Last month, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) sought to authenticate North Korea’s status as a nuclear weapon state by citing a recent assessment by Robert Norris and Hans Kristensen. KCNA reported that “the Federation of American Scientists of the United States has confirmed (North) Korea as a nuclear weapon state.” However, KCNA’s report was an oversimplification of the Norris-Kristensen assessment. Yesterday, the South Korean Yonhap News Agency disseminated Kristensen’s rebuttal to the KCNA report, though over a week after it had been made. Better late than never…

Norris and Kristensen did list North Korea as a state that possesses nuclear weapons. On the FAS Strategic Security Blog, Kristensen wrote: “It’s certainly curious that they would need our reaffirmation, but after two nuclear tests we feel it is safe to call North Korea a nuclear weapon state.” However, Kristensen added that KCNA omitted a “huge caveat.” The original assessment reads:

We are not aware of credible information on how North Korea has weaponized its nuclear weapons capability, much less where those weapons are stored. We also take note that a recent U.S. Air Force intelligence report did not list any of North Korea’s ballistic missiles as nuclear-capable.

Concluding his rebuttal to the abridged analysis by Pyongyang’s media monopoly, Kristensen wrote:

In other words, two experimental nuclear test explosions don’t make a nuclear arsenal. That requires deliverable nuclear weapons, which we haven’t seen any signs of yet.

A rebuttal to Kristensen’s rebuttal, in the form of a new KCNA report, is unlikely. Hopefully, a flying missile rebuttal will not come too soon either.

Drawing inspiration from America’s Four Horsemen, the British group seeks to secure the world from nuclear dangers. Their plans include reducing nations’ reliance on nuclear weapons and advocating for the CTBT. Yet perhaps their most valuable aspiration is the group’s hope to create a unified European voice.

In an event hosted by the Carnegie Endowment last month, Des Browne introduced this mission as part of his goal for the group: “We hope to bring Europe together. As I say, every country in Europe has its Gang of Four, but they’re operating broadly separate from each other.” In the press release announcing their launch, the group stated that they hope to “provide an authoritative European voice to back up the position of U.S. President Barack Obama.”

Such an enterprise could provide U.S. politicians and lawmakers with a window of clarity into the European stance on key issues. As the press release explains: “The group has also tasked itself with ensuring that politicians in the U.S., of all political persuasions, are in no doubt of their allies’ positions on extended deterrence, tactical nuclear weapons, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty.”

The issues of extended deterrence and tactical nuclear weapons have fueled an intense debate in Washington over the future of U.S. nuclear deployments in Europe. Withdrawal of U.S. tactical nukes from Europe would go a long way toward promoting global nuclear reductions, but this possibility has run into numerous obstacles.

Despite strong indications that the tactical deployments are unwanted and unnecessary, critics of withdrawal argue that our European allies want the nukes. They argue that withdrawal would lead to anxiety and even proliferation as the Europeans would begin to doubt the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. And the critics have plenty of anecdotes from their own meetings with Europeans to support this view.

On the other hand, Des Browne at Carnegie articulated his strong personal view that tactical nuclear weapons could be discarded without undercutting anyone’s strategic defense. He also expressed his confidence that the United States could withdraw its tactical nuclear deployment from Europe smoothly without prompting some sort of extended deterrence crisis, provided that the United States properly engaged diplomatically with Europe in the process.

The UK group’s pursuit of a unified European voice should help to clarify these types of conflicting messages The U.S. political process and future of nuclear reductions are in great need of a clear and coherent message from U.S. allies. The UK group has spotted this problem and seems poised to ameliorate it.

It is often difficult to separate public diplomacy from the real diplomacy.  Similarly, it is also difficult to separate hard analysis from catchy headlines.  As a ‘rogue’ nation, North Korea is under the constant scrutiny of the media and governments worldwide.  Thus, there is an incredible amount of incoming data on North Korean behavior and activities.  But that data is not always synthesized into coherent messages; after all, it is incredibly difficult to know what exactly is going on with as insular a country as North Korea.  Thus, it is very helpful when experts and analysts flesh out the details.

But ultimately, the clarity offered by analysts has its limits. Let us not forget that it is impossible to know, even for the most astute scrutinizers, exactly what North Korea’s motives and future plans are.  Below, I explore three headline issues, seeking lucidity but noting the limits of understanding: (1) North Korea’s recent mix of reconciliation and provocation, (2) its report on uranium enrichment capabilities, and (3) its willingness to negotiate.

Part 1.  Truly conciliatory or just a tactical game?

It seems like just yesterday that former President Bill Clinton visited North Korea and personally met with Kim Jong Il to secure the release of detained journalists Euna Lee and Laura Ling.  In conjunction with releasing the two Americans, the North Korea regime made a few other decisions portraying a newfound desire for reconciliation.  On August 29^th, North Korea released a South Korean fishing boat that had been detained for a month.  The release of the boat and crew, which had strayed into the North’s territorial waters, was characterized by Reuters as an act of “reach[ing] out to its foes after months of military grandstanding” and “the latest in a series of conciliatory moves by the North.”  This conciliatory trend also included the decision to allow another round of family reunions (between North and South Koreans separated since the Korean War) and the restoration of regular traffic over the border for the North-South jointly run industrial park.

The "Bridge of No Return" in the Korean DMZ, Looking to the North from South

On the surface, thorny relations with North Korea seemed to be progressing nicely.  But then all of a sudden, new reports came in about North Korea nearing mastery over uranium enrichment.  In addition, North Korea this past Sunday opened the flood gates to a reservoir, resulting in the deaths of six South Korean campers in the pathway of the flood.  Of course, this was not necessarily an “attack” on South Korea, but the North has failed to make a formal apology, and the ordeal has cast “a pall over recently warming ties between the rivals.” (Washington Post)

And finally, North Korea was also caught on August 14^th, in the middle of all the conciliatory gestures, shipping weapons to Iran in contravention of UN Security Council Resolution 1874.

Thus, it may seem that North Korea is being inconsistent in its approach to international ties.  Not so, explain analysts.  Instead, North Korean behavior displays confidence and the steadfast desire to maintain their status quo objective: to become a nuclear power.

For example Van Jackson reported in UPI Asia:

Such behavior is not contradictory but actually consistent, when viewed as the coordinated effort of a rogue state attempting to consolidate its infant nuclear capability. North Korea can achieve the best of both worlds – that is, positive relations with the United States and South Korea while possessing nuclear weapons – if it can succeed in reframing the nuclear issue as a negotiation over arms reduction and nonproliferation rather than total denuclearization.

South Korea officials have referred to this approach as a mere change in North Korea’s tactics. (AP)

A report yesterday by Reuters, which also refers to North Korea’s recent behavior as a “tactical game,” presents Stanford analyst Peter Beck’s understanding:

Peter Beck, research fellow at Stanford University and a specialist in Korean affairs, said Pyongyang was trying to gain the upper hand by forcing regional powers to guess its intentions. “By being nice, the North wants to relieve any pressure they are feeling by the sanctions,” he said. “They are also making it pretty clear that they are intent on being a nuclear power.”

Apparently, the U.S. has also adopted such an understanding as Stephen Bosworth, U.S. special envoy to North Korea, stated on Sunday that he has not seen a “fundamental change” in North Korea. (Korea Times)

As can be gleaned from above, the experts have done a masterful job of making sense of the contradictory details.  But perhaps the most important thing to remember is this: they could be absolutely wrong.  Even the most beautifully stitched analyses on North Korea (and, for that matter, any country) are simply political forecasts.  The particularly opaque nature of the North Korean regime makes such a task even more tenuous.

The perspectives provided by the analysts are impressive, compelling, and useful.  Nonetheless, it must be remembered that they may amount to an artificial ordering of the disorder.

Part 2.  Securing the second pathway to a nuclear bomb?  No, just a test.

Following North Korea’s declaration on Friday, September 4^th, that it has reached the “concluding stage” of uranium enrichment tests, mainstream media poured onto the public some incredibly loaded headlines.  Some examples:

BBC News: N Korea ‘in final uranium phase’

Washington Post: North Korea: Uranium Program Near Completion

The Daily Telegraph: North Korea in ‘final phase’ of uranium enrichment

Asia Times Online: North Korea drops a uranium bombshell

All of these headlines can be said to simply reflect Pyongyang’s statement.  But nonetheless, the implications and exigency expressed in the headlines do not necessarily capture reality.  It requires some more in-depth reading than just the headlines and first few paragraphs of each story to get to the important details about the uranium enrichment progress.

David Sanger of The New York Times indicated in regard to North Korea’s statement:

No details were offered, and the use of the word “tests” suggests that the country may only be experimenting and has not yet undertaken the huge expense required to install the thousands of centrifuges necessary to produce enough uranium for a nuclear weapon.

Reuters also indicated that Pyongyang’s statement does not amount to an immediate threat:

The U.S. has long suspected North Korea of trying to enrich uranium for weapons but proliferation experts said the North is nowhere near a full scale program, and it would take several years at least before it could reach that stage.

Instead, The Korea Times has reported that Pyongyang’s uranium statement simply amounts to another short-term tactical move:

North Korea’s uranium enrichment program is seemingly aimed at pressing the United State to promptly agree to hold bilateral talks, an analyst here said Friday.

Of course, we do not know North Korea’s exact motives for its recent announcement. However, any response to this announcement must be tempered. North Korea’s uranium program is obviously of concern to the U.S., but its latest statement is not a sudden, game-changing breakthrough, as some headlines may seem to indicate.  As Stephen Bosworth said:

This is not the first we have heard of HEU [highly enriched uranium] and it may not be the last.

Check out Joshua Pollack’s post on ACW if you want a more in-depth look at Pyongyang’s enrichment and the recent reporting on it.

Part 3.  Open to negotiations? We just don’t know.

We cannot say unequivocally that North Korea is not open to negotiations.  We just don’t know.

Kim Jong-il, De Facto Leader of North Korea

But many have argued that North Korea is only open to negotiations whose terms it can personally dictate.  As evidence they point to North Korea’s pursuit of bilateral talks with the U.S. outside the scope of the Six-Party Talks.  We have yet to see North Korea reply to the Bosworth’s indication that such talks will not occur outside of multilateral engagement.  Moreover, North Korea has shown no serious interest in negotiations over total denuclearization.

Van Jackson explained in UPI Asia:

Instead, North Korea seeks to negotiate arms reductions, the suspension of proliferation activities and the shutdown of its nuclear facilities. If Pyongyang succeeds in reframing the primary issues of concern in this way, it will have gained tacit recognition of its membership in the club of de facto nuclear weapons states, joining the likes of Pakistan, India and Israel.

Van Jackson’s statement makes a great deal of sense, particularly within the scope of the abovementioned ‘tactical game’ North Korea may be playing.  The analogy to Pakistan, India, and Israel also solidifies his persuasion.  But despite the logic and aesthetics of his rhetoric, we still do not know North Korea’s motives.

It remains to be seen if the world’s powers are willing to take the denuclearization card off the table for a nuclear compromise.  Nonetheless, they will need to continue to actively pursue diplomacy with Pyongyang.  Regardless of what the North Koreans are up to, as Travis Sharp and Lt. Gen. Robert S. Gard have pointed out over at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, there is simply no reasonable alternative at this point.

In addition to the debate over whether or not a world without nuclear weapons is realistically attainable, another debate continues to lurk in the background: whether or not the world would be better off without nuclear weapons.  The immense destructive power of nuclear weapons has been made viscerally clear by the approximately 2,000 nuclear detonations in the 64-year history of nuclear weapons.  Moreover, it does not take a collection of academic and esoteric theoretical frameworks to understand that humans and the international system naturally tend towards conflict.  The combination of these two things seems to be an evident equation for catastrophe.

Nonetheless, the world has lived with nuclear weapons for over 64 years without nuclear conflict aside from the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings.  In addition, the world has been without major global conflicts for that period of time.  Some would argue that this is directly linked to the inimitable effects of global nuclear deterrence.  But this, of course, is mere postulation.  Basing decisions on postulation can be a treacherous way of going about business; facts are much more reliable.  However, when dealing with the social and phenomenological realm of international relations, fact and postulation are not necessarily dichotomous entities that may be clearly separated.

Anthropologist Michael Herzfeld has denied the “positivistic” attitude toward facts, instead suggesting that humans render items of knowledge into “facts” to provide greater order in human life and understanding: “Facts are the external shell of classification.  They are brought into being by fiat—religious dogma, educational inculcation, or bureaucratic intransigence” (Herzfeld, “Factual Fissures: Claims and Contexts,” 1998: pg. 73).  Facts are constituted and instituted through deliberate renderings of examined objects; a priori assumptions and predetermined associations are established to create authoritative understandings of those objects.  However, some “facts” are more easily constructed and more convincingly real than others.  On a relative scale, one should be able to separate postulation from these more convincing “facts.”  This task must be incorporated into the debate on nuclear weapons—that is, whether or not the world would ultimately be safer and more productive without them.

POSTULATION

There are several strong theoretical arguments that have been applied to the nuclear debate.  Though based in solid logic, counterfactuals, and historical evidence, many of these arguments are simply postulation that must be carefully considered.  The following are things we do not know with convincing certainty.

1. The usefulness and reliability of nuclear deterrence

A U.S. Peacekeeper ICBM

It is unclear exactly why there has not been large-scale, global conflict over the past sixty years.  Perhaps, it is because of nuclear weapons, and the multifaceted layers of deterrence that have been established as a result of several nuclear weapon powers.  Or perhaps it is because for the majority of the last sixty years, the international arena was dominated by a bipolar power rivalry.  The Cold War between the U.S. and Soviet superpowers sucked up virtually the entire world’s international relations dynamics, which could arguably have provided overarching global stability with or without nuclear weapons.  Within this stream of logic, the transition into the post-Cold War world introduced a unipolar international power structure that has similarly served to provide overarching global stability.  Or perhaps the conflict trend over the past sixty years should be attributed to a combination of countless things that we cannot quite explain because of the chaos and idiosyncrasies of international relations.  It does not seem possible to create an overwhelmingly convincing argument on why exactly the last sixty years have been free of a third world war.  Some academic realists may argue that it must be a result of nuclear weapons, as the international system intrinsically tends toward conflict.  However, a broader view of history shows that world wars may in fact anomalies, not the norm.

To Prevent Conventional War

It is unclear that nuclear deterrence is truly reliable to prevent conventional war.  After all, the last sixty years have been plagued by smaller-scale conflicts and wars, many of which have included nuclear-armed nations and some of which have been proxy wars between nuclear-arms nations.  The lack of large-scale conflicts and profusion of small-scale conflicts in the post-WWII era has been explained by a theory known as the stability/instability paradox, coined by theorist Glenn Snyder in 1965.  Robert Jervis exaplains the stability/instability paradox within the context of U.S.-Soviet bilateral relations:

Strategic stability creates instability by making lower levels of violence relatively safe and undermining “extended deterrence”—that is, the threat to use strategic nuclear weapons to protect allies.  This, the argument goes, the ability of the Soviet Union to destroy the United States means that the United States cannot credibly threaten to use its strategic nuclear forces in response to a Soviet attack on West Europe or the Persian Gulf. (Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution, 1989, pg. 20)

Similarly, nuclear retaliation has never occurred in the wake of aggressive action taken by non-nuclear nations against nuclear nations, creating a trend that displays the unreliability of nuclear deterrence to prevent conventional war.  As was displayed by many international conflicts, no nuclear-armed nation was truly willing to use nuclear retaliation against non-nuclear aggression.  Hall Gardner of the American University of Paris recently wrote an article emphasizing the need to dispel several nuclear myths, including the concept that nuclear weapons deter conventional warfare.   He gives many examples pointing to this argument, including the proxy wars during the Cold War (such as in Vietnam and Afghanistan), the 1982 Falklands War between Argentina and the United Kingdom, and the 1999 Indian-Pakistani Kargil Crisis, a year after both had displayed their nuclear might through series of nuclear tests.

Nonetheless, there are many so-called “nuclear optimists” who believe in the stability that nuclear weapons endow upon the world.  Perhaps the most well-known, influential nuclear optimist is international relations theorist Kenneth Waltz, who famously outlined his position in a 1981 paper.  Waltz has gone as far as to say that:

Waltz also outlines his nuclear proliferation optimism in this iconic book, co-authored with nuclear proliferation pessimist Scott D. Sagan

The worst number of nuclear weapons to have in the world is zero.

In his 1981 article, Waltz stated:

If states can score only small gains because large ones risk retaliation, they have little incentive to fight.

However, we have seen many cases over the last sixty years in which states have found plenty of incentive to fight despite nuclear threats.

Alongside Waltz, other academics have made strong cases for maintaining comprehensive nuclear deterrence schemes involving many nuclear-armed nations, even encouraging greater proliferation.  Here is a good article that describes the “nuclear optimism” movement in academia.

Although certainly supported by solid theoretical frameworks and profound academic logic, what is described by the nuclear optimists cannot be considered empirical conclusions.  In reality, it is pure theorization.  It is incredibly interesting and comfortable to think that this is how it may actually be.  However, this form of speculation can be incredibly dangerous when dealing with things as destructive and risky as nuclear weapons.

In a recent Newsweek article, journalist Jonathan Tepperman explains:

The logic of nuclear peace rests on a scary bargain: you accept a small chance that something extremely bad will happen in exchange for a much bigger chance that something very bad—conventional war—won’t happen. This may well be a rational bet to take, especially if that first risk is very small indeed. But it’s a tough case to make to the public.

Seeing this hypothetical “bargain” as a good deal is an incredibly short-sighted type of thinking—the type of thinking that is endemic to nuclear debates, as explained here.  The description of the bargain does not quite catch the magnitude of the trade-off.  In the long run, the “extremely bad” thing makes the “very bad” thing essentially negligible; nuclear confrontation entails risks of an apocalyptic magnitude.

To Prevent Nuclear Strikes

Moreover, it remains unclear that nuclear deterrence will indefinitely continue to achieve its primary goal: to deter the use of nuclear weapons.  It is certainly evident that nuclear weapons have existed but have not been aggressively used over the past sixty-four years (with the exception of Hiroshima and Nagasaki).  Nonetheless, it is impossible to consider this to be empirical proof that basic nuclear deterrence is a constant in all situations going into the indefinite future.

The Cuban Missile Crisis is used as the most compelling example nuclear deterrence being safe and reliable.  During the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, the U.S. and Soviet Union were close to war and the potential use of nuclear weapons for roughly 13 days of threats, provocation, and urgent diplomacy.  That these two nations emerged virtually unscathed may be testament to the reliability of nuclear deterrence.  Perhaps, in this one case, nuclear deterrence did prove to be reliable.  Or perhaps we just got incredibly lucky.  This is Robert McNamara’s stance, one that we should value highly given his intimate role in the crisis.  In a documentary (The Fog of War) about Robert McNamara and revolving around filmed interviews with McNamara, he states simply in regard to the Cuban Missile Crisis:

Robert McNamara, United States Secretary of Defense from 1961 to 1968

I want to say—and this is very important—in the end, we lucked out; it was luck that prevented nuclear war.  We came that close to nuclear war.  Rational individuals! Kennedy was rational. Khrushchev was rational. Castro was rational. Rational individuals came that close to total destruction of their societies. And that danger exists today.

To Deter Terrorists

It is convincingly clear that terrorist organizations would not be deterred by threats of nuclear retaliation.  The possession of nuclear power by various nations certainly has not thwarted terrorist attacks for several reasons.  First, nuclear weapons are not suited for small-scale targets.  Second, it is debatable that hardcore terrorist organizations can be thwarted by any threat of force.  Third, terrorist organizations are often dispersed within a society’s population, making an indiscriminate nuclear blast almost inconceivable.

1. 2. The Morality of Nuclear Weapons

Their Use and Threats to Use

Morality is an issue that often comes into play in nuclear debates for intuitive reasons: nuclear weapons represent the most destructive force on the planet controlled by humans.  Coupled with the ubiquity of religious, spiritual, and humanistic thinking, nuclear weapons have become an icon of evil to many.  The power of all the nuclear weapons on the planet is of an apocalyptic magnitude.

This may seem to be a self-evident truth to many people in the world.  For many, it may be the most important consideration within the nuclear debate.  Nonetheless, the moral argument is not something that can necessarily be considered a fact of sufficiently convincing substance to the overarching collective that constitutes the whole nuclear debate.  The practice of ethics and morality is one of the most powerful motivators on an individual levels, but it also a practice of cultural context.  The concept of ethics, or ethical action, is a complex social construction that cannot enjoy shared meaning and understanding amongst society’s diversity of individuals, institutions, and interest groups.

Some would go so far to say that ethics are arbitrary based on a person’s subjective, or inculcated, understanding of a hypothetical metaphysical reality.  Metaphysical realities and arguments of the sort are certainly important and they should be applied on a personal level.  However, they cannot be said to have convincing clarity within the context of open, contentious debates (as anyone who has had an argument about religion can attest to).

The Hiroshima/Nagasaki Debates

The atomic explosion over Nagasaki

Debates over the morality of nuclear weapons usage, in the past and in the hypothetical future, are characterized by tradeoffs of incommensurable value.  The contentious debates over the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings are an informative illustration.  On the one side are those who contend that the use of the atomic bomb against Japan ended the war, sparing the lives of countless others upon whom the war would have inevitably taken its toll.  Others suggest that although the Japanese were getting closer to surrender, the seemingly swift end to the war that came in the wake of the atomic bombings prevented a planned invasion by U.S. forces, thereby saving the lives of countless U.S. soldiers at the expense of Japanese civilians.  On the other side, others believe that the use of the atomic bombs against Japan was an inexcusable act of genocide.  Each stance relies on a different reading of the evidentiary landscape as well as different sets of valuation on the lives involved.  The Hiroshima/Nagasaki debates underscore the likely set of moral debates that would precede a serious consideration of a nuclear strike today.  No single moral understanding is overwhelming convincing amid the variety of perspectives and interests that constitute each society.  See here for a very thorough examination of the Hiroshima debate.

FACTS—or, at least, better than postulation

They may not be facts either, but the following contentions should prove to be more collectively convincing, able to enjoy greater shared and widespread understanding, than the issues above.

1.  The costs of maintaining nuclear weapons are astronomical

Taking into account the money that has been directed into the nuclear-weapon production complex (which includes fissile material production and weaponization processes), the production of delivery vehicles, and maintenance of these strategic forces and the necessary expertise, the nuclear weapons have taken an incredible toll on the resources of the nuclear-armed states, particularly the U.S. and Russia.  The Brookings Institute completed a project, entitled The U.S. Nuclear Weapons Cost Study Project, in August 1998.  The project, whose purpose is self-explanatory based on the title, was created into a book called Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Since 1940.  The project archives are still on the Brookings Institute.  See here for a helpful summary in the form of quick facts.  Below are some of the facts:

1. Cost of the Manhattan Project (through August 1945): $20,000,000,000

2. Total number of nuclear missiles built, 1951-present: 67,500

3. Estimated construction costs for more than 1,000 ICBM launch pads and silos, and support facilities, from 1957-1964: nearly $14,000,000,000

31. Estimated amount spent between October 1, 1992 and October 1, 1995 on nuclear testing activities: $1,200,000,000 (0 tests)

50. Estimated 1998 spending on all U.S. nuclear weapons and weapons-related programs: $35,100,000,000

In Stephen Schwartz’s overview of the project findings, he indicates that:

From 1940 through 1996, we spent nearly $5.5 trillion on nuclear weapons and weapons-related programs, in constant 1996 dollars.

In a 1953 speech, President Dwight D. Eisenhower poignantly declared:

President Dwight D. Eisenhower

Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies in a final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed.  This world in arms is not spending money alone.  It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children.  This is not a way of life at all in any true sense.  Under the clouds of war, it is humanity hanging on a cross of iron.

Eisenhower’s statement is a dramatized (and, for many, incredibly moving) version of a simple fact: the immense investments made into modern weapons divert resources, energy, and human labor away from more productive uses.  Many believe military force to be incredibly important for the stability and security of the modern world, and perhaps they may be right according to realist and neorealist predictions.  Nonetheless, it still remains clear that each dollar put into weapons expenditure is one less dollar that could potentially be put into fostering the basic necessities, health, and peaceful welfare of the human race.  This is a simple physical, financial reality.

Nuclear weapons inhabit the top of the weapons expenditure hierarchy.  Even though the U.S. no longer produces new nuclear weapons, the costs each year of maintaining the current stockpile are astronomical.  Within the context of active nuclear rivalries, those costs will not remain and will continue to plague national economies around the world.  Hall Gardner believes that the costs of nuclear weapon rivalries “can destabilize the political economy of whole regions.”

2.  The more nuclear weapons there are and the more countries have them, the more likely it is that they will get into terrorist hands

This is another simple physical reality.  If terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda remain persistent about attaining nuclear weapons, it is not unreasonable to assume that eventually, they will achieve their goal.  Unlimited time comes with infinite possibilities, and the greater the numbers and the more profuse the locations of nuclear weapons, the greater the potential access terrorist organizations have to nuclear weapons.  Whether through theft of a working nuclear device, the use of scientist or military insiders in some national program, or the gradual assembly of a bomb through continued theft and the use of its own experts, the prospects of a terrorist nuclear bomb increase every day as long as the status quo of nuclear weapons numbers and states is maintained.  This is a simple mathematical fact: the more nuclear weapons and components in the world, the more nuclear weapons and components in the world that terrorists could potentially acquire.  Nuclear weapon safety and security are obviously also, and perhaps more, important than the numbers problem.  But this is a different issue altogether, and should have no bearing on the numbers issue.

In addition, it is impossible to say convincingly according to almost anyone’s standards that deterrence would function against a terrorist nuclear bomb.  A terrorist organization’s possession of a nuclear weapon is virtually equivalent to the inevitable usage of that nuclear weapon—or at least, the employment of unacceptable threats made by a terrorist organization that would end up in comparably horrible results and most likely the ultimate use of the nuclear weapon anyway.

3.  The longer nuclear weapons are around, and the longer the NWS maintain their general status quo, the more likely proliferation to other countries will occur

U.S. W76 Warheads

So far, reductions achieved by the U.S. and Russia have been, perhaps, quantitatively significant.  However, they have not been qualitatively significant.  Qualitatively, it may be argued that the current U.S. and Russian nuclear deployed warhead arsenals are strategically equivalent to those at the height of the Cold War arms race.  From the perspective of other nations around the world, the U.S. and Russia have not upheld their duty according to Article VI of the NPT:

to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

This situation provides other nations with both the incentive and justification to pursue their own nuclear weapons.

President John F. Kennedy predicted in the 1960s that by the 1970s, there would be 20-30 nuclear weapon states.  His prediction turned out to be incorrect, leading to much reason for optimism in regard to nuclear proliferation.  Kenneth Waltz espoused such optimism in Tepperman’s recent Newsweek article:

In 64 years, the most nuclear-weapons states we’ve ever had is 12.  Now with North Korea we’re at nine. That’s not proliferation; that’s spread at glacial pace.

It may be true that, over the past 64 years, nuclear weapons have proliferated at a pace slower than most would have predicted.  However, it would be foolish to assume that the future trend will simply match the trend of the past.  Many things have occurred to maintain the nonproliferation regime, including promises by the five official nuclear-weapon states to seriously pursue reductions and disarmament in order to achieve an indefinite extension of the NPT.  The nonproliferation regime, and confidence in the NPT, is indeed fragile.  The actions of nations that have pursued, or are suspected of pursuing, nuclear weapons (such as Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea, Iran, Iraq) despite the global push for nonproliferation is evidence that the nonproliferation regime is not perfectly solid.  And with the existence of dozens of “virtual” nuclear powers—nations that possess the technology, expertise, components, knowledge, and material to produce nuclear weapons should the decision be made—and with more countries joining these ranks, the world is constantly on the brink of breaking the threshold at which point the nonproliferation regime ceases to function effectively.

4.  The more nuclear weapons there are in the world, and the longer they are there, the closer we are to human extinction

This is not a prediction that a massive nuclear war will inevitably occur at some point in the foreseeable future.  Instead, this is another simple physical fact: the more nuclear destructive power that exists on the planet, the greater the possibility that human extinction by nuclear destruction could actually occur.  It is certainly unclear whether or not an event would occur that would actually bring about the employment of all these nuclear weapons.  However, such an event is possible.  And if it were to occur, the world would be best kept safe if it had as few as possible.

CONCLUSIONS

The conclusions should be for the reader to make.  As explained in the introduction, the different between fact and postulation is often vague, and perhaps impossible to delineate when dealing with complex political and phenomenological issues.  Thus, I tried to keep the “facts” described above (with the exception of the third) as deeply grounded in simple physical realities as possible, making them pieces of evidence that are as indispensible as possible.  In contrast, I cannot claim that the “postulations” described above are as deeply grounded in physical realities—though they may be more deeply grounded than anything else in certain academic and political realities.  It is for the reader to decide if he or she agrees with this assessment of fact versus postulation in the context of the nuclear debate.  And it is for the reader to decide how greatly to rely on what he or she would consider postulations and what he or she would consider facts.

(Please note: This piece does not take a take a stance on the legitimacy of the atomic bombings.  It is meant to be provocative but not judgmental.)

In the new ethos, prompted by the atomic bomb and subsequent rise of ‘technoscience’, the scientist no longer practiced a reductionism of self-identity—based on the perceived existence within an isolatable value sphere and unconditional pursuit of its raw, technical objectives—but rather incorporated a new awareness of unavoidably overlapping value spheres into a new ethically, socially, and politically responsible self-identity.

In his famous lecture in 1918 at Munich University, the text of which is entitled “Science as a Vocation,” Max Weber instructed his audience against the use of science to determine ethics and values.  Weber trivialized the overly rational perspective that science could answer humanity’s deep political and philosophical questions, rhetorically asking:

Who—aside from certain big children who are indeed found in the natural sciences—still believes that the findings of astronomy, biology, physics, or chemistry could teach us anything about the meaning of the world? (Weber 1918: 142).

Weber relates the practice of science as a vocation with the task of teaching and warns his audience that “whenever the man of science introduces his personal value judgments, a full understanding of the facts ceases” (146).  For Weber, the scientist, like the teacher, must focus exclusively on his pursuit of technicality, logic, and the full spectrum of objective facts while purposefully neglecting personal and political views, which threaten to defile the purity of science.  According to Weber’s perceived scientific ethos—an ethos passionately devoted to the raw pursuit of technical mastery over the world—science should generate its own types of knowledge and techniques independent from the values of other disciplines and spheres of life: “the tension between the value-spheres of ‘science’ and the sphere of ‘the holy’ is unbridgeable” (154).  J. Robert Oppenheimer, father of the atomic bomb, characterized this Weberian spirit in the contention that:

the true responsibility of a scientist, as we know, is to the integrity and vigor of his science. (Oppenheimer 1947: 91)

J. Robert Oppenheimer

The embracing of this scientific ethos resulted in a reductionist practice of self-identity focused exclusively and unconditionally on the technical function of the modern scientist, a phenomenon that is epitomized by the scientists in the Manhattan Project.  In his lecture entitled “Physics in the Contemporary World,” Oppenheimer situated the traditional value of science in ‘method’, rather than ‘doctrine’, thus implicitly depicting science as an exercise of technique rather than morals, ethics, and value judgments (Oppenheimer 1947: 96-97).  The practice and organization of science described by Oppenheimer indicated that, to a large extent, the popular self-identity of scientists incorporated a robust complacency in ignoring the tough social, political, and ethical questions: “science is disciplined in its rejection of questions that cannot be answered and in its grinding pursuit of methods for answering all that can” (99-100).  The Manhattan Project scientists, it must be noted, certainly engaged in deep discourses on the ethical and social implications of their work in the course of the project.  However, the unconditional focus on the scientist’s technical pursuit suggested a superficiality within these discourses: they were to be discussed and contemplated but not allowed to affect the order and operations of life, which is indicated by the scientists’ unanimous unwillingness to halt their efforts even after V-E Day (Else 1981).  Oppenheimer retrospectively described this technical spirit in his 1954 security hearing testimony:

When you see something that is technically sweet, you go ahead and do it, and you argue about what to do about it only after you have had your technical success. That is the way it was with the atomic bomb. (Oppenheimer 1954)

A sense of patriotism certainly exerted some amount of influence over the Manhattan Project scientists, who sought to ensure the safety of American citizens and military superiority of the U.S.  However, Edward Teller’s spirit in support of the hydrogen bomb, which can be likened to the spirit of the original atomic bomb scientists, demonstrates that it was not patriotism that was responsible for eliminating possible sources of moral dilemma, but rather the self-ascribed, exclusively technical function:

it is not the scientist’s job to determine whether a hydrogen bomb should be constructed, whether it should be used, or how it should be used. This responsibility rests with the American people and with their chosen representatives. (Teller 1950: 71)

As described by Oppenheimer and various other physicists working under him in the Manhattan Project, these scientists had conceptualized scientific knowledge and technique in a totally de-contextualized manner, envisioning scientific knowledge and technique as products to be pursued in and of themselves.  Thus, they established their self-identities within an isolated value sphere, which many would regret having done in the wake of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings.

The rise of a new scientific ethos featuring profound disapproval with the past reductionism of self-identity was implicit within the tremendous guilt felt and described by many of the Manhattan Project scientists.  In his retrospective contemplation of the moral implications of atomic involvement, Oppenheimer could no longer dissociate himself and his discipline from ethics and value judgments:

In some sort of crude sense which no vulgarity, no humor, no overstatement can quite extinguish, the physicists have known sin; and this is a knowledge which they cannot lose. (Oppenheimer 1947: 88)

Manhattan Project physicist Robert Wilson shared Oppenheimer’s overwhelming feeling of guilt (Else 1981).  Fulfilling the self-identity of the traditional scientific ethos depended upon pursuing scientific knowledge and the ‘technically sweet’ with an ethically, politically, and socially neutral perspective.  However, the deep pangs of guilt and conscience crises experienced by many of the Manhattan Project scientists evidenced the rise of a new ethos in which the scientist assumes responsibilities beyond that of the technical.  Robert Wilson alluded to his previously one-tracked, technical consciousness with deep remorse and a new conviction to bridge the Weberian separation between value spheres:

Robert Wilson Breaking Ground at Fermilab in 1967

My reawakening from being completely technically oriented came dramatically on July 16 as I experienced the test explosion of the first nuclear bomb…That which has been an intellectual reality to me for some three years had suddenly become a factual, and existential reality. There is a very great difference. My technical work was done, the race was run, and the full awful magnitude of what we had done came over me. I determined at that moment that, having played even a small role in bringing it about, I would go all out in helping to make it become a positive factor for humanity. (Wilson 1971: 74)

Wilson, like many other scientists in the new atomic age, would no longer sit on the sidelines of political decision-making; he committed himself to the new ethos that inhabited not only the value sphere of science but also those of politics and ethics.  Wilson and Oppenheimer became integral in forming the Association of Los Alamos Scientists, which made political moves in pushing for international control of atomic energy.  Oppenheimer’s and Wilson’s sentiments illustrate how the new, unparalleled intimacy between science (specifically physics) and the ethically and politically significant capability to destroy produced a moral quandary so powerful that science was sucked into Weber’s sphere of ‘the holy’ as well as the spheres of politics, ethics, and social dynamics.  Self-identity in this new scientific ethos is no longer reductionist; rather, it straddles many different value spheres.

The rise of the age of technoscience, the origins of which have strong roots in the Manhattan Project, and its associated forms of scientific organization further illustrate the new intimacy between science and other value spheres.  Beginning with the Manhattan Project, U.S. scientific research and organization moved principally into the realm of state direction.  Political agendas increasingly drove and funded science; science had become intimate on a new level with external industries and institutions seeking to take advantage of it in precise ways for technological applications.  The term technoscience refers to this “end of the bifurcation between science and technology” (Professor Andrew Lakoff).  The fact of state-dominated funding implicitly indicated a de facto unity of mission, a deal-brokering process, between the scientific and political realms.  Organizational trends—specifically, the increase of interdisciplinary cooperation combined with huge mobilizations of scientific personnel—illustrate the increasingly direct orientation of science towards political agendas.

From this perspective, scientists were no longer neutral collectors and explorers of knowledge; other value spheres had extended themselves onto that of science and consequently imbued the scientist with ethical, political, and social responsibility.  Norbert Wiener, the father of cybernetics, acknowledged the importance of technoscience.  Peter Galison described Wiener’s thinking during WWII: “to be useful in the war effort, it was science itself that would have to change, becoming both materially grounded and squarely directed into the world of weapons,” that is, into technological application (Galison 1994: 235).  However, after the use of the atomic bomb, Wiener himself suffered an “acute attack of conscience” resulting from his awareness of the scientist’s multi-sphere role in the technoscientific world:

I think the omens for a third world war are black and I have no intention of letting my services be used in such a conflict. I have seriously considered the possibility of giving up my scientific productive effort because I know no way to publish without letting my inventions go to the wrong hands. (253)

The new scientific ethos and its elaborated form of self-identity have become firmly established within today’s collective consciousness, but this does not mean that every scientist has fully accepted and adopted them.  For this reason, the issue of the scientific ethos continues to have a vivacious presence in public discourses.  For example, within the discourse of the life sciences dual-use dilemma vis-à-vis the obligations established by the Biological Weapons Convention, a large cohort in the international scientific community united with public policy makers and diplomats have in the past decade increasingly voiced a deep concern over irresponsible decision-making on the level of the individual scientist and declared the need to institute a global culture of bioethics.  These advocates recognize the state’s weakening control and industry’s rising control over the life sciences, and worry about the possibility for inadvertent physical, social, or political damage as a result of reckless science—that is, science concerned more with technical and industrial advances than the social and political implications of those advances.  Dr. Jamie Metzl is one such advocate who envisions the frightening possibility of an international genetic arms race as a result of unchecked science.  He proposes a global “Genetic Heritage Safeguard Treaty” which calls on states, institutions, and individual scientists to incorporate a universally accepted set of ethics and standards into their activities in order to mitigate dangerous possibilities (Metzl 2008).  The proponents of a global culture of bioethics, in effect, oppose the reductionist self-identity of the Weberian scientific ethos just as many of the Manhattan Project scientists had come to do.  However, whereas the Manhattan Project scientists retrospectively recognized the predicament of a reductionist self-identity, the scientist proponents of international bioethics are attempting to proliferate the new ethos of moral, political, and social responsibility in advance so that they will not, as Robert Wilson did, have to repent:  “Thinking back to that time, it occurs to me that it would have been an excellent occasion for the conscience of a scientist to have been exercised” (Wilson 1971: 70).

Works Cited

Else, Jon, dir. The Day After Trinity: Oppenheimer & the Atomic Bomb. 88 min. KTEH, 1981.

Metzl, Jamie. “Brave New World War.” Democracy: A Journal of Ideas. Issue #8 (Spring 2008), 50-58.

Oppenheimer, J. Robert. “Physics in the Contemporary World,” in Oppenheimer, The Open  Mind, 81 – 102. 1947.

Oppenheimer, J. Robert. Security Hearing Testimony. 1954.

Teller, Edward. “Back to the Laboratories.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 6 (March 1950),  71- 2.

Weber, Max. “Science as a Vocation.” 1918. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, 129 – 156. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958.

Wilson, Robert. “The Conscience of a Physicist.” Alamogordo Plus Twenty-Five Years, ed. Richard S. Lewis and Jane Wilson.  New York: Viking, 1971.

The Basics of Negative Security Assurances

Negative security assurances are legally binding commitments by nuclear weapon states (NWS) to not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS).  These assurances are generally established in the context of overarching nuclear treaties, such as the regional African Treaty of Pelindaba, or under the authority of the United Nations.  Negative security assurances are an important counterpart to positive security assurances.  Positive security assurances are iterated clearly in their originating document, UN Security Council Resolution 255 of 1968, which upholds the commitment of the five NWS (who make up the permanent members of the UN Security Council) to:

provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the [United Nations] charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the [NPT] that is a victim of an act or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.

UNSC 255 essentially establishes a sort of nuclear League of Nations.

Employed in concert, positive and negative security assurances are intended to thwart nuclear aggression, enhance the confidence of NNWS in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and thereby contribute to the nonproliferation regime.  See here for more information on security assurances.  As both tools of principle and confidence-building devices aimed at promoting general nuclear peace and nonproliferation, negative security assurances gain their strength and authority as unequivocal pledges to withhold the use of nuclear weapons.  As the nonproliferation regime is a system of not only laws but also norms and voluntary willingness, it is important that negative security assurances are unequivocal in order to maintain confidence in the nonproliferation regime and the credibility of pledges by the NWS.

The Problem with U.S. Negative Security Assurances: The WMD Conflation

Unfortunately, negative security assurances employed by the U.S. are not unequivocal.  The U.S. has adopted a policy of “strategic ambiguity,” which a release by the Arms Control Association explains:

Despite the “negative security assurances” pledge, the United States has not ruled out the use of nuclear weapons in response to attacks with chemical or biological weapons. The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), for example, maintains the possibility that U.S. nuclear forces may be used to counter threats from non-nuclear adversaries. In addition to China, an NPT nuclear-weapon state, the NPR cites five non-nuclear-weapon states (Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Syria) as driving “requirements for nuclear strike capabilities.” While all five states were suspected of pursuing nuclear weapons, none of the five at that time had demonstrated possessing such a capability. All five, however, were believed to have biological and/or chemical weapons or programs. The NPR also stated that “nuclear weapons could be employed against targets able to withstand non-nuclear attack, (for example, deep underground bunkers or bio-weapon facilities).”

Test of a Trident Nuclear Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile

The doctrine of “strategic ambiguity” in the way that it is employed by the U.S. is intertwined with the conflation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons under the umbrella genre of weapons of mass destruction.  As we know, ‘WMD’ has made its way into the most basic levels of vocabulary.  The term WMD is certainly useful for the purpose of understanding the extraordinary scope of danger that nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons present, in contrast to conventional weapons.  However, dealing with these three classes of weapons as a single group also contributes to general misconceptualizations, reductionism, of each class’s distinctions.  It undermines the need to shape policies that properly deal with the real-life contexts of each class of weaponry.

This is the case in terms of U.S. negative security assurances.  The conflation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons as WMD has led to the addition of exceptional “belligerent reprisal” clauses to U.S. negative security assurances: the U.S. reserves the right to U.S. nuclear weapons against NNWS if they employ chemical or biological weapons.  Dr. Lewis points out this phenomenon in the context of individual treaties as well as in the context of the overarching U.S. Negative Security Assurance policy issued in 1995 and reaffirmed in 2002.

For example, in the context of the Treaty of Pelindaba, which includes protocols for non-African states to sign onto to promote greater confidence and inclusion, the Clinton administration adopted what Dr. Lewis calls a “commitment [that] is not actually a commitment”:

Under Protocol I, which we signed, each party pledges not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any ANFZ party. However, Protocol I will not limit options available to the United States in response to an attack by an ANFZ party using weapons of mass destruction.

The Arms Control Association points out that this “belligerent reprisal” exception is a part of overarching U.S. policy, as opposed to just in the purview of individual treaties:

Signed in September 2002, National Security Presidential Directive 17 took an apparent step toward making nuclear retaliation to the use of any WMD official U.S. policy. The secret directive, portions of which were leaked, stated, “the United States will continue to make clear that it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force—including potentially nuclear weapons—to the use of WMD against the United States, our forces abroad, and friends and allies.” A subsequent unclassified version, known as the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, was not as explicit, substituting “including through resort to all of our options” for “including potentially nuclear weapons.”

Are our Claims to Retaliation Rights Helpful or Unhelpful?

Dr. Lewis thinks not, and he shares some fascinating words of wisdom that must be quoted here:

I wonder, however, about the wisdom of to invoking the possibility of belligerent reprisal too often in our public policy prouncements.

After all, nuclear weapons exist — a physical manifestation of the option to use them that seems rather more impressive than a paper pledge not to. (Think of “speak softly and carry a big stick.”)

and…

It seems to me that our nuclear options are too plausible, to the point where the interesting public policy challenge is too make credible the forgotten half of deterrence as articulated by Schelling — the promise to refrain:

“We have learned the threat of massive destruction deters only if there is a corresponding implicit promise of nondestruction in the event he complies …”

In his opinion it is time to revise the U.S. Negative Security Assurance—that is, make it more like a true Negative Security Assurance—which is something that could happen in an upcoming special session of the UN Security Council chaired by President Obama.

Strengthening the Nonproliferation Regime

The U.S. continues to try to make the case to all new and suspected nuclear proliferator countries that their security is actually enhanced by not pursuing and by not possessing nuclear weapons.  However, with exceptions to our negative security assurances that seem to continue to get looser, it may appear to other countries that the only true way to deter the U.S. is through the classical deterrence model: possess one’s own nuclear weapons.  Loose ambiguity undermines, as Dr. Lewis points out, the important “promise to refrain” that solidifies effective global deterrence.  Such a trend is increasingly worrisome as the WMD umbrella genre constantly seems like it is in the process of expansion.  NBC (Nuclear, Biological, Chemical) became CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear).  And then, recently, CBRN became CBRNE to include high-yield explosives.  As of January 8, 2008, U.S.C. federal law considers as a weapon of mass destruction “any destructive device as defined in section 921 of Title 18,” where “destructive devices” are defined as:

(A) any explosive, incendiary, or poison gas—

(i) bomb,

(ii) grenade,

(iii) rocket having a propellant charge of more than four ounces,

(iv) missile having an explosive or incendiary charge of more than one-quarter ounce,

(v) mine, or

(vi) device similar to any of the devices described in the preceding clauses;

See here and here

Now, this does not mean that the U.S. will respond to use of grenades in an international war with nuclear retaliation.  However, the conflation of terms seems unwarranted.  Such ambiguity, as expressed by loosening WMD definitions and exceptions to negative security assurances, could certainly be a reasonable cause of anxiety, concern, and fear on the part of other nations.  Some would argue that it is a good thing for your adversaries to fear you.  However, in an age of nuclear proliferation and market-technological globalization, fear is not productive.  Official inclusion of and constant lip service to an ambiguous belligerent reprisal privilege aids in making other nations paranoid about U.S. influence in the world—or at least gives other nations a useful excuse to pretend to feel paranoid—and such paranoia carries the possibility of resulting in the pursuit of nuclear weapons, as with North Korea.

It is a basic concept in the most widely accepted tradition of international relations theory, realism, that fear is one of the fundamental causes of conflict.  Leading realist scholar John J. Mearsheimer notes realism’s five foundational assumptions about the international system:

the international system is anarchic

states inherently possess some offensive military capability

states can never be certain about the intentions of other states

the most basic motive driving states is survival

states think strategically about how to survive in the international system (Mearsheimer, International Security 13 (3), 1994, pg. 10)

Fear results from natural competition between self-driven states and the impossibility of transparency in an anarchic international system.  However, theorists in the school of international liberalism believe there are ways to mitigate, and hypothetically eliminate, these base causes of tension.  In the context of the nonproliferation regime, such mitigation is aided by unequivocal negative security assurances.  Such a policy is certainly less morally ambiguous.  And to those who believe that such a change may display a softness that threatens national security, remember Dr. Lewis’s words: “After all, nuclear weapons exist — a physical manifestation of the option to use them that seems rather more impressive than a paper pledge not to.”  No nation on earth would forget that.

Back to Deterrence 101: Is the Ambiguous Negative Security Assurance Credible?

According to the very basics of the theory, in order for nuclear deterrence to be successful, the following two criteria must be met: 1) the threat must be sufficiently unacceptable and 2) the threat must be sufficiently credible.  Given the proper technical capacities, the first criterion is generally easier to meet, as it simply requires a threat.  The second criterion is trickier, as it is tied to the unverifiable realm of motives.  Ambiguity in U.S. negative security assurances is designed as an element of nuclear deterrence.  However, it is unclear that such ambiguity, as mere rhetoric, is even effective.  In fact, it is likely to be counterproductive.

Although the U.S. position is one of ‘reserving a right,’ by emphasizing belligerent reprisal in official stances and in public declarations, the U.S. seems to be committing itself to employment of this right if circumstances warrant it according to the policy.  This is the result of deterrence criterion number two: the threat must be sufficiently credible.  In order for the threat of belligerent reprisal in the wake of ‘WMD’ use to be credible, the U.S. would need to display its credibility.  That is, the U.S. would be committed on the principles of deterrence—in order to maintain and solidify the effectiveness of deterrence—to employ nuclear retaliation.  Otherwise, the credibility of that specific deterrent would be lost, and it would no longer be an effective deterrent.  Such a situation would not only undermine the credibility of the ambiguous belligerent reprisal deterrent, but it could also undermine the credibility of overall U.S. deterrence policy, or even the credibility of the U.S. word.  Essentially, the dangers of our currently ambiguous Negative Security Assurance policy outweigh its benefits.  It is unclear that its benefit, as a deterrent, is at all effective.

A Dangerous Paradox

This situation is similar to the “central paradox of assured destruction” described by Freeman Dyson in Weapons and Hope:

The great conceptual advantage of the assured destruction strategy is that it does not require us to believe in the feasibility of actually fighting a nuclear war.  The purpose of assured destruction weapons is only to prevent nuclear war, not to fight it.  The weapons achieve their purpose by not being used.  The assured destruction strategist is not supposed to worry about what happens if the weapons are used.  When we threaten to use weapons of assured destruction, our threat depends for its credibility upon our not worrying about the consequences.  This is the central paradox of assured destruction.  Its success requires us to blind ourselves deliberately to the consequences of its failure. (Freeman Dyson, Weapons and Hope, pg. 247)

To be fair, the belligerent reprisal clause in the U.S. Negative Security Assurance policy is not a function of assured destruction; it does not pledge to retaliate unconditionally.  Moreover, retaliation would more likely come in the form of tactical nuclear weapons rather than an apocalyptic rain of strategic nuclear weapons.  However, as explained, the openness to retaliate is meant to deter the use of WMD aggression, and if WMD aggression were perpetrated, deterrence would only be effective if that retaliation took place.  Therefore, the paradox of our ambiguity stance is this: for true adherents of deterrence, who are many in top policy and military positions, openness to retaliate is in fact the commitment to retaliate.  The supposed “ambiguity” of the stance is another situation that “requires us to blind ourselves deliberately to the consequences of its failure.”

International nuclear policy-makers must better heed developmental politics.  By developmental politics, I refer to the economic disparity between the developed and the developing nations, and the political tensions between these two sides resulting from that disparity.  This may also be referred to as the politics of inequality or the North-South Divide, a rough geoeconomic approximation.  The North-South Divide is alive and kicking in international nuclear issues.

Developmental political tensions have been a centerpiece of the nuclear nonproliferation regime since the establishment of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970.  The terms of the NPT are characterized by an internal contradiction: five nations (the initial nuclear weapon states) are given legal authorization to possess nuclear weapons while every other nation must forswear them.  In return, the NPT (Article IV) authorizes every nation to have access to civilian nuclear energy, a policy partially aimed at promoting equality amongst nations and assuaging international unease over the NPT’s internal contradiction.  However, Article IV of the NPT did not successfully eliminate international tensions over nuclear development and privileges, particularly because the five nuclear weapon states have arguably not been faithful their duties according to Article VI, which obliges them to move toward nuclear disarmament.

These tensions have resulted in a rough “North-South Divide”, in which the nuclear policies of the developed nation bloc (mostly northern) have been seen as hypocritical and inequitable by the developing nation bloc (mostly southern).  Even though the majority of developed/northern nations do not possess nuclear weapons themselves, their economic and political ties to the nuclear weapon states have afforded them with nuclear deterrence umbrellas (through NATO and other alliances) and civilian nuclear energy programs, thus resulting in a general solidification of a northern nuclear bloc.  China may be considered as an outlier, as it is one of the legitimate nuclear weapon states but often aligns itself with developing nation policies.

The concept of the North-South Divide is featured in social science academic discourses as a response to Modernization Theory

The North-South Divide political tensions have obstructed cooperation and consensus-building in international nuclear issues, but this trend has largely been neglected.  When dealing with international nuclear arms control issues, policy- and law-makers obsess over technocratic approaches and high politics.  Great time and energy has gone into producing comprehensive verification plans, technical fixes, and complex carrot-and-stick approaches.  These things are undoubtedly vital to effective mitigation of nuclear proliferation threats.  In fact, nuclear issues should be considered fundamentally within the realm of high politics as these issues deal with the most destructive force controlled by man.  However, nuclear issues and solutions to these issues are not limited to high politics and technocratic reasoning.  In focusing on these ‘expert’ perspectives, the perspectives that traditionally claim ascendancy in the bureaucratic hierarchy, policy-makers have not been sufficiently cognizant of the North-South Divide.

The Divide Comes into the Limelight

Yukiya Amano

However, the recent election of a new Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Yukiya Amano of Japan, has brought the North-South Divide to the forefront, possibly for the long-run.  Amano’s election on July 1^st came after an extended deadlock, during which Amano competed with South African candidate Abdul Minty.  The two had been contending for the position since an election in March, in which Amano led but could not procure the mandatory two-thirds majority.  Of the 35 member nations represented on the IAEA’s Board of Governors, the developed nations overwhelmingly supported Amano, representing industrialized Japan.  The developing nations mostly supported Minty, who had run for the position on a platform of moderate activism, aimed at challenging the nuclear weapon states on disarmament issues.  Minty’s vision more closely resembled that of departing Director General Mohamed ElBaradei of Egypt, and Amano’s assumption of the position appeared to the developed nations as an agreeable departure from ElBaradei’s own activism.

As several news sources pointed out, the deadlock and close victory of Amano revealed the continuing North-South Divide.  United Press International explained here:

Poor Asian and African nations regard him as too aligned with rich nations. Some European nations believe he isn’t the inclusive candidate that they would like.

And Associated Press writer George Jahn pointed out here:

Without publicly saying so, the U.S. and its allies had made clear before Tuesday’s voting that they favored Amano because they saw him as someone who would manage the IAEA without thrusting himself into the political fray.

The Problem, Practically Speaking

The North-South Divide visible within IAEA politics is far more than trivial bureaucratic drama; the divide has serious practical consequences for the nonproliferation regime.  This political tension has plagued the IAEA’s ability to effectively build consensuses required to investigate suspected nuclear weapons programs, such as that of Iran.  As Jahn explains:

The Iranian investigation in particular has been affected by the deep divide between Western nations, including the United States, and developing countries that accuse the West of being indifferent to the problems of poorer countries.

The industrialized nations have formed robust opposition to the Iranian nuclear development program, claiming that it is ultimately geared towards the production of nuclear weapons.  In contrast, many (perhaps a majority of) developing nations uphold on principle Iran’s claim to the right to its uranium enrichment program for energy purposes, a claim that is tied to Article IV of the NPT.  Despite any of their own fears of Iran’s potential weaponization in the future, developing nations have a stronger affinity for supporting nuclear energy rights than for opposing potential nuclear threats, thereby partially undermining the efforts of the U.S. and its allies to prevent nuclear proliferation in Iran.  This is a direct result of the North-South Divide.  And Iran has been completely aware of this vulnerability in the nonproliferation regime, realizing that the developing world would either believe or feel ethically obliged to support claims that Western opposition to its nuclear program are simply attempts to thwart its development.

Mohamed ElBaradei

It is impossible to determine definitively, but the evidence is quite convincing that Iran is indeed pursuing nuclear weapons capability.  From a practical standpoint, the North-South Divide has provided Iran with a useful political tool to continue its program without serious and unequivocal global opposition.  Let us remember that not everyone, and not every influential political official in the world, has come to the conclusion that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons capability.  One prime example is Mohamed ElBaradei, who has occupied perhaps the most authoritatively important global political role in nuclear affairs.  Diplomacy and foreign relations often seem like a game, where probing, stalling, brinksmanship, rhetoric, and symbolism come into play.  With the exception of the closest of allies, frank discussions between countries are not always common.  In the pursuit of suspicious or dubious goals, any excuse helps.  Iran has capitalized on a prime excuse for pursuing its nuclear program, and for wanting to do so without any Western intervention.  Even with adamant opposition of the part of the U.S. and its allies, such an excuse gives Iran just enough persuasive capital in the eyes of other countries and just enough pause to the U.S. to allow for Iran’s nuclear activities to continue unchallenged.

Whom to Blame?

To this question, many would answer: Mohamed ElBaradei.  After all, it has been on his 12-year watch that Iran, North Korea, and perhaps Syria have defied the nonproliferation regime.  In fact, former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice placed great blame for Iran’s activities on the IAEA and its leadership under ElBaradei.  She accused ElBaradei of “muddying the message” to Iran and stated that “The IAEA is not in the business of diplomacy. The IAEA is a technical agency…”  See here.  But Rice’s perspective perhaps does not capture the full spectrum of understandings.  And she seems incorrect in saying that the IAEA is not in the business of diplomacy, because political tensions within the agency have resulted in diplomatic motions, even despite the IAEA’s technical mission.  Whether anyone likes it or not, the IAEA’s technical business cannot be divorced from political maneuvers that result from entrenched ideological conflicts.

This does not excuse ElBaradei.  Perhaps he too should have tempered his principles of global equality with the legitimate worries over emerging nuclear threats.  However, it is possible that the U.S. and its allies can do more as well.

Perhaps the IAEA should not be in the business of diplomacy, as this is the function of individual nations.  And if this is the case, then individual nations must pursue more effective diplomacy.  The developing nations must be more sensitive to the North-South Divide and understand its intricacies.  If the developing nations made it apparent that they were more sensitive to these inequality issues, the results would be significant: the IAEA would find the solidarity required for being an effective nuclear watchdog, countries like Iran would be less capable of claiming legitimacy for its own nuclear program, safeguarded nuclear partnerships would be easier to facilitate, and the nonproliferation regime would become stronger in general.  There are many things that could be done to express this sensitivity, within the nuclear realm and beyond.  The nuclear North-South Divide is part of an overarching North-South Divide, a gap that nations across the world are attempting to close through international development and investment activities.  The developing nations should tie this movement into nuclear issues and better understand how the two are connected.  Rhetorical and diplomatic confidence-building measures could greatly contribute in many ways.  And notably, the nuclear weapons states must make more concerted efforts to display their desire to uphold Article VI of the NPT.

Could Amano Lead the Way?

Despite appearing in the developing world as a sort of icon of nuclear inequality, Yukiya Amano has expressed his understanding of this political tension and his desire to alleviate it.  At a conference shortly following his election, Amano told reporters here:

As a national from Japan, I will do my utmost to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. To do that, the solidarity of all the member states, countries of the north, from the south, from east and west, is absolutely necessary.

Amano has also called for a wider understanding of the IAEA not only as a nuclear watchdog but also as a key facilitator of peaceful nuclear energy use.  He explained that new perceptions of the IAEA as a “dual objective organization” would be “helpful in strengthening confidence in the agency,” thereby identifying the encumbering political divide in the IAEA as tied to nuclear energy access.

It is unclear at this early stage whether Amano, who has been described as more of a technocrat than a diplomat, is simply paying lip service to this political issue or if he truly does plan to incorporate it into his leadership vision.  Much of his support has come from the belief that Amano may be able to “depoliticize” the IAEA in the wake of ElBaradei’s leadership.  However, assuming that his words are genuine, it seems that Amano may turn out to be another politically involved IAEA head, though perhaps with more effective diplomatic tempering than ElBaradei.  Reuters quotes Mark Fitzpatrick of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London here:

Given the nuclear challenges facing the world and the divisions that have deepened between the ‘haves and have nots’, it’s very important for the IAEA to have a leader who can bridge the differences and bolster its reputation for technical competence and political independence.

Amano may, in fact, be such a leader.

Concluding Remarks

The developing nations must be directly engaged by the developed nations.  They need to be assured that their inequality in terms of access to nuclear power will be appropriately resolved.  They need to be assured that the developed nations understand, empathize, or regret their inequality.  They must not feel neglected or disrespected.  The politics of inequality reaps international envy and bitterness.  This, combined with nuclear technology and international market systems that are impossible to completely monitor, could spell a proliferation nightmare.

With the coming of 20^th-century globalization, humanity has learned quite viscerally that the happenings on one side of the planet can directly affect the other side.  In order to make the nonproliferation regime work, it must work globally.  And in order to make it work globally, the entire globe must work cooperatively, rather than having the developed nations exclusively dictate the terms.  Let us hope that the NPT does not fall apart and that the world does not lose confidence in the nonproliferation regime.  Engaging the politics of inequality, in addition to technocratic fixes and diplomatic pressures, is crucial to seeing that this does not happen.