As the diplomatic standoff with Iran continues to heat up, Yukiya Amano of Japan today begins his tenure as the new Director General of the IAEA. In an interview with Reuters in February, Amano praised President Obama’s willingness to open dialogue with Iran. But dialogue has not gone well thus far, which prompted exiting Director General Mohamed ElBaradei to declare last Friday that the IAEA’s cooperation with Iran has reached a “dead end.” With these firm farewell words from ElBaradei, it is now Amano’s turn to navigate the technical and political minefield that is the Iranian nuclear program…

Mohamed ElBaradei has been a controversial figure due to his hostile relationship with the Bush administration. During his term, ElBaradei was criticized by Washington for politicizing the IAEA and taking a relatively soft stance on Iran. Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice placed much of the blame for Iran’s nuclear developments on ElBaradei’s leadership of the Agency.  She accused ElBaradei of “muddying the message” to Iran and stated that “The IAEA is not in the business of diplomacy. The IAEA is a technical agency…”

In contrast, Amano is known to be more of a technocrat than a diplomat. In his February interview, he stated: “The IAEA’s basic function is not political negotiation but implementing already agreed safeguards. Remarks by the director have political implications which, if made without properly assessing these implications, can be very dangerous.”

In fact, much of Amano’s support in his July 1st election was rooted in the belief that he would “depoliticize” the IAEA in the wake of ElBaradei’s leadership. The AP’s George Jahn noted in July that, “without publicly saying so, the U.S. and its allies had made clear before Tuesday’s voting that they favored Amano because they saw him as someone who would manage the IAEA without thrusting himself into the political fray.”  In a similar vein, UPI explained that, “poor Asian and African nations regard him as too aligned with rich nations.” The developing nations largely supported South African candidate Abdul Minty, who had run for the position on a platform of moderate activism aimed at challenging the nuclear weapon states on disarmament issues.

Amano has tried to deflect concerns that he has a hidden, factional agenda. At a conference shortly after his election, Amano told reporters: “As a national from Japan, I will do my utmost to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. To do that, the solidarity of all the member states, countries of the north, from the south, from east and west, is absolutely necessary.”

Amano has also called for a wider understanding of the IAEA as not only a nuclear watchdog, but also a key facilitator of peaceful nuclear energy use.  He explained that new perceptions of the IAEA as a “dual objective organization” would be “helpful in strengthening confidence in the agency.”

As for how Amano’s vision of a depoliticized IAEA and increased solidarity will play out in the context of the Iranian nuclear issue, NoH wishes the new Director General the best of luck.  He is likely to need it.

Update: James Acton has published a more in-depth analysis of the IAEA’s change in leadership on Carnegie’s website

The last few weeks have seen several noteworthy nuclear news items from the South Asian rivals, including: India’s announcement (perhaps premature) of its new nuclear submarines, Pakistan’s ambivalent responses to this announcement, Pakistan’s obstruction of breakthrough progress in the Conference on Disarmament, and renouncement of the CTBT by a top India nuclear physicist.  It is vital that the challenges of South Asia are not simply swept to the side as the world focuses on Iran and North Korea.  Once the Iran and North Korea crises are hypothetically (and hopefully) resolved, India and Pakistan will remain central to the dynamics of the global nonproliferation regime.  Their impact is distinctive, because as non-members of the NPT, it can be interpreted that they are technically outside of the nonproliferation regime.  However, though they do not participate in the NPT, India and Pakistan are nonetheless being increasingly pulled into the global politics of the overarching nonproliferation regime, thus rendering their nuclear decisions as issues of increasing global importance.

Indian External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee and U.S. Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice After Signing the Bilateral Civil Nuclear Deal in October 2008

The U.S. seems to be the key player in bringing India and Pakistan into the fold, as it has pursued strong ties with both India and Pakistan.  Perhaps the most significant event was the final establishment of a U.S.-India civil nuclear partnership last summer/fall.  It was an unprecedented deal, effectively breaking the U.S. moratorium on nuclear trade with India that had existed for thirty years, and bringing the U.S. into the company of an unofficial nuclear power previously considered a nuclear renegade.  There was great opposition to the proposal for the deal both worldwide and within the U.S., but after three years of diplomatic, technical, and political processes—the U.S. had to amend domestic law, India had to implement a separation in their civil and military nuclear programs, India had to make extensive safeguard arrangements with the IAEA, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) had to build the consensus to make an exception for the non-NPT India—the partnership finally came to fruition.  See the CFR’s backgrounder for a good summary.

One of the interesting surprises of this deal was Nobel Peace Prize winner IAEA Director Mohamed ElBaradei’s support for it.  Despite the regular tension between ElBaradei and U.S. policies (see here), despite the fact that the deal was a bilateral accord between the U.S. and a country known to have been avoiding the nonproliferation regime, and despite ElBaradei’s passionate commitment to averting nuclear proliferation, ElBaradei threw his full support behind the deal.  There are two primary grounds on which the deal was opposed.  The first 1), global in scope, was that the deal would contribute to nuclear proliferation by a) providing India with nuclear fuel that it could divert towards its weapons program and b) projecting a delegitimizing effect on the nonproliferation regime by rewarding India despite its shunning of the NPT.  The second 2), regional in scope, was that the deal would ultimately intensify the nuclear rivalry between India and Pakistan and contribute to a destabilizing arms race.  After all, China pledged that it would establish a corresponding partnership with Pakistan if the U.S.-India deal came through.  Nonetheless, ElBaradei felt that these problems were outweighed by the advantages of the deal.

ElBaradei was able to provide a comprehensive explanation of his unexpected position on the U.S.-India civil nuclear deal during a public conversation with Scott Sagan at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies in May 2006.  He explained this deal as an example of an innovative method of dealing with the intricate realities of global nuclear challenges.  By creating a partnership with India, the U.S. effectively filled in a critical gap in the nonproliferation regime; the U.S. brought India finally into the fold, an event that was long overdue.

ElBaradei emphasizes that we must remember the reality of India’s status: it made a sovereign decision to refrain from joining the NPT because of its own security concerns, and it became a nuclear power outside of the bounds of the NPT.  It possesses nuclear weapons, and thus, a civil nuclear deal with India will not affect its weapon status.  Instead, such a deal has brought India into compliance with other aspects of the nonproliferation regime despite not being a party to the NPT: India has permanently separated its nuclear civil energy and weapons programs, has established cooperation with the IAEA safeguard and inspection regimes, and enhanced the public and international accountability of India’s overall nuclear program.  According to ElBaradei, the U.S.-India partnership is a creative way of dealing with the reality of India’s complicated nuclear status.  Moreover, such a deal helps to address India’s need for energy to promote development.  ElBaradei explained: “From a safety, security, and nonproliferation standpoint, I see that agreement as a win-win for everyone.”  ElBaradei, of course, has a soft spot for the energy-development argument.

Technically speaking, the U.S.-India partnership should not be seen as negatively impacting the nonproliferation regime because, by shunning the NPT, India never officially joined the nonproliferation regime, and no one can expect India to ever join the NPT.  Nonetheless, a more accurate understanding of the nonproliferation regime is perhaps one that views it more broadly—that is, as a global system of norms and ideas that transcend a single treaty.  In that sense, the appearance that India is being rewarded despite neglecting the authority of the NPT is in fact damaging to the system of mutual confidence that drives the nonproliferation regime.  Nonproliferation efforts require diplomatic finesse and political symbolism as much as they do technical fixes and international laws.  How can India be rewarded with such a fantastic bilateral nuclear partnership even though it has been a longstanding pariah to the NPT?

If India can have such a great deal, perhaps it is incumbent upon the five NWS and the IAEA to do a better job facilitating for nuclear energy partnerships for all countries around the world, most of which have actually joined the NPT and are thus assured of access to nuclear energy.  However, herein lies one of the big paradoxes of the nuclear nonproliferation agenda.  In order to maintain adherence to the NPT and confidence in the nonproliferation regime, the IAEA and five NWS have the duty to aid other nations in the developing of their own nuclear energy capabilities, provided that the other nations agree to safeguards and monitoring.  However, it is also through these nuclear energy programs that proliferation of nuclear weapon capabilities is facilitated.  This may occur through a nation’s intentional strategic plan to begin an energy program as a front for an eventual weapons program.  Or more likely, the development of a nuclear energy program may render a nation into what ElBaradei calls a virtual nuclear power, or a latent nuclear power—that is, a nation that does not possess nuclear weapons but possesses the expertise, components, technology, and knowledge required to produce nuclear weapons in a very short period of time if an occasion for demand ever arises.  The limiting factor for the transition from a virtual nuclear power into an actual nuclear power is the approximately 6-month period it would take to enrich energy-grade uranium into weapons-grade uranium or reprocess plutonium into fissile material.  But there are hypothetical fixes to this paradox.  One of the most popular is the multinational fuel bank proposal, another idea that ElBaradei considers a uniquely creative step forward.

The abovementioned paradox, alongside the contentiousness of the U.S.-India civil nuclear partnership, illustrates that decisions made in the nuclear realm are full of internal contradictions and trade-offs.  As in all situations involving a two-sided coin, the question becomes, which side should one choose?  There is a lesson to be learned from ElBaradei’s conception of the U.S.-India deal and the related paradox.  Although he did not explicitly articulate it as such, it seems that ElBaradei saw the advantages of the deal as indispensible pieces of progress whereas he saw the deal’s problems and dangers as capable of being mitigated and overcome.  There is an elegant, and forward-looking wisdom to such an approach—choosing the advantages that are indispensible, accepting the dangers that may be mitigated, and then actually dealing with and mitigating those dangers.  Bringing a key global nuclear player like India into the political and diplomatic fray was an indispensible move for the future of the global nonproliferation and disarmament agenda.  The dangers of the partnership, though certainly understandable and serious, were capable of being effectively resolved.  In fact, the solutions for mitigating these dangers are additional measures that should be pursued and implemented regardless of the U.S.-India partnership.

4th IAEA Director General and Nobel Prize Winner Mohamed ElBaradei

The solution to the first, globally scoped, major danger (delegitimization of the NPT) is for the U.S. and IAEA to better facilitate universal access to effectively safeguarded nuclear energy while continuing to press for nonproliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities.  As stated earlier, one proposed way of balancing the need for access to nuclear energy against the danger of spreading weapons capabilities is through the use of multinational fuel banks.  And the solution to the second, regionally scoped, major danger (an Indo-Pakistani arms race) is to enhance the solidarity and cooperation between India and Pakistan.  This latter solution is one that is being conspicuously tested as evidenced by the increased attention on India’s and Pakistan’s recent nuclear posturing.

The U.S. and international community must serve as effective arbiters between India and Pakistan as both nations seem determined to build upon their strategic armaments.  As the decision of a sovereign nation, India has the right to pursue its own nuclear ballistic missile submarines.  But this does not mean that the U.S. cannot get involved in the political implications of such a posturing.  After India’s announcement of its nuclear submarine, the Pakistani Foreign Ministry gave the following statements on July 28^th:

Continued induction of new lethal weapon systems by India is detrimental to regional peace and stability…Pakistan believes that maintenance of strategic balance is essential for peace and security in South Asia…Without entering into an arms race with India, Pakistan will take all appropriate steps to safeguard its security and maintain strategic balance.

However, on July 30^th, the Nuclear Threat Initiative quoted a top Pakistani naval commander, navy chief of staff Admiral Bashir Noman, as expressing a different sentiment:

“We are not focused on India,” said Adm. Bashir Noman, chief of staff for the Pakistani navy. “India is a neighbor, so we must have [a] good relationship.” Pakistan is instead focused on curbing terrorism, piracy and drug trafficking in the Indian Ocean, he said.

This is a very productive change in attitude, and the world is very fortunate that the Pakistani navy has taken this tone.  Most likely, U.S. urging for greater partnership between India and Pakistan had much to do with this position.  India’s strategic posturing severely interferes with U.S. and global goals to curb terrorism.  Pakistan’s resources are stretched very thin due to the tremendously delicate stability across its lands, as Taliban militants, having been expelled from many parts of Afghanistan, have expanded into Pakistan looking to seize more power and more territory.  But at the same time that this struggle is occurring, Pakistan’s military remains on constant alert against Indian threats; Pakistan maintains strong forces along the Indo-Pakistani border.  In fact, it seems as though Pakistan has been inclined in some cases to negotiate with Taliban forces rather than face off against them because Pakistan lacks the military forces to divert toward this struggle, when in fact, excess Pakistani forces are deployed as a hedge against India.  As a consequence, the Taliban have gained stronger hold in some territories.

For the sake of both global nuclear nonproliferation and the struggle against the Taliban, the U.S. must continue to work toward easing the tensions between India and Pakistan.  On July 28^th, Pakistan pledged that they would balance against India’s nuclear submarine development, which translates into the funding of more weapons of war that that threaten the world’s survival and are useless in the fight that really matters right now.  It seems that the U.S. has gotten serious about wise military spending as applies to the challenges presented by 4th generation and asymmetrical warfare, which is why the U.S. has cut the funding to additional F-22s and certain projects within the army’s future combat systems.  The U.S. also needs its most important allies to get wise about spending.  Pakistan is one such ally, and this will not occur without cooperation from India.

Thus, we should be alarmed by the claim on Wednesday by high-level Indian nuclear scientist that India must not join the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and must pursue further thermonuclear tests.  See here.

Meanwhile, we should also be alarmed by Pakistan’s meddling in overdue progress in the Conference on Disarmament.  See here and here. The Conference on Disarmament, the paramount international disarmament negotiating forum, has been politically deadlocked for over a decade, and there are finally signs of a major breakthrough.  However, Pakistan may prove to be the single impediment to this progress, as Pakistan has called for a reconsideration of a work plan that the entire conference had agreed upon earlier this year (something that has not happened throughout the decade-long deadlock).  The Conference on Disarmament intends to address the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, the prospect of global zero, and other related items.  There may be no progress in any of these issues without the participation and cooperation of Pakistan.

India and Pakistan should heed the lesson of ElBaradei’s perspective on the U.S.-India civil nuclear partnership: they must seek the advantages that are indispensible, accept the dangers that can be mitigated, and then work towards mitigating the dangers.  Greater cooperation and solidarity amongst the world’s nuclear players is indispensible.  India and Pakistan must act correspondingly.

International nuclear policy-makers must better heed developmental politics.  By developmental politics, I refer to the economic disparity between the developed and the developing nations, and the political tensions between these two sides resulting from that disparity.  This may also be referred to as the politics of inequality or the North-South Divide, a rough geoeconomic approximation.  The North-South Divide is alive and kicking in international nuclear issues.

Developmental political tensions have been a centerpiece of the nuclear nonproliferation regime since the establishment of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970.  The terms of the NPT are characterized by an internal contradiction: five nations (the initial nuclear weapon states) are given legal authorization to possess nuclear weapons while every other nation must forswear them.  In return, the NPT (Article IV) authorizes every nation to have access to civilian nuclear energy, a policy partially aimed at promoting equality amongst nations and assuaging international unease over the NPT’s internal contradiction.  However, Article IV of the NPT did not successfully eliminate international tensions over nuclear development and privileges, particularly because the five nuclear weapon states have arguably not been faithful their duties according to Article VI, which obliges them to move toward nuclear disarmament.

These tensions have resulted in a rough “North-South Divide”, in which the nuclear policies of the developed nation bloc (mostly northern) have been seen as hypocritical and inequitable by the developing nation bloc (mostly southern).  Even though the majority of developed/northern nations do not possess nuclear weapons themselves, their economic and political ties to the nuclear weapon states have afforded them with nuclear deterrence umbrellas (through NATO and other alliances) and civilian nuclear energy programs, thus resulting in a general solidification of a northern nuclear bloc.  China may be considered as an outlier, as it is one of the legitimate nuclear weapon states but often aligns itself with developing nation policies.

The concept of the North-South Divide is featured in social science academic discourses as a response to Modernization Theory

The North-South Divide political tensions have obstructed cooperation and consensus-building in international nuclear issues, but this trend has largely been neglected.  When dealing with international nuclear arms control issues, policy- and law-makers obsess over technocratic approaches and high politics.  Great time and energy has gone into producing comprehensive verification plans, technical fixes, and complex carrot-and-stick approaches.  These things are undoubtedly vital to effective mitigation of nuclear proliferation threats.  In fact, nuclear issues should be considered fundamentally within the realm of high politics as these issues deal with the most destructive force controlled by man.  However, nuclear issues and solutions to these issues are not limited to high politics and technocratic reasoning.  In focusing on these ‘expert’ perspectives, the perspectives that traditionally claim ascendancy in the bureaucratic hierarchy, policy-makers have not been sufficiently cognizant of the North-South Divide.

The Divide Comes into the Limelight

Yukiya Amano

However, the recent election of a new Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Yukiya Amano of Japan, has brought the North-South Divide to the forefront, possibly for the long-run.  Amano’s election on July 1^st came after an extended deadlock, during which Amano competed with South African candidate Abdul Minty.  The two had been contending for the position since an election in March, in which Amano led but could not procure the mandatory two-thirds majority.  Of the 35 member nations represented on the IAEA’s Board of Governors, the developed nations overwhelmingly supported Amano, representing industrialized Japan.  The developing nations mostly supported Minty, who had run for the position on a platform of moderate activism, aimed at challenging the nuclear weapon states on disarmament issues.  Minty’s vision more closely resembled that of departing Director General Mohamed ElBaradei of Egypt, and Amano’s assumption of the position appeared to the developed nations as an agreeable departure from ElBaradei’s own activism.

As several news sources pointed out, the deadlock and close victory of Amano revealed the continuing North-South Divide.  United Press International explained here:

Poor Asian and African nations regard him as too aligned with rich nations. Some European nations believe he isn’t the inclusive candidate that they would like.

And Associated Press writer George Jahn pointed out here:

Without publicly saying so, the U.S. and its allies had made clear before Tuesday’s voting that they favored Amano because they saw him as someone who would manage the IAEA without thrusting himself into the political fray.

The Problem, Practically Speaking

The North-South Divide visible within IAEA politics is far more than trivial bureaucratic drama; the divide has serious practical consequences for the nonproliferation regime.  This political tension has plagued the IAEA’s ability to effectively build consensuses required to investigate suspected nuclear weapons programs, such as that of Iran.  As Jahn explains:

The Iranian investigation in particular has been affected by the deep divide between Western nations, including the United States, and developing countries that accuse the West of being indifferent to the problems of poorer countries.

The industrialized nations have formed robust opposition to the Iranian nuclear development program, claiming that it is ultimately geared towards the production of nuclear weapons.  In contrast, many (perhaps a majority of) developing nations uphold on principle Iran’s claim to the right to its uranium enrichment program for energy purposes, a claim that is tied to Article IV of the NPT.  Despite any of their own fears of Iran’s potential weaponization in the future, developing nations have a stronger affinity for supporting nuclear energy rights than for opposing potential nuclear threats, thereby partially undermining the efforts of the U.S. and its allies to prevent nuclear proliferation in Iran.  This is a direct result of the North-South Divide.  And Iran has been completely aware of this vulnerability in the nonproliferation regime, realizing that the developing world would either believe or feel ethically obliged to support claims that Western opposition to its nuclear program are simply attempts to thwart its development.

Mohamed ElBaradei

It is impossible to determine definitively, but the evidence is quite convincing that Iran is indeed pursuing nuclear weapons capability.  From a practical standpoint, the North-South Divide has provided Iran with a useful political tool to continue its program without serious and unequivocal global opposition.  Let us remember that not everyone, and not every influential political official in the world, has come to the conclusion that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons capability.  One prime example is Mohamed ElBaradei, who has occupied perhaps the most authoritatively important global political role in nuclear affairs.  Diplomacy and foreign relations often seem like a game, where probing, stalling, brinksmanship, rhetoric, and symbolism come into play.  With the exception of the closest of allies, frank discussions between countries are not always common.  In the pursuit of suspicious or dubious goals, any excuse helps.  Iran has capitalized on a prime excuse for pursuing its nuclear program, and for wanting to do so without any Western intervention.  Even with adamant opposition of the part of the U.S. and its allies, such an excuse gives Iran just enough persuasive capital in the eyes of other countries and just enough pause to the U.S. to allow for Iran’s nuclear activities to continue unchallenged.

Whom to Blame?

To this question, many would answer: Mohamed ElBaradei.  After all, it has been on his 12-year watch that Iran, North Korea, and perhaps Syria have defied the nonproliferation regime.  In fact, former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice placed great blame for Iran’s activities on the IAEA and its leadership under ElBaradei.  She accused ElBaradei of “muddying the message” to Iran and stated that “The IAEA is not in the business of diplomacy. The IAEA is a technical agency…”  See here.  But Rice’s perspective perhaps does not capture the full spectrum of understandings.  And she seems incorrect in saying that the IAEA is not in the business of diplomacy, because political tensions within the agency have resulted in diplomatic motions, even despite the IAEA’s technical mission.  Whether anyone likes it or not, the IAEA’s technical business cannot be divorced from political maneuvers that result from entrenched ideological conflicts.

This does not excuse ElBaradei.  Perhaps he too should have tempered his principles of global equality with the legitimate worries over emerging nuclear threats.  However, it is possible that the U.S. and its allies can do more as well.

Perhaps the IAEA should not be in the business of diplomacy, as this is the function of individual nations.  And if this is the case, then individual nations must pursue more effective diplomacy.  The developing nations must be more sensitive to the North-South Divide and understand its intricacies.  If the developing nations made it apparent that they were more sensitive to these inequality issues, the results would be significant: the IAEA would find the solidarity required for being an effective nuclear watchdog, countries like Iran would be less capable of claiming legitimacy for its own nuclear program, safeguarded nuclear partnerships would be easier to facilitate, and the nonproliferation regime would become stronger in general.  There are many things that could be done to express this sensitivity, within the nuclear realm and beyond.  The nuclear North-South Divide is part of an overarching North-South Divide, a gap that nations across the world are attempting to close through international development and investment activities.  The developing nations should tie this movement into nuclear issues and better understand how the two are connected.  Rhetorical and diplomatic confidence-building measures could greatly contribute in many ways.  And notably, the nuclear weapons states must make more concerted efforts to display their desire to uphold Article VI of the NPT.

Could Amano Lead the Way?

Despite appearing in the developing world as a sort of icon of nuclear inequality, Yukiya Amano has expressed his understanding of this political tension and his desire to alleviate it.  At a conference shortly following his election, Amano told reporters here:

As a national from Japan, I will do my utmost to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. To do that, the solidarity of all the member states, countries of the north, from the south, from east and west, is absolutely necessary.

Amano has also called for a wider understanding of the IAEA not only as a nuclear watchdog but also as a key facilitator of peaceful nuclear energy use.  He explained that new perceptions of the IAEA as a “dual objective organization” would be “helpful in strengthening confidence in the agency,” thereby identifying the encumbering political divide in the IAEA as tied to nuclear energy access.

It is unclear at this early stage whether Amano, who has been described as more of a technocrat than a diplomat, is simply paying lip service to this political issue or if he truly does plan to incorporate it into his leadership vision.  Much of his support has come from the belief that Amano may be able to “depoliticize” the IAEA in the wake of ElBaradei’s leadership.  However, assuming that his words are genuine, it seems that Amano may turn out to be another politically involved IAEA head, though perhaps with more effective diplomatic tempering than ElBaradei.  Reuters quotes Mark Fitzpatrick of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London here:

Given the nuclear challenges facing the world and the divisions that have deepened between the ‘haves and have nots’, it’s very important for the IAEA to have a leader who can bridge the differences and bolster its reputation for technical competence and political independence.

Amano may, in fact, be such a leader.

Concluding Remarks

The developing nations must be directly engaged by the developed nations.  They need to be assured that their inequality in terms of access to nuclear power will be appropriately resolved.  They need to be assured that the developed nations understand, empathize, or regret their inequality.  They must not feel neglected or disrespected.  The politics of inequality reaps international envy and bitterness.  This, combined with nuclear technology and international market systems that are impossible to completely monitor, could spell a proliferation nightmare.

With the coming of 20^th-century globalization, humanity has learned quite viscerally that the happenings on one side of the planet can directly affect the other side.  In order to make the nonproliferation regime work, it must work globally.  And in order to make it work globally, the entire globe must work cooperatively, rather than having the developed nations exclusively dictate the terms.  Let us hope that the NPT does not fall apart and that the world does not lose confidence in the nonproliferation regime.  Engaging the politics of inequality, in addition to technocratic fixes and diplomatic pressures, is crucial to seeing that this does not happen.