Last month, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) sought to authenticate North Korea’s status as a nuclear weapon state by citing a recent assessment by Robert Norris and Hans Kristensen. KCNA reported that “the Federation of American Scientists of the United States has confirmed (North) Korea as a nuclear weapon state.” However, KCNA’s report was an oversimplification of the Norris-Kristensen assessment. Yesterday, the South Korean Yonhap News Agency disseminated Kristensen’s rebuttal to the KCNA report, though over a week after it had been made. Better late than never…

Norris and Kristensen did list North Korea as a state that possesses nuclear weapons. On the FAS Strategic Security Blog, Kristensen wrote: “It’s certainly curious that they would need our reaffirmation, but after two nuclear tests we feel it is safe to call North Korea a nuclear weapon state.” However, Kristensen added that KCNA omitted a “huge caveat.” The original assessment reads:

We are not aware of credible information on how North Korea has weaponized its nuclear weapons capability, much less where those weapons are stored. We also take note that a recent U.S. Air Force intelligence report did not list any of North Korea’s ballistic missiles as nuclear-capable.

Concluding his rebuttal to the abridged analysis by Pyongyang’s media monopoly, Kristensen wrote:

In other words, two experimental nuclear test explosions don’t make a nuclear arsenal. That requires deliverable nuclear weapons, which we haven’t seen any signs of yet.

A rebuttal to Kristensen’s rebuttal, in the form of a new KCNA report, is unlikely. Hopefully, a flying missile rebuttal will not come too soon either.

The love-hate triangle between the United States, North Korea, and South Korea continues.

Pyongyang has called its recent naval clash with the South the result of Seoul’s meddling in U.S.-North Korean reconciliation. Referring to the incident as “deliberate, planned provocation” by South Korea, one of Pyongyang’s state-run newspapers reported today, “It goes to show how recklessly crazy the South Korean government is in trying to put a brake on improving relations between North Korea and the U.S.”

This is not the first time Pyongyang has accused Seoul of playing saboteur…

In its rejection of President Lee Myung-bak’s “grand bargain” proposal, Pyongyang explained that the real problem was Washington’s hostility and that Lee’s “ridiculous proposal” was nothing more than interference: “It is evident that [Lee] seeks to meddle and stand in the way of settling the nuclear issue between the DPRK and the U.S.”

South Korean newspaper Donga Ilbo explained the predictability of Tuesday’s sudden clash: “The North uses the fears of its counterparts as a negotiating tactic.” According to Donga Ilbo, both the 1999 Yellow Sea clash and 2002 Yeonpyeong Island clash were prompted by North Korea amidst diplomatic activity so as to achieve leverage through tension. Similarly, Tuesday’s clash precedes a trip to Pyongyang next month by U.S. special envoy Stephen Bosworth.

In each confrontation, the North blamed the South. “It’s a sly conspiracy,” said the DPRK state-run news agency of South Korea’s role during Tuesday’s naval clash. But documentation of each incident tells another story. In the most recent confrontation, a North Korean patrol boat charged through a disputed sea border, ignored several warning shots from South Korean vessels, and then fired directly upon a South Korea patrol boat. North Korean vessels were also first to fire in the other two conflicts.

In what seems to be an effort to undercut Pyongyang’s rhetoric, both the United States and South Korea have attempted to downplay the event, noting that it would have no bearing on diplomatic plans. Within hours of the clash, South Korea’s government declared that inter-Korean cooperation and exchanges would be unaffected, while Secretary Clinton yesterday “urged calm” and noted that plans for Bosworth’s trip remain unchanged.

South Korean troops are now on high alert, anticipating possible retaliation after the superior South Korean navy sent Pyongyang’s patrol boat limping away in flames.

While the United States has chastised both Iran and North Korea for their human rights abuses, it has typically kept the issue separate from denuclearization talks. Yet some experts recommend integrating human rights into broader discussions, as opposed to pursuing single-variable negotiations, in order to create valuable synergies within the diplomatic process.

At an event hosted by the National Iranian American Council on November 4, Ambassador Thomas Pickering emphasized the value of integrating human rights into current U.S. outreach to Iran. In his view, introducing more items for discussion broadens the range of diplomatic possibilities and increases chances for success. As opposed to a “grand bargain” with a rigid a priori formula, Pickering proposed a “grand agenda” with the goal of squeezing as many goodies as possible into the final package.

Ambassador John Limbert expounded upon this point, recommending a “firm but polite” approach with Iran. He explained that while “chest-bumping” moralistic statements by the West have proven unsuccessful, a calculated play of the human rights card could create a dilemma for the Iranian regime, which would run the risk of discrediting itself if it did not respond positively to ostensibly well-intentioned concern for its population. Nonproliferation and human rights might be simultaneously strengthened in this type of approach.

Similar reasoning has been applied to the standoff with North Korea. In a New York Times op-ed, Andrei Lankov recommended cultural and informational exchanges to plant seeds for the eventual emergence of North Korean civil society. Another recent report also recommended outreach, including academic and economic exchanges, in order to “spur better behavior by Pyongyang while helping its impoverished citizens.” Of course, the United States would have to reassure North Korea that these exchanges were not a backhanded attempt at regime change. Providing full transparency of all activities would help.

Lankov makes a strong case for the people-to-people strategy: “This is a well-tested approach: It is, essentially, the one that allowed liberal democracies to win the Cold War…it was the West’s economic prosperity and political freedom that irrevocably undermined popular support for Communism.” That may be true, but it is unclear whether or not sociopolitical reform will lead regular Iranians and North Koreans, let alone the ruling regimes, to support denuclearization or other policies more amenable to U.S. interests.

While the human rights-denuclearization link is compelling and policymakers should hope for its effectiveness, there are a few assumptions that are difficult to swallow. The first is that the American government and public will be patient enough to await the positive effects of the approach. The second is that the two regimes will be open to American engagement with their economies and populations. The latter assumption can more reasonably be made vis-à-vis Iran, which has, despite heinous crackdowns, shown concern about sustaining domestic popular support since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. In contrast, North Korea is a totalitarian state with a constitution based on a “military first” (songun) ideology and a public both barred from electing their leaders and isolated from the outside world.

As the Obama administration closes in on an agenda for bilateral talks with Pyongyang, it looks as though the United States and South Korea are back on the same page after a protracted spell of miscommunication…

The State Department still has not indicated if it will accept Pyongyang’s invitation for a visit by U.S. special envoy Stephen Bosworth. A senior South Korean official told the Korean Hankyoreh newspaper last Friday, however, that “Special envoy (Stephen) Bosworth will visit North Korea next month.” It was unclear at the time if the report had any concrete truth behind it.

But yesterday, the Korea Times quoted South Korea’s chief nuclear envoy, Wi Sung-lac, saying that the United States is “expected to make a decision soon on the date and agenda of bilateral talks with North Korea.” This statement has been corroborated by The Cable, which reported that the United States has already put forth a proposal. This report came a day after North Korea expressed impatience.

The United States has yet to make any formal public announcements about an agenda. Yesterday, State Department spokesman Ian Kelly limited his comments on the matter to the status quo policy. “We are willing to have bilateral talks with the North Koreans if these talks are conducted in the context of the Six-Party Talks and if they lead to the resumption of the Six-Party Talks,” Kelly said.

But the statements made by Wi Sung-lac and the unnamed senior South Korean official indicate that the South Koreans are aware of a U.S. plan, probably even more than they let on. Since North Korea began insisting on bilateral talks, the United States has uneasily assumed a vanguard diplomatic role. Each member of the six-party talks has accepted the prospect of bilateral talks provided that the goal is to revive the six-party negotiations. Yet this approach has not been without anxiety.

South Korea has been gently pushed to the side despite President Lee Myung-bak’s “grand bargain” proposal. Last month, South Korean media highlighted a potential rift between the United States and South Korea, perhaps exaggerating at times for fear of being relegated to the periphery. In light of this uneasiness, it is a relief that the United States and South Korea are no longer refuting or overlooking each other’s public statements.

Also noteworthy is the seeming coordination between South Korea and Japan. In response to Pyongyang’s announcement on Tuesday that it has reprocessed all of its 8,000 spent nuclear rods and made “significant achievements” in producing another atomic bomb, South Korea and Japan both used the word “regret” to express their outlook on the matter. It may simply be coincidence, but it seems possible that they coordinated this careful word choice to present a calculated and unified message.

Are the U.S. and South Korea struggling to effectively coordinate policy on North Korea? Last week Kurt Campbell, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, applauded the current level of international cooperation on the North Korea issue, but recent interactions between the U.S. and South Korea paint a different picture.

Signs of a potential rift emerged a month ago in the immediate wake of President Lee’s grand bargain proposal, which apparently took U.S. officials by surprise. When asked about Lee’s proposal a day later, Campbell noted that he was not aware of the offer. U.S. State Department spokesman Ian Kelly said, “I think it’s really not for me to comment on the particulars, because it’s – this is his policy. These were his remarks.”

What ensued was a tempest of South Korean media speculation about discord between the U.S. and South Korea. U.S. Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg assured reporters in Seoul that the two sides were on the same page. President Lee left a different impression: “So what if Mr. so-and-so says he is not aware of [the proposal],” he said.

Evidence of a communication gap was again evident earlier this week. In a Washington briefing with South Korean reporters, U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs Wallace Gregson indicated that Kim Jong-il had invited President Lee Myung-bak to Pyongyang for summit talks. Cheong Wa Dae promptly issued a denial of this claim and suggested a “misunderstanding.” Despite the denial, South Korea’s Chosun Ilbo and Korea Times reported that Gregson’s statement has powered a vigorous rumor mill.

As the North’s deputy nuclear envoy, Ri Gun, prepares a visit to the U.S. that may lead to bilateral negotiations, the U.S. and South Korea need to coordinate their efforts more carefully, even if the Korean media has overblown the extent of a rift. Negotiation with North Korea will be challenging enough as it is; it need not be further complicated by lack of communication between two allies.

On September 21, South Korean President Lee Myung-bak proposed a “grand bargain” with North Korea. Tired of counterproductive step-by-step negotiations with Pyongyang, Lee’s deal was a one-shot process: complete and irreversible denuclearization in exchange for security guarantees and economic aid.

On September 30, the North responded to the offer, calling it “ridiculous.” Given this response, we should not expect a similar American proposal. Or should we?

The Cato Institute’s Ted Galen Carpenter believes we should, and his reasoning is clever. In a September 30 briefing, Carpenter and Doug Bandow argued that while there are no good options, the best chance of persuading North Korea to adopt policies acceptable to the United States (i.e. denuclearization) is through coordinated effort with China.

Carpenter proposed that the United States offer its own one-shot grand bargain not as a diplomatic end-game with North Korea, but as a shrewd gambit to persuade Beijing to get tough with Pyongyang. (It’s worth noting that Carpenter is fond of the grand bargain concept; he has proposed a similar approach for dealing with Iran). Carpenter referred to the strategy as “smoking North Korea out,” by which he means forcing North Korea’s hand and making them reveal their true intentions to the United States and, more importantly, to China.

It is unclear whether or not Pyongyang is truly considering denuclearization, though it has pledged to work for a nuclear-weapons-free peninsula. This uncertainty (or hope) is enough to prevent China from confronting North Korea; after all, China has some legitimate concerns that include North Korean destabilization leading to a chaotic refugee flow and the potential geopolitical threat from a united Korea. China also knows, however, that an established nuclear weapon power on the peninsula is not in its interests.

Carpenter’s presentation suggested that he does not expect Pyongyang to accept the grand bargain, which would include a non-aggression pact and economic aid in return for denuclearization. For Carpenter, Pyongyang’s rejection of the deal would clarify their intentions and reveal their determination to become an established nuclear weapon power. In such a situation, China would be left with no choice but to bring out its stick.

One problem, however, is that such diplomatic litmus tests tend to be of questionable utility, particularly when it comes to North Korea. Carpenter said that rejection of the grand bargain would mean North Korea had determined to go nuclear, but this assumes Pyongyang: a) knows what it wants; b) has decided upon a course of action that will get it what it wants; and c) attributes as much importance to the grand bargain offer as Carpenter does. As Travis Sharp (Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation) ranted awhile ago, imperfect information makes conjectures about North Korean intentions suspect by default.

Another potential problem in Carpenter’s approach is that if the United States expects the grand bargain to fail, it might act accordingly. This pitfall has been prevalent in U.S. policy toward Iran. Skeptical that negotiations will bear fruit, a few Obama administration officials reportedly believe that direct talks with Iran are important mainly because they provide political cover for more coercive actions down the road. If articulated publicly – like when placating congressional hawks with tough talk on Iran, for example – such sentiments not only cause Iranian leaders to doubt American sincerity, but also assume future coercive steps to be a foregone conclusion. Such assumptions could quickly become self-fulfilling prophecies in both Iran and North Korea.

Implementing Carpenter’s strategy becomes dangerous if it succeeds when we do not expect (or want) it to. Chester Crocker explained this type of scenario a few weeks ago in the New York Times: “If we succeed in changing the position of the other country’s decision-makers, we then must decide whether we will take yes for an answer and reciprocate their moves with steps of our own.” Carpenter’s strategy is crafty, but it would be imprudent unless we were actually serious about following through.

Carpenter also appraised U.S. diplomacy vis-à-vis Pyongyang’s two nuclear tests. He concluded that it was a mistake by both the Bush and Obama administrations to issue immediate public statements after both tests pledging full nuclear umbrella protection for South Korea and Japan. If it were up to Carpenter, the United States would have issued private statements of assurance to South Korea and Japan but kept China guessing about the U.S. level of commitment to these two countries. If this had occurred, China might more earnestly fear the proliferation implications of Pyongyang’s tests, and the possibility of South Korea and Japan pursuing the bomb would have been an alarming consideration.  This could have been a critical impetus for China to get tough on North Korea.

Yesterday, in reaction to these diplomatic developments, The Wall Street Journal and The New York Times both ran op-ed pieces discussing Obama’s strategy, the demerits and the merits respectively.  The Wall Street Journal published “Kim Wins Another”, arguing that the U.S. is effectively strengthening North Korea’s hand by reaching out to it.  The article espouses opposition to the Obama strategy, and although it speaks specifically only in regard to North Korea, its position and tone seem implicitly linked also to Iran.  The New York Times published Chester A. Crocker’s “Terms of Engagement”, which argues that critics mischaracterize the nature of Obama’s strategy and do not fully understand the utility of engagement.  Though critical of the Obama Administration’s failure to fully explain the strategy, the article espouses support for the strategy.  Although they are contradictory, both articles are rhetorically credible, and each should each be read.  But in the partisan world that we live in, it is an unfortunate rarity that a reader of WSJ op-eds will also be reading NYT op-eds, and vice versa.

The reader is encouraged to view the articles in their entirety.  Although the articles are not written in direct contradiction to each other—as they each deal with slightly different subject matter and they vary in length—their underlying spirits and their stances on Obama’s engagement strategy do stand in direct contradiction to each other.  Juxtaposition of the two articles is an attempt to circumvent reader partisan bias: the reader must decide for him or herself which position is more compelling without the usual convenience of having the position already pre-chosen.  In promotion of this open-minded approach, I will not give my own opinion.  Instead, I will let the opinions speak for themselves:

Kim Wins Another, The Wall Street Journal, 14 September 2009

Terms of Engagement, by Chester A. Crocker in The New York Times, 13 September 2009

It is often difficult to separate public diplomacy from the real diplomacy.  Similarly, it is also difficult to separate hard analysis from catchy headlines.  As a ‘rogue’ nation, North Korea is under the constant scrutiny of the media and governments worldwide.  Thus, there is an incredible amount of incoming data on North Korean behavior and activities.  But that data is not always synthesized into coherent messages; after all, it is incredibly difficult to know what exactly is going on with as insular a country as North Korea.  Thus, it is very helpful when experts and analysts flesh out the details.

But ultimately, the clarity offered by analysts has its limits. Let us not forget that it is impossible to know, even for the most astute scrutinizers, exactly what North Korea’s motives and future plans are.  Below, I explore three headline issues, seeking lucidity but noting the limits of understanding: (1) North Korea’s recent mix of reconciliation and provocation, (2) its report on uranium enrichment capabilities, and (3) its willingness to negotiate.

Part 1.  Truly conciliatory or just a tactical game?

It seems like just yesterday that former President Bill Clinton visited North Korea and personally met with Kim Jong Il to secure the release of detained journalists Euna Lee and Laura Ling.  In conjunction with releasing the two Americans, the North Korea regime made a few other decisions portraying a newfound desire for reconciliation.  On August 29^th, North Korea released a South Korean fishing boat that had been detained for a month.  The release of the boat and crew, which had strayed into the North’s territorial waters, was characterized by Reuters as an act of “reach[ing] out to its foes after months of military grandstanding” and “the latest in a series of conciliatory moves by the North.”  This conciliatory trend also included the decision to allow another round of family reunions (between North and South Koreans separated since the Korean War) and the restoration of regular traffic over the border for the North-South jointly run industrial park.

The "Bridge of No Return" in the Korean DMZ, Looking to the North from South

On the surface, thorny relations with North Korea seemed to be progressing nicely.  But then all of a sudden, new reports came in about North Korea nearing mastery over uranium enrichment.  In addition, North Korea this past Sunday opened the flood gates to a reservoir, resulting in the deaths of six South Korean campers in the pathway of the flood.  Of course, this was not necessarily an “attack” on South Korea, but the North has failed to make a formal apology, and the ordeal has cast “a pall over recently warming ties between the rivals.” (Washington Post)

And finally, North Korea was also caught on August 14^th, in the middle of all the conciliatory gestures, shipping weapons to Iran in contravention of UN Security Council Resolution 1874.

Thus, it may seem that North Korea is being inconsistent in its approach to international ties.  Not so, explain analysts.  Instead, North Korean behavior displays confidence and the steadfast desire to maintain their status quo objective: to become a nuclear power.

For example Van Jackson reported in UPI Asia:

Such behavior is not contradictory but actually consistent, when viewed as the coordinated effort of a rogue state attempting to consolidate its infant nuclear capability. North Korea can achieve the best of both worlds – that is, positive relations with the United States and South Korea while possessing nuclear weapons – if it can succeed in reframing the nuclear issue as a negotiation over arms reduction and nonproliferation rather than total denuclearization.

South Korea officials have referred to this approach as a mere change in North Korea’s tactics. (AP)

A report yesterday by Reuters, which also refers to North Korea’s recent behavior as a “tactical game,” presents Stanford analyst Peter Beck’s understanding:

Peter Beck, research fellow at Stanford University and a specialist in Korean affairs, said Pyongyang was trying to gain the upper hand by forcing regional powers to guess its intentions. “By being nice, the North wants to relieve any pressure they are feeling by the sanctions,” he said. “They are also making it pretty clear that they are intent on being a nuclear power.”

Apparently, the U.S. has also adopted such an understanding as Stephen Bosworth, U.S. special envoy to North Korea, stated on Sunday that he has not seen a “fundamental change” in North Korea. (Korea Times)

As can be gleaned from above, the experts have done a masterful job of making sense of the contradictory details.  But perhaps the most important thing to remember is this: they could be absolutely wrong.  Even the most beautifully stitched analyses on North Korea (and, for that matter, any country) are simply political forecasts.  The particularly opaque nature of the North Korean regime makes such a task even more tenuous.

The perspectives provided by the analysts are impressive, compelling, and useful.  Nonetheless, it must be remembered that they may amount to an artificial ordering of the disorder.

Part 2.  Securing the second pathway to a nuclear bomb?  No, just a test.

Following North Korea’s declaration on Friday, September 4^th, that it has reached the “concluding stage” of uranium enrichment tests, mainstream media poured onto the public some incredibly loaded headlines.  Some examples:

BBC News: N Korea ‘in final uranium phase’

Washington Post: North Korea: Uranium Program Near Completion

The Daily Telegraph: North Korea in ‘final phase’ of uranium enrichment

Asia Times Online: North Korea drops a uranium bombshell

All of these headlines can be said to simply reflect Pyongyang’s statement.  But nonetheless, the implications and exigency expressed in the headlines do not necessarily capture reality.  It requires some more in-depth reading than just the headlines and first few paragraphs of each story to get to the important details about the uranium enrichment progress.

David Sanger of The New York Times indicated in regard to North Korea’s statement:

No details were offered, and the use of the word “tests” suggests that the country may only be experimenting and has not yet undertaken the huge expense required to install the thousands of centrifuges necessary to produce enough uranium for a nuclear weapon.

Reuters also indicated that Pyongyang’s statement does not amount to an immediate threat:

The U.S. has long suspected North Korea of trying to enrich uranium for weapons but proliferation experts said the North is nowhere near a full scale program, and it would take several years at least before it could reach that stage.

Instead, The Korea Times has reported that Pyongyang’s uranium statement simply amounts to another short-term tactical move:

North Korea’s uranium enrichment program is seemingly aimed at pressing the United State to promptly agree to hold bilateral talks, an analyst here said Friday.

Of course, we do not know North Korea’s exact motives for its recent announcement. However, any response to this announcement must be tempered. North Korea’s uranium program is obviously of concern to the U.S., but its latest statement is not a sudden, game-changing breakthrough, as some headlines may seem to indicate.  As Stephen Bosworth said:

This is not the first we have heard of HEU [highly enriched uranium] and it may not be the last.

Check out Joshua Pollack’s post on ACW if you want a more in-depth look at Pyongyang’s enrichment and the recent reporting on it.

Part 3.  Open to negotiations? We just don’t know.

We cannot say unequivocally that North Korea is not open to negotiations.  We just don’t know.

Kim Jong-il, De Facto Leader of North Korea

But many have argued that North Korea is only open to negotiations whose terms it can personally dictate.  As evidence they point to North Korea’s pursuit of bilateral talks with the U.S. outside the scope of the Six-Party Talks.  We have yet to see North Korea reply to the Bosworth’s indication that such talks will not occur outside of multilateral engagement.  Moreover, North Korea has shown no serious interest in negotiations over total denuclearization.

Van Jackson explained in UPI Asia:

Instead, North Korea seeks to negotiate arms reductions, the suspension of proliferation activities and the shutdown of its nuclear facilities. If Pyongyang succeeds in reframing the primary issues of concern in this way, it will have gained tacit recognition of its membership in the club of de facto nuclear weapons states, joining the likes of Pakistan, India and Israel.

Van Jackson’s statement makes a great deal of sense, particularly within the scope of the abovementioned ‘tactical game’ North Korea may be playing.  The analogy to Pakistan, India, and Israel also solidifies his persuasion.  But despite the logic and aesthetics of his rhetoric, we still do not know North Korea’s motives.

It remains to be seen if the world’s powers are willing to take the denuclearization card off the table for a nuclear compromise.  Nonetheless, they will need to continue to actively pursue diplomacy with Pyongyang.  Regardless of what the North Koreans are up to, as Travis Sharp and Lt. Gen. Robert S. Gard have pointed out over at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, there is simply no reasonable alternative at this point.