a Biological Arms Race

Several experts on the matter have asserted that the biodefense research, with its focus on national defense, creates the precarious possibility of a foreign bioweapons arms race as foreign nations will also perceive biodefense facilities, such as the NEIDL, as bioweapons development facilities.  This includes Boston University School of Public Health Professor Dr. David Ozonoff and medical anthropologist Jeanne Guillemin, both of whom have been very involved in the NEIDL political controversy and in biodefense discourses in general.

Despite controversy surrounding any single particular laboratory, biodefense research will continue in the U.S., whether in university laboratories or government laboratories.  It is difficult to gauge just exactly how real the threat of bioterrorism or use of biological weapons actually is, since we do not have full access to information on the capabilities and intentions of terrorist groups and foreign governments.  However, it is perfectly clear that technically feasible use of biological weapons could result in horrific and catastrophic losses of life and social stability.  Biological weapons could theoretically also be deployed as genocidal weapons.  In this scope, biodefense seems perfectly warranted despite the concerns surrounding it.

Thus, there is a tremendous need for transparency and accountability in biological research programs around the world in order to mitigate mutual suspicions and prevent a competitive, self-perpetuating biological arms race.  The Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation has identified this challenge, expressed in a report (released yesterday) that explains the need for more effective compliance processes.  The report was the result of a “meeting, held in Washington, DC on 25 February 2008, [that aimed] to facilitate information sharing and discussion among a small group of governmental and nongovernmental experts about the processes used by various governments and government agencies to ensure their compliance with the BWC.”  The underling significance of the report is its contributions to the understanding of how to strengthen compliance with and confidence in the BWC.

There are several things about the BWC that are important to keep in mind when considering how to implement compliance:

1. The standards of the BWC may be interpreted vaguely, with intention being extremely important in the determination of what is legal and what is not legal
2. Lack of a verification protocol and lack of clear, automatic consequences of noncompliance has made the BWC a treaty of norms, requiring the building of credibility and confidence between nations, and revolving around perceptions
3. The ultimate intent of biological research programs is impossible to know definitively

The Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation report discusses the compliance procedures in place for several countries as well as delving into the challenges to credibility of the BWC.  The report expressed a general positive consensus among the meeting participants over two particular treaty interpretation principles:

The first principle was that compliance assessments should proceed from the presumption that biodefense activities must be shown to be justified under the terms of the BWC, rather than from the presumption that biodefense activities must be considered compliant unless shown to violate the terms of the Treaty.

and…

Second, it was proposed that in order to justify an activity under Article I.1 of the BWC, the activity should be shown to be both useful and critical for a prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purpose, the more so the greater the compliance concern.

A CDC Vaccine Researcher in a BSL-4 Laboratory

These two principles put the burden on individual countries to demonstrate they are in compliance, rather than putting the burden on others to prove individual countries are not are not in compliance.  There is a push to implement this approach for nuclear activities as well.  Although such an approach is not necessarily fair in terms of domestic civil punishment, this is a strong approach for an international treaty like the BWC, which tends to be based on normative action and mutual confidence and does not result in automatic punishment.  Such an approach promotes greater transparency and positive accountability, which are essential for mitigating the risk of a biological arms race.

A Trickier Future with Biotechnology

The BWC does not cover international competition in biotechnological research that does not deal with pathogens and toxins.  As discussed in my earlier post, the hypothetical threats of biotechnology include social hazards in addition to the physical hazards caused by pathogens.  The social hazards may expand into the international realm, particularly since, as already mentioned, there is a lack of global cultural standards on what should and should not be permitted.  Thus, one nation’s standards, and attempts to prohibit seemingly socially divisive or risky technologies, would not necessarily be followed by other nations.  How would one nation respond to a second nation pursuing cutting-edge biotechnological research that the first nation had decided was too ethically and socially sensitive to pursue, particularly if this research could present some sort of economic or even military advantage over the first nation?  National security, economically and militarily, are topics that often trump all other arguments.  The concept of morality and social stability often seem too abstract and impractical to focus on in the minds of strategic policymakers.  Such a situation could undermine individual nations’ attempts to practice responsible and moderated biotechnological research.

On 19 June 2008, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade held a meeting entitled “Genetics and Other Human Modification Technologies: Sensible International Regulation or a New Kind of Arms Race?”  One of the expert witnesses called for testimony was Jamie F. Metzl of the Asia Society.  Metzl explained that in the face of a country, corporation, or group moving forward with an aggressive program in a biotechnological field, particularly one that is socially and politically taboo (genetic enhancement, for example), others would have the choice of responding in four ways:

1. Doing nothing and accepting a deteriorating relative position
2. Beginning the same program in order to keep up
3. Working to halt the offending program
4. Seeking to develop a global governance structure to produce uniform conduct and application

Metzl supported the fourth choice.

Concluding Thoughts

Many consider nuclear weapons to be a paramount gauge of international eminence.  As the global disarmament agenda proceeds, and nuclear weapons are hypothetically abolished, what will take the place of nuclear weapons as a measure of international status?  Biotechnological capabilities are certainly a possibility, and it could be a possibility equally as dangerous as nuclear weapons.  The nuclear and biological technologies have many differences and their uses in society include distinct contexts.  Nonetheless, as biotechnology, synthetic biology, nanotechnology, and even robotics continue to advance at an explosive pace, lessons learned from the international nuclear voyage can certainly be applied so that the general challenges and dangers presented by nuclear weapons can be prevented in these other fields of science before they even arise.